Filed: Jul. 08, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4041 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MELVIN JEROME JETER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (7:11-cr-00053-JMC-6) Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 8, 2015 Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4041 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MELVIN JEROME JETER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (7:11-cr-00053-JMC-6) Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 8, 2015 Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4041
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MELVIN JEROME JETER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (7:11-cr-00053-JMC-6)
Submitted: June 29, 2015 Decided: July 8, 2015
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr., OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Melvin Jerome Jeter appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to eight months
in prison. Jeter’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but raising the issue of whether
Jeter’s sentence was reasonable. Despite notice, Jeter has not
filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
As we recently held in United States v. Padgett, __ F.3d __,
2015 WL 3561289 (4th Cir. 2015), we review a district court’s
ultimate decision to revoke Jeter’s supervised release for abuse
of discretion.
Id. at *1; see United States v. Copley,
978 F.2d
829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). In so doing, we review a district
court’s factual findings underlying a revocation for clear error.
Padgett,
2015 WL 3561289 at *1. Reliance on a clearly erroneous
material fact itself constitutes an abuse of discretion, United
States v. Zayyad,
741 F.3d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 2014), and we will
not disturb a district court’s revocation sentence unless it is
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433,
437 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if a revocation sentence is unreasonable
must we assess whether it is plainly so. United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007).
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Our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion by
the district court. Jeter’s eight-month sentence was imposed at
the bottom of his 8-14 months policy statement range. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2014) (p.s.). We find
no reason to disturb the presumptively reasonable sentence. See
United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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