Filed: Jun. 26, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-2200 TOUGH MUDDER, LLC; PEACEMAKER NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, LLC; GENERAL MILLS, INC.; GENERAL MILLS SALES, INC., Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. MITA SENGUPTA, Individually and as Personal Representative of Avishek Sengupta; BIJON SENGUPTA; PRIYANKA SENGUPTA, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:14-cv-00
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-2200 TOUGH MUDDER, LLC; PEACEMAKER NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, LLC; GENERAL MILLS, INC.; GENERAL MILLS SALES, INC., Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. MITA SENGUPTA, Individually and as Personal Representative of Avishek Sengupta; BIJON SENGUPTA; PRIYANKA SENGUPTA, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:14-cv-000..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2200
TOUGH MUDDER, LLC; PEACEMAKER NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER,
LLC; GENERAL MILLS, INC.; GENERAL MILLS SALES, INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MITA SENGUPTA, Individually and as Personal Representative
of Avishek Sengupta; BIJON SENGUPTA; PRIYANKA SENGUPTA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh,
District Judge. (3:14-cv-00056-GMG)
Submitted: June 23, 2015 Decided: June 26, 2015
Before SHEDD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert N. Kelly, Michele L. Dearing, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC,
Washington, D.C.; Alonzo D. Washington, FLAHERTY SENSABAUGH &
BONASSO, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellants.
Robert P. Fitzsimmons, Clayton J. Fitzsimmons, FITZSIMMONS LAW
FIRM PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia; Robert J. Gilbert, Edward J.
Denn, GILBERT & RENTON LLC, Andover, Massachusetts, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Tough Mudder, LLC, Peacemaker National Training Center,
LLC, General Mills, Inc., and General Mills Sales, Inc.,
(collectively “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s order
dismissing their petition to compel arbitration for lack of
jurisdiction. Appellants filed their petition to compel against
Mita Sengupta, invoking the district court’s diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012), after Sengupta filed a
state court wrongful death action against Appellants, Travis
Pittman, and Airsquid Ventures, Inc. In dismissing the
petition, the district court held that Pittman, who shared
Maryland citizenship with Sengupta, was a necessary and
indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, and that his
joinder would defeat complete diversity. Appellants argue that
the district court erred when it held that Pittman was both a
necessary and indispensable party. Finding no error, we affirm.
The threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law that we review de novo. Home Buyers Warranty
Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014). We review
the district court’s dismissal of an action pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19 for abuse of discretion, and review the district
court’s factual findings underlying the Rule 19 dismissal for
clear error. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid of S.C.,
Inc.,
210 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2000).
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For a court to have jurisdiction over an action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), “diversity must be complete such that the
state of citizenship of each plaintiff must be different from
that of each defendant.” Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 750 F.3d
at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Rule 19, a
district court must dismiss an action brought in diversity
jurisdiction if a nondiverse, nonjoined party is “necessary” and
“indispensable” to the action. Home Buyers Warranty
Corp., 750
F.3d at 433. In deciding whether to dismiss an action, Rule 19
is to be applied “pragmatically, in the context of the substance
of each case, and courts must take into account the possible
prejudice to all parties, including those not before it.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Among other reasons provided in Rule 19, a party is
necessary to an action where “that person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . leave
an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because
of the interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Pittman was a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) because
(1) Pittman, as a defendant seeking to compel arbitration in the
state action, had an interest in the validity of the arbitration
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provision; and (2) Sengupta faced the substantial risk of
inconsistent results regarding the validity of the arbitration
provision, potentially causing her to simultaneously pursue her
claims through arbitration and trial. See Owens-Illinois v.
Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 438-41 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that party
faces “conflicting legal obligations” and is necessary to an
action to compel arbitration where failure to join creates a
“high potential for inconsistent judgments”).
Having found Pittman a necessary party, we must assess, as
did the district court, whether he is an indispensable one.
Four factors control whether a necessary party is indispensable:
(1) “the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties”;
(2) “the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or
avoided”; (3) “whether a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence would be adequate”; and (4) “whether the plaintiff would
have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for
nonjoinder.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see Home Buyers Warranty
Corp., 750 F.3d at 435-36. Because Sengupta faces a substantial
risk of inconsistent obligations, the first and third factors
support the conclusion that Pittman is an indispensable party.
See
Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 441-42 (noting that first and
third factors of indispensable evaluation “address much the same
concerns as the Rule 19(a)[(1)(B)] analysis”). Regarding the
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second factor, Appellants suggested no way to mitigate the
prejudice to Sengupta, and no remedy is apparent. Home Buyers
Warranty Corp., 750 F.3d at 435-36;
Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at
442. Finally, as to the fourth factor, the West Virginia state
courts provide Appellants an adequate forum to seek enforcement
of the arbitration provision and the state courts are better
positioned to apply West Virginia law to determine the validity
of the provision. *
Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 442.
All four factors support the conclusion that Pittman is an
indispensable party. Therefore, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 19
required joining Pittman as a petitioner. As Pittman’s joinder
to the action would defeat complete diversity, the district
court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and
properly dismissed the petition. Home Buyers Warranty Corp.,
750 F.3d at 436;
Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 442.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal
order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
*
Sengupta’s brief to this court notes that the state
circuit court denied Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration,
and that Appellants are seeking appellate review of this denial
in the West Virginia Supreme Court.
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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