Filed: Mar. 25, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-2056 TROY STEWART, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; WARREN HAYMAN; BENJAMIN WELSH; DALLAS R. EVANS; MARTIN R. RESNIK; T. JOAN ROBINSON; DAVID WILSON, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District Judge. (8:11-cv-03605-DKC) Submitted: February 27, 2015 Decided: March 25, 2015 Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-2056 TROY STEWART, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; WARREN HAYMAN; BENJAMIN WELSH; DALLAS R. EVANS; MARTIN R. RESNIK; T. JOAN ROBINSON; DAVID WILSON, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District Judge. (8:11-cv-03605-DKC) Submitted: February 27, 2015 Decided: March 25, 2015 Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN,..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2056
TROY STEWART,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; WARREN HAYMAN; BENJAMIN WELSH;
DALLAS R. EVANS; MARTIN R. RESNIK; T. JOAN ROBINSON; DAVID
WILSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
Judge. (8:11-cv-03605-DKC)
Submitted: February 27, 2015 Decided: March 25, 2015
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Troy Stewart, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Faulk, Assistant
Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Troy Stewart, a former doctoral candidate at Morgan State
University (MSU), filed a civil action against MSU and MSU
faculty and administrators, including Benjamin Welsh, Warren
Hayman, Dallas Evans, Martin Resnick, T. Joan Robinson, and
David Wilson (collectively, “Defendants”). Stewart alleged
Title VII employment discrimination and retaliation claims,
violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), and breach of contract. At the heart of
Stewart’s claims is his disagreement with feedback and grades he
received for an internship course and two lecture courses taught
by Welsh during the Spring 2010 semester, and his eventual
academic probation, unsuccessful grade appeal, and dismissal
from the doctoral program.
Following the dismissal of several of Stewart’s claims,
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Stewart
responded. The court granted summary judgment as to each of
Stewart’s remaining claims. Stewart now appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On appeal, we limit our review to arguments raised in
Stewart’s brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Additionally,
arguments and allegations not raised in the district court are
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not properly before us. See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285
(4th Cir. 2014).
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v.
Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the
movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any
individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). A plaintiff can establish a
discriminatory discharge claim either by providing direct
evidence of discrimination or by proceeding under the burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co.,
416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005). A
plaintiff provides direct evidence by demonstrating that race
was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s adverse employment
decision. Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640
3
F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must show that (1) he is a
member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action, (3) at the time of the action, he was
performing his job in a manner that met his employer’s
legitimate expectations, and (4) he was terminated under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Adams, 640 F.3d at 558. If the employer provides evidence of a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the employee must
demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretext for
discrimination. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
We have reviewed the record in this case and find no
reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Stewart
failed to meet his burden of establishing a viable claim of
racial discrimination under either method. We therefore affirm
substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. See
also Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir.
2002) (recognizing that subjective beliefs about discrimination
are “insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to any discriminatory conduct on [employer’s] part”).
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Similarly, a plaintiff may prove a Title VII retaliation
claim either by providing direct evidence of retaliation or by
proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Price v.
Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). Under the latter
method, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie retaliation
claim by demonstrating “(1) engagement in a protected activity;
(2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the
protected activity and the employment action.” Coleman v. Md.
Ct. App.,
626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). Protected
opposition activities include both “complaints about suspected
violations” and “staging informal protests and voicing one’s own
opinions in order to bring attention to an employer’s
discriminatory activities.” EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,
424
F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
Reviewing the record in its entirety, we discern no
reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Stewart
failed to establish a viable retaliation claim. See Coleman,
626 F.3d at 190; Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp.,
458 F.3d 332, 338
(4th Cir. 2006).
To succeed on a breach of contract claim under Maryland
law, a plaintiff must establish “that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a contractual obligation and that the defendant
breached that obligation.” Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 776
5
A.2d 645, 651 (Md. 2001). A contract is only binding if it is
supported by consideration — that is, “a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for” in that “it is sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise.” Chernick v. Chernick,
610 A.2d 770, 774 (Md. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We find no error in the court’s conclusion that the Statement of
Agreement between Stewart and Welsh lacked either an obligation
on Welsh (or any other Defendant) or consideration, and
therefore Stewart did not demonstrate the existence of a
contract to support his breach of contract claim.
Turning to Stewart’s § 1983 claims, Stewart argues that the
district court erred in adjudicating his First Amendment and
Equal Protection claims. Even assuming, without deciding, that
Stewart properly alleged in the district court a First Amendment
claim of infringement on his right to free speech, we conclude
such a claim necessarily fails. See Smith v. Gilchrist, 749
F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2014) (addressing requirements for claim
that adverse employment action violates public employee’s free
speech rights); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,
356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir.
2004) (addressing constitutional restrictions on
school-sponsored speech). Additionally, we find no error in the
court’s adjudication of Stewart’s claim related to his grade
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appeal and affirm as to that claim for the reasons stated by the
district court.
Finally, to the extent Stewart alleges that the district
judge exhibited bias against him, we conclude his bald
assertions provide no legitimate basis for questioning the
impartiality of the experienced district court judge. See
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Stewart’s
motion for default judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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