Filed: Dec. 05, 1996
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: FILED: November 8, 1996 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 95-4004 RONALD BERNARD BENNETT, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. O R D E R We have before us a motion to stay the execution of Bennett, which execution has been set for November 21, 1996. The motion was filed November 5, 1996. On October 23, 1996, we entered our order staying the execution of Bennett until the final dis
Summary: FILED: November 8, 1996 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 95-4004 RONALD BERNARD BENNETT, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. O R D E R We have before us a motion to stay the execution of Bennett, which execution has been set for November 21, 1996. The motion was filed November 5, 1996. On October 23, 1996, we entered our order staying the execution of Bennett until the final disp..
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FILED: November 8, 1996
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-4004
RONALD BERNARD BENNETT,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections,
Respondent - Appellee.
O R D E R
We have before us a motion to stay the execution of Bennett,
which execution has been set for November 21, 1996. The motion was
filed November 5, 1996. On October 23, 1996, we entered our order
staying the execution of Bennett until the final disposition of any
timely filed petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States. That stay of execution was vacated by order of the
Supreme Court in Angelone v. Bennett, No. A-303 on November 4,
1996.
Our said order of October 23, 1996, reflected a long-standing
practice in this circuit of treating death penalty cases the same
as other criminal cases with respect to time restrictions on filing
writs of certiorari. That practice had been followed, at least
until Netherland v. Tuggle,
116 S. Ct. 4, (1995), and even
thereafter. But the said decision of the Court in this case
vacating our said order of October 23, 1996 made it plain that the
Court does not approve of our said practice.
The gist of Bennett's present motion is that ". . . Bennett is
requesting only that he be afforded the same time for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari that is afforded to other
litigants in the United State Supreme Court." Petition, p. 1. That
same reason was offered in Bennett's previous petition filed
October 16, 1996, p. 1. That the present motion is without merit
is made plain by the dissenting opinions in Angelone v. Bennett,
No. A-303, to which we have previously referred.
With respect to other merit of the motion for a stay of
execution which was filed October 16, 1996, we are of opinion the
execution date having been set, the only open question is whether
or not there is "'a significant possibility of reversal.'"
Netherland v.
Tuggle, 116 S. Ct. at 5.
The said motion for a stay of execution relies, as grounds for
reversal, on improper argument of the Commonwealth's attorney at
the sentencing phase and the failure of Bennett's attorneys to
object to that argument. In our opinion in this case, however, we
rejected the contention that the argument was constitutionally
impermissible because
it was not sufficiently egregious to render Bennett's
trial fundamentally unfair. First, the evidence of
Bennett's guilt was powerful, and there is little doubt
that the murder of which he was convicted was a
particularly vile one. Next, immediately before the
sentencing argument, the trial court gave the standard
instruction, "What the lawyers say is not evidence. You
heard the evidence. You decide what the evidence is."
[page citation omitted] Thus, we ultimately are
convinced that the Commonwealth's improper arguments--
though clearly such--did not so infect the sentencing
proceedings as to render them constitutionally unfair.
Slip, p. 14.
With respect to the contention that Bennett's attorneys were
incompetent for not objecting to the closing argument, we rejected
that claim also. Bennett's attorneys had intentionally not
objected as a tactical matter. We noted that such is a standard
trial tactic and concluded that the failure to object did not
render them constitutionally ineffective. Slip, p. 19-20.
We adhere to those conclusions and are of opinion that there
is not a significant possibility of reversal in this case.
It is accordingly ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the motion for a
stay of execution shall be, and the same hereby is, denied. *
With the concurrences of Judge Phillips and Judge Motz.
/s/ H. E. Widener, Jr.
For the Court
*
We adopt the reasoning of Judge Widener in the opinion filed
November 7, 1996, in the case of Beaver v. Netherland, No. 95-4003,
as it may concern our consideration of motions for stays of
executions in capital cases. It is also not remiss for us to say
that the attorneys for Bennett would be well advised to file
forthwith in the Supreme Court of the United States their petition
for certiorari, together with any appropriate motions.