Filed: Feb. 19, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4466 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LAWRENCE DOE, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:12-cr-00128-MR-DLH-1) Submitted: January 23, 2015 Decided: February 19, 2015 Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eric J. Fos
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4466 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LAWRENCE DOE, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:12-cr-00128-MR-DLH-1) Submitted: January 23, 2015 Decided: February 19, 2015 Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eric J. Fost..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4466
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE DOE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00128-MR-DLH-1)
Submitted: January 23, 2015 Decided: February 19, 2015
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eric J. Foster, LAW OFFICE OF RICK FOSTER, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Richard Lee Edwards, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence Doe, Jr., pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court found that Doe qualified
for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) and
sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Doe appeals, claiming
that he lacked the requisite number of prior convictions to be
sentenced under the ACCA. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
In considering a district court’s determination that a
defendant is an armed career criminal, we review factual
findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. Wardrick,
350 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 2003). Doe
argues that, under Descamps v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2276
(2013), and related cases, the district court erroneously
determined that he had at least three prior convictions for
burglaries committed on occasions different from one another.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4B1.4(a) (2013).
Descamps, however, does not aid Doe. First it was
permissible for the district court to determine that he had the
requisite prior convictions. In this regard, Descamps did not
overrule Almendarez–Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 228–
35 (1998), which held that the fact of a prior conviction that
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may increase a penalty may be found by the district court and
does not need to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Almendarez-Torres opinion remains
authoritative. See United States v. McDowell,
745 F.3d 115, 124
(4th Cir. 2014) (stating that “Almendarez–Torres remains good
law”), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June 16,
2014) (No. 13–10640); United States v. Graham,
711 F.3d 445 (4th
Cir.) (“[W]e are bound by Almendarez–Torres unless and until the
Supreme Court says otherwise.”), cert. denied
134 S. Ct. 449
(2013).
Moreover, our review of indictments and related
documents discloses that Doe had at least three qualifying
convictions that occurred on different occasions and arose out
of separate and distinct criminal episodes. See United States
v. Hobbs,
136 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Letterlough,
63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we
affirm Doe’s sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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