PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                   No. 95-5458

DWAIN E. MYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                   No. 95-5818

DWAIN E. MYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.
Irene M. Keeley, District Judge.
(CR-94-15)

Argued: March 8, 1996

Decided: August 28, 1996

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Widener wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wilkins and Judge Michael joined.

_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Robert Cameron Stone, Jr., Martinsburg, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Sherry L. Muncy, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Steven M. Askin, ASKIN & ASSOCIATES, Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellant. William D. Wilmoth, United States
Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Whee-
ling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-appellant Dwain E. Myers appeals from his conviction
of offering drug paraphernalia for sale and selling the same in viola-
tion of 21 U.S.C. § 863(a)(1). The only question on appeal is the dis-
trict court's grant of a motion in limine prohibiting him from
introducing evidence of a good faith defense to the charge. Myers
owned a store in Martinsburg, West Virginia called The Headquar-
ters. A search warrant executed January 12, 1994, revealed that some
of his merchandise included onyx pipes and bongs which are defined
as contraband drug paraphernalia by federal law. 1 Myers pleaded
guilty after the district court granted the government's motion in
limine, and now appeals. We affirm.

The effect of the grant of the motion in limine was that it prevented
Myers from offering evidence that "he relied on the advice of others,
including similarly situated businesses, as well as distributors, that the
items he was selling at his business, `The Headquarters,' were not
illegal." Brief, p. 6. The district court excluded this evidence as irrele-
vant based on the objective knowledge requirement announced by the
_________________________________________________________________

1 The Special Agent of the United States Customs Service that investi-
gated Myers' establishment testified that he saw offered for sale bongs,
small marijuana pipes made of metal and onyx, and small metal cocaine
snorters. He purchased a small bong and small onyx marijuana pipe,
items particularly mentioned in § 863(d)(1) and (d)(12).

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Supreme Court in Posters 'N' Things v. United States, 

(1994). Under this standard, while "the Government must estab-
lish that the defendant knew that the items are likely to be used with
illegal drugs, it need not prove specific knowledge that the items are
`drug paraphernalia' within the meaning of the statute." 

.

Myers' argument is negated by Posters. There, the Supreme Court
considered 21 U.S.C. § 857, which Congress repealed and replaced
with 21 U.S.C. § 863. 

n.5. The two pro-
visions are identical in all respects relevant to this appeal.2 Section
863(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person "to sell or offer for sale
drug paraphernalia." Section 863(d) defines drug paraphernalia:

          The term "drug paraphernalia" means any equipment
          product or material of any kind which is primarily intended
          or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, con-
          verting, concealing, producing, processing, preparing,
          injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into
          the human body a controlled substance . . . . It includes
          items primarily intended or designed for use in ingesting,
          inhaling, or otherwise introducing marijuana, cocaine, hash-
          ish, hashish oil, PCP, or amphetamines into the human body
          ....

21 U.S.C. § 863(d). The section continues with a list of items Con-
gress determined to be per se drug paraphernalia which includes
bongs and stone pipes, items purchased from Myers' store. 21 U.S.C.
§ 863(d)(1) & 

. As the district court cor-
rectly recognized, the Supreme Court held that to prove a violation of
§ 863(a) "[i]t is sufficient that the defendant be aware that customers
in general are likely to use the merchandise with drugs." 

. Thus, whether Myers believed he could legally sell drug para-
phernalia is irrelevant and the motion in limine was properly granted.
_________________________________________________________________
2 Both sections contain an identical definition of drug paraphernalia.
Section 863(a) eliminates "transportation in interstate or foreign com-
merce" as an element of the offense. Posters , 62 U.S.L.W. at 4355 & n.5
(comparing statutory text).

                    3
Finally, any argument is without merit that the use of the word
"knowingly" in the indictment binds the government to prove that the
defendant acted "with subjective knowledge of the criminal nature of
his actions." Brief at 16. Whatever the reason for the inclusion of the
word in the indictment, under Posters, the government must only
prove that: "It is sufficient that the defendant be aware that customers
in general are likely to use the merchandise with 

.

The judgment of the district court is accordingly

AFFIRMED.

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