Filed: Oct. 01, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4923 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. SHAWNATHON JETER, a/k/a Shawn, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (7:07-cr-00711-MGL-24) Submitted: September 11, 2014 Decided: October 1, 2014 Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lora Blanchard, Ass
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4923 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. SHAWNATHON JETER, a/k/a Shawn, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (7:07-cr-00711-MGL-24) Submitted: September 11, 2014 Decided: October 1, 2014 Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lora Blanchard, Assi..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4923
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SHAWNATHON JETER, a/k/a Shawn,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge.
(7:07-cr-00711-MGL-24)
Submitted: September 11, 2014 Decided: October 1, 2014
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora Blanchard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, E. Jean Howard, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shawnathon Jeter appeals from his twenty-four month
sentence imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised
release. On appeal, Jeter challenges the procedural
reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district
court’s explanation was insufficient. * We affirm.
In examining a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, we “take[] a more deferential appellate
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We will affirm a revocation sentence
that falls within the statutory maximum, unless we find the
sentence to be “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). In reviewing a revocation
sentence, we must first determine “whether the sentence is
unreasonable,” using the same general analysis employed to
review original sentences.
Id. at 438. Only if we find a
sentence to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable will
we determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so.
Id. at 439.
*
Jeter’s counsel originally filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). However, after our
independent review of the record, we ordered counsel to file a
merits brief.
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A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors and the policy statements contained in
Chapter Seven of the Guidelines. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Chapter Seven instructs that, in fashioning a revocation
sentence, “the court should sanction primarily the defendant's
breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree,
the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal
history of the violator.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch.
7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012). The statute governing supervised release
further directs courts to consider factors enumerated in
“section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4),
(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). The
cross-referenced § 3553(a) factors include (1) “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant”; (2) “the need for the sentence imposed . . .
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” “to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant,” and “to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner”; (3) the sentencing range established by
the Guidelines; (4) the pertinent policy statements of the
Sentencing Commission; (5) “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
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have been found guilty of similar conduct”; and (6) “the need to
provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582 (2012). Absent from these enumerated factors is §
3553(a)(2)(A), which requires district courts to consider the
need for the imposed sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.” The district court also must
provide an explanation of its chosen sentence, although this
explanation “need not be as detailed or specific” as is required
for an original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
When imposing a revocation sentence, a district court
should avoid punishing a defendant for criminal conduct
supporting the revocation of his supervised release. Crudup,
461 F.3d at 437-38 (holding that, in fashioning supervised
release sentences, Chapter Seven policy statements make clear
that primary goal is not to punish new criminal conduct but
rather to penalize defendant’s failure to comply with
court-ordered terms of supervision); USSG ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b).
However, while a district court may not impose a revocation
sentence based predominately on the seriousness of the
releasee’s violation or the need for the sentence to promote
respect for the law and provide just punishment, mere reference
to such considerations does not render a revocation sentence
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procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to,
and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a)
factors. See United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir.
2013). Moreover, “the court ultimately has broad discretion to
revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum.”
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Because Jeter argued for a sentence below the advisory
Guidelines range, he preserved an argument of procedural error
in failing to address his arguments and provide a proper
explanation of his sentence. See United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010). Preserved claims are reviewed
for abuse of discretion, and if this court finds abuse, reversal
is required unless the error was harmless.
Id. at 576.
Here, the court imposed a twenty-four-month sentence,
finding that such a sentence reflected the “seriousness of the
offense,” promoted respect for the law, provided adequate
punishment, and afforded adequate deterrence. The court also
recognized that Jeter had not met his “short-term goals” the
last time he was released. While the district court’s
discussion was brief, we find that this case is governed by
Webb, where we held that consideration of the omitted § 3553(a)
factors was appropriate, so long as the discussion of those
factors was connected with enumerated factors. As in this case,
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the discussion in Webb was brief and conclusory and was mostly a
listing of the factors, some enumerated and some omitted, that
were considered. However, the court recognized Jeter’s failure
to comply with the conditions of his supervised release; this
was not a complex case; and Jeter was sentenced at the bottom of
his Guidelines range.
Accordingly, we affirm Jeter’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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