Filed: Dec. 02, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-2115 MADIAGNE DIOP, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: October 28, 2015 Decided: December 2, 2015 Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Thacker joined. ARGUED: Luis Carlos Diaz, LAW OFFICE
Summary: PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-2115 MADIAGNE DIOP, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: October 28, 2015 Decided: December 2, 2015 Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Thacker joined. ARGUED: Luis Carlos Diaz, LAW OFFICES..
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2115
MADIAGNE DIOP,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Argued: October 28, 2015 Decided: December 2, 2015
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge
Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge
Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Luis Carlos Diaz, LAW OFFICES OF JAY S. MARKS, LLC,
Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Aaron David Nelson,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent. ON BRIEF: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Greg D. Mack, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Madiagne Diop challenges here the decision by
the immigration judge and Board of Immigration Appeals to deny
him a continuance or administrative closure of his removal
proceedings so he could receive a mental health evaluation.
Because the immigration judge did not err procedurally or
substantively in assessing Diop’s mental competency, we deny the
petition for review.
I.
A.
Diop is a native of Senegal. He was admitted to the United
States as a temporary visitor under a B-2 visa on October 15,
1997 and granted entry only until April 14, 1998. Diop
overstayed his six-month visa and has resided in the United
States without legal immigration status for the past seventeen
years. On January 14, 2012, Diop was arrested following a
psychotic episode at his workplace, a Bed Bath & Beyond in
Rockville, Maryland. He was indicted on eleven counts, including
assault, sexual assault, and resisting arrest. Based on his
behavior at the time of arrest, Diop was transferred from police
custody to a hospital for a psychological evaluation. He was
diagnosed with psychosis and prescribed antipsychotic medication
before returning to police custody.
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Diop eventually pled guilty to three counts of second-
degree assault. He was sentenced to 120 days for each count. The
court suspended all of his sentences and placed him on probation
for three years. The Department of Homeland Security served Diop
with a Notice to Appear on October 10, 2012. The Notice deemed
Diop removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) as a nonimmigrant
who remained in the United States longer than permitted in
violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
B.
During his removal proceedings, Diop appeared before an
immigration judge (IJ) in Baltimore, Maryland a total of five
times between November 2012 and May 2013. At the November 28,
2012 hearing, the IJ indicated that the court would evaluate
Diop’s mental competency when it reconvened on December 13,
2012. The IJ questioned Diop at that hearing, leading to the
following dialogue:
IJ: And, Mr. Diop, I would like to just ask you a few
questions. Your attorney said that she was about to
communicate with you. Did you feel like you were able to
have a meaningful conversation with her?
Diop: I spoke to her on the phone.
IJ: You did talk to her on the phone? Okay. All right, and
are you having any trouble understanding me today?
Diop: [Indiscernible]
IJ: Okay. Do you have any history of mental health
problems?
Diop: No.
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IJ: No? Okay. And do you understand why you are in these
proceedings?
Diop: Not really.
IJ: Okay. Okay, what do you understand the purpose of these
hearings that you’ve been brought to be?
Diop: Excuse me?
IJ: What do you understand the purpose of these hearings?
Diop: It’s about immigration, right?
IJ: Yes, Okay, this is about immigration. And if you have
anything that you . . . need to tell your attorney about
your Immigration history or Immigration status, do you
think you will be able to communicate with her and tell her
what you need to tell her?
Diop: Sure.
IJ: Okay.
Diop: Sometimes it’s hard. Where I’m at, I have to pay to
use the phone and it costs like $20.
IJ: Okay. Okay, but other than that, once you can get her
on the phone do you feel like you can communicate with her
about your situation?
Diop: Yes.
J.A. 143-45. Based on this exchange, his counsel’s
representations, and the record as a whole, the IJ found Diop
competent to participate in removal proceedings. At the next
hearing on February 7, 2013, Diop admitted all factual
allegations against him and conceded that he was removable.
Diop’s counsel requested another continuance so that she could
ask for prosecutorial discretion. When asked whether Diop would
seek other forms of relief, counsel responded, “at this time . .
. all I’m seeing immediately is that he might be eligible for a
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prosecutorial discretion.” J.A. 155. The IJ granted the
continuance.
