Filed: Jun. 29, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4726 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JANSON LAMARK STRAYHORN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:11-cr-00368-CCE-2) Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015 Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Renorda E. Pryor,
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4726 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JANSON LAMARK STRAYHORN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:11-cr-00368-CCE-2) Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015 Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Renorda E. Pryor, ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4726
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JANSON LAMARK STRAYHORN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00368-CCE-2)
Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015
Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Renorda E. Pryor, HERRING LAW CENTER, PLLC, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Graham T. Green, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Janson Lamark Strayhorn was convicted by a jury of
interference with commerce by robbery (Count One), conspiracy to
commit robbery (Count Three), carrying and using a firearm during
and in relation to crimes of violence (Counts Two and Four), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count Five).
Strayhorn appealed his convictions on Counts One-Four. United
States v. Strayhorn,
743 F.3d 917, 921 & n.1, 925 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied,
134 S. Ct. 2689 (2014). Because we concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to support the convictions on Counts One
and Two,
id. at 922-24, “we reverse[d] . . . [those] convictions
. . . , vacate[d] the sentence[,] and remand[ed] [the] case for
resentencing in light of our disposition on [the] motion for
judgment of acquittal.”
Id. at 927. We also affirmed the
convictions on Counts Three and Four,
id., concluding that
substantial evidence supported them.
Id. at 925-26.
On remand, Strayhorn sought a new trial on Counts Three, Four,
and Five, arguing that the evidence from Counts One and Two tainted
his trial on the surviving counts. The district court denied this
request, and Strayhorn appeals. We affirm.
“[I]n the absence of exceptional circumstances, [the mandate
rule] compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a superior
court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly
decided by the appellate court,” as well as issues “foregone on
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appeal or otherwise waived, for example because they were not
raised in the district court.” United States v. Pileggi,
703 F.3d
675, 679 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted). In his original appeal, Strayhorn did not challenge his
conviction on Count Five, and we affirmed his convictions on Counts
Three and Four without authorizing the district court to reconsider
those convictions on remand.
Strayhorn, 743 F.3d at 921 n.1, 926-
27. Strayhorn does not allege any exceptional circumstances that
might exempt his spillover-prejudice claim from the effects of the
mandate rule. See
Pileggi, 703 F.3d at 681-82 (discussing
exceptions to rule). We therefore conclude that the district court
properly denied the request for a new trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the amended judgment entered by the
district court. We also deny Strayhorn’s motions for leave to
file pro se supplemental briefs. See United States v. Penniegraft,
641 F.3d 566, 569 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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