Filed: Sep. 11, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4695 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. PHILLIP RADFORD POTTER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-55) Submitted: August 26, 2014 Decided: September 11, 2014 Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opini
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4695 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. PHILLIP RADFORD POTTER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-55) Submitted: August 26, 2014 Decided: September 11, 2014 Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinio..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4695
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PHILLIP RADFORD POTTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:13-cr-00010-JPJ-PMS-55)
Submitted: August 26, 2014 Decided: September 11, 2014
Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph W. Rasnic, Jonesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy
J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Phillip Radford Potter of five counts
of passing false and fictitious checks with the intent to
defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2) (2012), and
conspiracy to pass false and fictitious checks with the intent
to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). On appeal,
Potter challenges his conviction, arguing that the Government
did not meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he had the intent to defraud. We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Strayhorn,
743 F.3d 917, 921 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2689
(2014). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the
government.
Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jaensch,
665 F.3d 83, 93
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
The test is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Madrigal-Valadez,
561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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We consider “the complete picture” created by the
evidence, United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc), including both circumstantial and direct
evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from such evidence
in the government’s favor. United States v. Harvey,
532 F.3d
326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). If the evidence supports different
interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to
believe, and we “may not overturn a substantially supported
verdict merely because [we] find[] the verdict unpalatable or
determine[] that another, reasonable verdict would be
preferable.”
Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862. Rather, “[a] defendant
bringing a sufficiency challenge must overcome a heavy burden,
and reversal for insufficiency must be confined to cases where
the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Engle,
676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
To sustain convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and
§ 514(a)(2), the government must prove, among other elements,
that the defendant had the intent to defraud when cashing the
false or fictitious instrument. See 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)
(“Whoever, with the intent to defraud . . . .”); Ingram v.
United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (“Conspiracy to commit a
particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the
degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense
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itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like other facts,
“[f]raudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.”
United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, under the doctrine of willful blindness, knowledge may
be inferred where a defendant deliberately avoids enlightenment.
United States v. Campbell,
977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).
Here, although there was no direct evidence of
Potter’s intent to defraud, we conclude that the jury could have
determined that the circumstances surrounding the check-cashing
scheme were suspicious enough to alert Potter to the fraudulent
nature of the scheme. Moreover, the evidence suggests that
Potter passed up opportunities to confirm that the checks were
legitimate, even after he expressed his concern that the scheme
was illegal. Thus, the jury could have concluded that Potter
“subjectively believe[d] that there [was] a high probability
that” the checks were invalid and that he took “deliberate
actions to avoid learning” that they were in fact invalid.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070
(2011).
Accordingly, we conclude that the Government met its
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Potter had the
intent to defraud, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
4
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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