On April 23, 2013, Diop moved to either administratively
close or continue proceedings in order to await passage of an
immigration reform bill in Congress. Diop argued that the law
would grant him legal status despite his prior convictions. The
IJ refused to continue the case pending legislation that “has
not been enacted and likely would not be enacted in its current
form.” J.A. 124. She granted Diop voluntary departure, or in the
alternative, ordered his removal.
Diop filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) on June 6, 2013, arguing that the IJ should have
administratively closed or continued the case in order to allow
Diop to receive a psychological evaluation. To contest the IJ’s
finding of competency, Diop put forth mental health records from
immediately after his arrest on January 14, 2012. Diop also
posited that a mental health assessment would have given him the
opportunity to advance, for the first time, a claim for
withholding of removal on account of his mental incompetency.
The BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s determination that
Diop was competent to proceed. The Board noted that Diop
testified to no prior history of mental health problems and had
demonstrated his ability to communicate with counsel. The BIA
discounted the assessment taken directly after Diop’s psychotic
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episode as merely a reflection of his mental state at that
moment and relied instead on his more recent favorable mental
health records. Diop’s withholding claim was rejected because he
had failed to raise it before the IJ. The BIA affirmed the order
of removal, and this petition for review followed.
II.
A.
Petitioner challenges his removal order on a single basis:
that the IJ should have continued or administratively closed the
removal proceedings to allow Diop to receive a mental health
evaluation. He claims that the IJ’s refusal to do so violated
due process. Respondents in removal proceedings are entitled to
procedural due process. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993). To establish a due process violation, the respondent
must prove both “that the defect in the proceeding rendered it
fundamentally unfair” and “that the defect prejudiced the
outcome of the case.” Anim v. Mukasey,
535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th
Cir. 2008).
The IJ denied Diop an independent psychological evaluation
because she deemed him competent to proceed. Competency has long
been considered an issue of fact. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 111 (1995). The IJ’s factual finding of competency is
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard and treated as
conclusive unless the evidence presented “was such that any
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reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” Haoua v. Gonzalez, 472 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir.
2007).
The BIA established in Matter of M-A-M the process for
addressing mental competency in removal proceedings. 25 I&N Dec.
474 (BIA 2011). Inherent in this process is a high degree of
flexibility and discretion for the fact-finder to tailor his
approach to the case at hand. First, the IJ starts with a
presumption of competence. Id. at 477 (citations omitted). If he
finds no indicia of incompetency, the inquiry is at an end.
Id.
(citations omitted). The test for competency utilized by the BIA
has three components: whether the respondent (1) “has a rational
and factual understanding of the nature and object of the
proceedings,” (2) “can consult with the attorney or
representative if there is one,” and (3) “has a reasonable
opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses.”
Id. at 479. In applying this test, the IJ may draw
on a “wide variety of observations and evidence,” including his
perception of the respondent’s behavior and medical records or
psychological assessments.
Id.
Where there are indicia of incompetency, the IJ should
“take measures to determine whether a respondent is competent to
participate in proceedings.”
Id. at 480. Here, the Board notes,
“the approach taken in any particular case will vary based on
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the circumstances.” Id. The Board offers some examples of
measures the IJ could take, such as questioning the respondent
about his state of mind and medical history or, if the matter
remains in doubt, requesting a mental health evaluation.
Id. at
480-81. In a recent decision, the BIA further clarified that
neither party bears the burden of proof at this stage; rather,
the IJ should determine by a preponderance of the evidence
whether the respondent is competent. Matter of J-S-S, 26 I&N
Dec. 679, 683 (BIA 2015); M-A-M, 25 I&N Dec. at 481.
B.
The upshot of the foregoing discussion should be clear. The
BIA does not tie the fact-finder to a list where one unchecked
item could invalidate an otherwise fair removal proceeding. The
Board has avoided requiring IJ’s to ask any particular question,
request any particular evaluation, or adopt any particular
safeguard. It opts instead for an adaptable case-by-case
approach. By contrast, petitioner here is bent on contorting
every “may” into “must,” every issue of fact into a question of
law, every illustrative guide into a binding directive.
Petitioner’s position ignores the Supreme Court’s language:
competency “depends heavily on the trial court’s appraisal of
witness credibility and demeanor.” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111. In
other words, competency is an issue that highlights the
institutional constraints on appellate courts: “Face to face
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with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a
position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded.”
Maggio v. Fulfold, 462 U.S. 111, 118 (1983) (citation omitted).
