Filed: Mar. 04, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4826 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GREGORY LYNN SANDRETH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00031-FPS-JES-1) Submitted: February 19, 2015 Decided: March 4, 2015 Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Pat
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4826 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GREGORY LYNN SANDRETH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr. Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00031-FPS-JES-1) Submitted: February 19, 2015 Decided: March 4, 2015 Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Patr..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4826
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY LYNN SANDRETH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00031-FPS-JES-1)
Submitted: February 19, 2015 Decided: March 4, 2015
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Patricia Valentino Kutsch, KUTSCH LAW OFFICES, Wheeling, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Andrew R. Cogar, Assistant United States
Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Sandreth pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a drug user, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3),
924(a)(2) (2012). The district court sentenced Sandreth to
fifteen months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Sandreth argues that
the court (1) erroneously applied U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2K2.1(b) (2010) and (2) imposed a cruel and unusual
sentence. We affirm.
When analyzing challenges to the application of the
Sentencing Guidelines, we review questions of fact for clear
error and questions of law de novo. United States v. Green,
436
F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2006). We review the district court’s
ultimate sentence, however, for abuse of discretion, while
presuming that a sentence within the properly calculated
Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Go,
517 F.3d
216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). At the
same time, we “lack the authority to review [the] court’s denial
of a downward departure unless the court failed to understand
its authority for doing so.” United States v. Hackley,
662 F.3d
371, 386 (4th Cir. 2011).
If a prohibited firearms offense involves between three and
seven firearms, a district court should increase a defendant’s
offense level by two. USSG § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). The court should
“count only those firearms that were unlawfully sought to be
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obtained, unlawfully possessed, or unlawfully distributed.”
USSG § 2K2.1 n.5. But if the defendant “possessed all . . . [of
the] firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or
collection,” and did not unlawfully use the firearms, his
offense level should be decreased to level six. USSG
§ 2K2.1(b)(2).
Our review of the record reflects that the district court
properly applied § 2K2.1(b). Under § 2K2.1(b)’s plain language,
the enhancement applies. Sandreth “unlawfully possessed” the
heirloom rifle when he did so as a drug user, and not “all” of
his firearms were “solely for lawful sporting purposes or
collection.”
Similarly, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Sandreth a variance.
Sandreth received a presumptively reasonable, within-Guidelines
sentence. Sandreth’s contention that his case falls outside of
§ 2K2.1’s “heartland” simply cannot be squared with the plain
language of the statute.
Moreover, as to Sandreth’s request for a departure, the
district court recognized its authority to depart, but merely
elected not to do so. We thus find no reason for reversal in
the district court’s application of § 2K2.1(b).
Sandreth next argues that his sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment. Because Sandreth did not raise this argument before
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the district court, we review the issue for plain error. See
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). To establish
plain error, Sandreth must show that an error (1) occurred, (2)
was plain, and (3) affected his substantial rights.
Id. We
find no error, plain or otherwise.
The Eighth Amendment bars “cruel and unusual punishments.”
U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “Punishment is deemed cruel and
unusual not only when it is ‘inherently barbaric,’ but also when
it is disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed.”
United States v. Cobler,
748 F.3d 570, 575 (4th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Graham v. Fla.,
560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)).
Sandreth contends the court violated the Eighth Amendment
by allowing thirty-three months to pass between pronouncing and
executing his sentence. The delay occurred while the court
awaited the disposition of United States v. Carter,
669 F.3d 411
(4th Cir. 2012), which potentially could have invalidated his
conviction. Sandreth cites no authority for the proposition
that mere delay in the execution of a sentence may violate the
constitution. To the extent we have addressed this issue in the
death penalty context, we have rejected it. See Turner v. Jabe,
58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J. concurring)
(calling such a claim “a mockery of our system of justice”).
Accordingly, we find no violation.
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We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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