Filed: Jan. 02, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4379 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. THADDAEUS SNOW, a/k/a Storm, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4387 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM SYKES, a/k/a Black, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00350-LMB-1; 1:13-cr-00350-LMB-3) Submitted: November 25, 201
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4379 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. THADDAEUS SNOW, a/k/a Storm, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4387 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM SYKES, a/k/a Black, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00350-LMB-1; 1:13-cr-00350-LMB-3) Submitted: November 25, 2014..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4379
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THADDAEUS SNOW, a/k/a Storm,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4387
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM SYKES, a/k/a Black,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00350-LMB-1; 1:13-cr-00350-LMB-3)
Submitted: November 25, 2014 Decided: January 2, 2015
Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Arif, ARIF & ASSOCIATES, PC, Fairfax, Virginia; Alan
H. Yamamoto, LAW OFFICES OF ALAN H. YAMAMOTO, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellants. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Dennis M. Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Thaddaeus Snow and William Sykes
(collectively, “Appellants”) of various crimes relating to their
activities in connection with a street gang known as the Nine
Treys. Appellants raise several challenges to their
convictions. We affirm.
Snow raises four procedural challenges to his
convictions. First, Snow claims that the district court erred
by failing to order a mistrial after several Government
witnesses allegedly violated its sequestration order.
Sequestration orders enforce Fed. R. Evid. 615, which “requires
that witnesses not discuss the case among themselves or anyone
else, other than the counsel for the parties.” United States v.
Rhynes, 218 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (plurality
op.) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]
trial court may employ one of three remedies when a
sequestration order has been violated: sanction of the witness;
instructions to the jury that they may consider the violation
toward the issue of credibility; or exclusion of the witness’
testimony.” United States v. Cropp,
127 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir.
1997); see United States v. Smith,
441 F.3d 254, 263 (4th Cir.
2006) (same). Because Snow did not raise this issue below, this
court reviews the district court’s decision for plain error.
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993). Although
3
there is evidence that several witnesses had the opportunity to
violate the sequestration order, Snow presents no evidence that
any violations actually occurred other than two statements by
witnesses on cross-examination. These statements do not plainly
indicate that any witnesses discussed the case after the
district court issued its sequestration order or that any
violations that may have occurred were sufficiently severe to
require mistrial. Accordingly, we find that the district court
did not plainly err in declining to order a mistrial sua sponte.
Snow also argues that the district court erred by
allowing the jurors to access unredacted transcripts that
contained references to the fact that Snow had been previously
incarcerated on a misdemeanor charge. The Government asserts
that any error was harmless. We review evidentiary rulings for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321,
351 (4th Cir. 2010). Any errors in such rulings are harmless if
we may “say with fair assurance, after pondering all that
happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole,
that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.”
United States v. Johnson,
617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Government bears the
burden of showing that such errors are harmless. United States
v. Robinson,
460 F.3d 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2006). The evidence
presented at trial included extensive evidence that Snow was
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involved in a wide variety of criminal activity in his role as
leader of the Nine Treys. Against this background, the fact
that Snow had been incarcerated previously on a misdemeanor
charge could not have influenced the jury’s decision.
Accordingly, we find that any error in allowing the jury to
access the unredacted transcripts was harmless.
Snow next argues that the jurors improperly discussed
the case with each other prior to the close of evidence. We
review a district court’s response to such internal
communications for abuse of discretion. See Robinson v. Polk,
438 F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gravely,
840
F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988). Having reviewed the record, we
find that the district court properly addressed this issue at
trial and therefore did not abuse its discretion by declining to
order a new trial on this basis.
Finally, Snow argues that the district court’s
supplemental jury instruction on constructive possession was
erroneous because the examples given by the district court
misleadingly implied that the fact of his leadership position
was all that was required to find that he constructively
possessed the property of his subordinates. We “review de novo
a claim that a jury instruction did not correctly state the
applicable law.” United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 941
(4th Cir. 2014). The key issue in such review is “whether,
5
taken as a whole, the instruction fairly states the controlling
law.” United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788-89 (4th Cir.
1990). We conclude that any misimpressions that may have been
created by the district court’s examples were rectified by the
court’s express statement that constructive possession requires
“both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise
dominion and control over” the object in question. See United
States v. Scott,
424 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating same
standard). Accordingly, we find that the court’s supplemental
jury instruction, taken as a whole, fairly stated the
controlling law.
Both Snow and Sykes argue that the evidence was
insufficient to support certain of their convictions. We review
de novo the district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29
motion. United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir.
2014), pet. for cert. filed,
83 U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2014) (Nos. 14-378, 14A199). We will sustain the jury’s verdict
“if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United
States,
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see
McFadden, 753 F.3d at 444
(defining substantial evidence). Because we resolve all
conflicting evidence in favor of the Government, the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even if the
witness is an accomplice, a codefendant, or an informant, may be
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sufficient evidence of guilt. United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d
1185, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1997).
Snow challenges his convictions for possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, both in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The Government
can prove the possession element of this offense by establishing
that Snow “exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and
control over” the firearm. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d
267, 282 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, a defendant is liable for his coconspirators’
reasonably foreseeable possession of firearms in furtherance of
the conspiracy. United States v. Min,
704 F.3d 314, 324 n.9
(4th Cir. 2013); see Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640,
646-48 (1946) (stating standard for coconspirator liability).
Having reviewed the record, we find sufficient evidence to
support Snow’s convictions under § 924(c)(1)(A).
Sykes challenges his conviction for conspiracy to
distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Sykes does not challenge the evidence that
the Nine Treys trafficked in such quantities of cocaine base,
but argues that these drugs are not attributable to him. In
determining the applicable statutory range “in a § 846 drug
conspiracy prosecution, the jury must determine that the
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threshold drug quantity was reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant.” United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 569 (4th
Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted). The record includes sufficient
evidence that Sykes could reasonably have foreseen that the Nine
Treys trafficked in 280 grams or more of cocaine base.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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