Filed: Jul. 16, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4105 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHAVON V. COLLINS, a/k/a Bang, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4106 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHAVON V. COLLINS, a/k/a Bang, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (2:12-cr-00102-1; 2:07-cr-00198-1) Submitted: July 10, 2
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4105 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHAVON V. COLLINS, a/k/a Bang, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4106 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHAVON V. COLLINS, a/k/a Bang, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (2:12-cr-00102-1; 2:07-cr-00198-1) Submitted: July 10, 20..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4105
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAVON V. COLLINS, a/k/a Bang,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4106
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAVON V. COLLINS, a/k/a Bang,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. David A. Faber,
Senior District Judge. (2:12-cr-00102-1; 2:07-cr-00198-1)
Submitted: July 10, 2014 Decided: July 16, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.
Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R.
Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, John J. Frail,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Shavon V. Collins
appeals his 84-month prison sentence after pleading guilty to
possession of a firearm and ammunition subsequent to a felony
conviction, and his consecutive 24-month prison sentence imposed
by the district court in its judgment revoking his supervised
release on a prior felony conviction. On appeal, he contends
that both sentences are unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. McManus, 734
F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States,
552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). We first consider whether the district
court committed a significant procedural error, such as
improperly calculating the Guidelines range or inadequately
explaining the sentence imposed. United States v. Allmendinger,
706 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2747
(2013). If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then
consider whether it is substantively reasonable, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances.
Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. We presume that a sentence within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Susi,
674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
In sentencing, the district court must first correctly
calculate the defendant’s Guidelines range. Allmendinger, 706
3
F.3d at 340. The court is next required to give the parties an
opportunity to argue for what they believe is an appropriate
sentence, and the court must consider those arguments in light
of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
Id.
When imposing a sentence, the court must make and place on the
record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case. United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328,
330 (4th Cir. 2009). While a court must consider the statutory
factors and explain its sentence, it need not explicitly
reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record.
United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
The court “should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate
court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the statutory maximum and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
Id. at 438. In
this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United States
v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find
4
the sentence unreasonable must we decide whether it is plainly
so. Id. at 657; see also United States v. Bennett,
698 F.3d
194, 200 (4th Cir. 2012) (if sentence unreasonable under Gall,
552 U.S. 38, then we decide whether it is plainly so). While a
district court must explain its sentence, the court “need not be
as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as
it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United
States v. Thompson,
595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). In exercising such
discretion the court “is guided by the Chapter Seven policy
statements in the federal Guidelines manual, as well as the
statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18
U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).”
Id. at 641. “Chapter Seven
instructs that, in fashioning a revocation sentence, ‘the court
should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while
taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.’”
Id. (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt.
A(3)(b) (2012)). It also instructs that a revocation sentence
“shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of
imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the
sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct
5
that is the basis of the revocation.” USSG § 7B1.3(g). We
presume that a sentence within the Chapter Seven policy
statement range is reasonable. Webb, 738 F.3d at 642.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that both
sentences are reasonable. On appeal, Collins contends that his
84-month prison sentence is greater than necessary to comply
with the purposes of § 3553(a), and it gives insufficient weight
to his cooperation with the Government. He further contends his
consecutive 24-month prison sentence on revocation of his prior
supervised release is unduly punitive and plainly unreasonable
in light of the purposes of supervised release. We disagree.
While Collins was on supervised release for his prior
felony conviction, he shot a man three times, and the man
sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. Collins
also committed other violations of his supervised release. He
was convicted in state court of malicious wounding, and he was
sentenced to two to ten years in prison. On the federal firearm
conviction, the probation officer determined that his Guidelines
range was 110 to 120 months. The district court sustained
Collins’s objection to application of the attempted murder
cross-reference pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§§ 2A2.1, 2K2.1(c) (2013), and determined that his Guidelines
range was 70 to 87 months. The court imposed the 84-month
sentence to run concurrently with the state sentence and
6
recommended that he receive credit for time served on that
sentence. The court explained its sentence was sufficient but
not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of
§ 3553(a), and specifically to punish Collins for his serious
offense and behavior, to instill within him and the public
proper respect for the law, and to provide for a proper period
of incapacitation from his further crimes. While Collins argued
for a sentence of 70 months or lower, the court rejected that
request and selected 84 months in view of his “significant
criminal history and the nature of that criminal history and the
fact that it’s extended over a long period of time”; but the
court did sentence him “slightly below the top of the Guidelines
in an effort to give him some credit for his cooperation.” We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
On the revocation of supervised release, the district
court determined that Collins’s Chapter Seven policy statement
range was 18 to 24 months, and his statutory maximum was three
years. The court explained its consecutive 24-month sentence
was “an appropriate sanction to the defendant’s breach of trust,
taking into account the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant, including
his lengthy criminal history and the number and seriousness of
the violations of supervised release”; and it was necessary to
provide adequate deterrence “to similar conduct by others and to
7
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” We
conclude that the revocation sentence is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
8
