Filed: Jun. 22, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4769 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TRAVIS STRICKLAND, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00378-WO-1; 7:98-cr-00082- BO-14) Submitted: June 18, 2015 Decided: June 22, 2015 Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinio
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4769 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TRAVIS STRICKLAND, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00378-WO-1; 7:98-cr-00082- BO-14) Submitted: June 18, 2015 Decided: June 22, 2015 Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4769
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS STRICKLAND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00378-WO-1; 7:98-cr-00082-
BO-14)
Submitted: June 18, 2015 Decided: June 22, 2015
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Todd Allen Smith, LAW OFFICE OF TODD ALLEN SMITH, Graham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Harry L.
Hobgood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Travis Strickland of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012), and
use of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012). He was sentenced to 248 months’
imprisonment, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release.
The district court subsequently granted Strickland a sentence
reduction to time served. After his release, Strickland’s
probation officer petitioned for revocation of Strickland’s
supervised release. At the revocation hearing, Strickland
admitted the alleged violations. The district court sentenced
him to 9 months of imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of
supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether Strickland’s revocation sentence is
reasonable. Strickland was informed of his right to file a pro
se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Finding no
error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation
sentence that “is within the statutory maximum and is not
‘plainly unreasonable’” will be affirmed on appeal.
Id.
(quoting United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir.
2
2006)). In so evaluating a sentence, we assess it for
reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive
considerations” employed in evaluating an original criminal
sentence. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court has considered the policy statements contained in
Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)
(2012). Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. The district court also must
provide an explanation for its chosen sentence, but the
explanation “need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a post-
conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson,
595 F.3d 544,
547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court states a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if we find a sentence
to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we
determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so.
Id. at 439.
Here, the district court considered the parties’ arguments,
Strickland’s allocution, the statutory maximum sentence upon
revocation, and the relevant statutory factors before sentencing
Strickland at the top of the policy statement range. The
district court further provided an explanation tailored to
3
Strickland, focusing specifically on the nature and
circumstances of his violations of supervised release. We
therefore conclude that Strickland’s sentence is neither
procedurally nor substantively unreasonable and, therefore, is
not plainly so.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Strickland, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Strickland requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Strickland. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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