In removal proceedings specifically, competency turns on a
credibility determination: the IJ must decide whether someone is
honestly failing to understand the proceedings or is instead
putting on an act. E.g., Munoz-Monsalve v. Mukasey,
551 F.3d 1,
7 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that “stumbl[es]” and “glitches” in
respondent’s exchange with the IJ “are more consistent with a
prevaricating petitioner than with a mentally incompetent one”).
Drawing that distinction requires the IJ to scrutinize facial
expressions, eye contact, tone of voice, body language -- all
those little details that a dry transcript cannot hope to
capture.
Ultimately, assessing the competency of individuals subject
to removal comes down to a balance between competing interests.
On the one hand, for someone navigating an unfamiliar legal
system while facing the daunting prospect of deportation,
procedural due process is a much-needed protection. See Rusu v.
United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 296 F.3d 316,
320-22 (4th Cir. 2002). To order the removal of someone unable
to participate meaningfully in his or her removal proceedings
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would make the whole process a charade. 1 On the other hand,
requests for continuances and medical evaluations can quickly
become a strategy of delay, delay, and more delay. Diop, for
instance, appeared in front of the IJ five separate times and
seized upon every conceivable basis to postpone his case. To
string out the proceedings on flimsy grounds risks prolonging
the stay of those who have no lawful basis for remaining in this
country.
C.
There is no question that the IJ in this case struck the
right balance by refusing Diop’s request for a separate mental
health evaluation. Petitioner’s due process argument falters at
the initial stage of the M-A-M analysis: there were no
sufficient indicia of Diop’s incompetency. “Mental competency is
not a static condition”; what matters is respondent’s mental
state at the time of the removal proceedings. M-A-M, 25 I&N Dec.
474 at 480. The only evidence that even comes close to
suggesting incompetency is the above-noted psychological
1In the removal context, for example, courts have required
safeguards to ensure meaningful participation if such
participation is in doubt. M-A-M, 25 I&N Dec. 474 at 481-83
(summarizing cases); accord 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3). Appropriate
safeguards include having the IJ actively aid in developing the
record or allowing a family member or guardian to assist the
respondent. Id. at 483. Because Diop was properly deemed
competent, however, the question of appropriate safeguards is
not one we need address.
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assessment of Diop taken mere days after his arrest. While past
mental history can certainly bear on competency, it is by no
means dispositive. See id. at 479. In this case, Diop denied any
history of mental health troubles, while his counsel had “no
reason to believe” that he suffered from “an ongoing medical
problem.” J.A. 137. In that context, a single snapshot of mental
health concerns taken ten months earlier can hardly represent
Diop’s state of mind when he arrived in immigration court.
Diop tried to prove this very point. In arguing before the
IJ for yet another continuance, he sought to portray his violent
behavior as an aberrant and isolated psychotic outburst brought
on by “lack of sleep.” J.A. 179. The strategy at that time
apparently was to demonstrate that his stable and non-violent
nature warranted a continued stay in the United States. Diop
submitted to the IJ mental health assessments conducted closer
in time to the removal proceedings, all of which indicated he
had been “cooperative with treatment,” found “no psychiatric
concerns” whatsoever, and recommended no further treatment or
medication. J.A. 171-72. By Diop’s own evidence then, he was
competent by the time he appeared before the IJ. Petitioner is
thus caught in a trap of his own design: he claimed a stable
condition before the IJ to stall for more time and incompetency
before the BIA to secure reversal of his removal order. We
11
cannot credit a strategy that uses competency as a delay tactic
rather than a genuine defense.
Erring on the side of caution, the IJ nonetheless took
appropriate measures to assess Diop’s competency by holding a
separate hearing and inquiring specifically about his mental
health and ability to communicate with counsel. Her exchange
with Diop provided ample basis for a finding of competency.
Petitioner voiced no psychological concerns, understood that the
proceedings related to his immigration status, and raised only
one objection, which focused on the cost of making phone calls
to his attorney.
The Supreme Court has cautioned against flyspecking the
IJ’s questions or quibbling with the quality of respondent’s
answers. In determining competency, fact-finders cannot look to
“fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for
further inquiry”; instead they have to rely on a “wide range of
manifestations and subtle nuances.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 180 (1975). The IJ did what she deemed necessary to
ascertain Diop’s competency in full compliance with M-A-M. This
was not a case where the IJ sacrificed due process for
expediency. Far from it. Diop received one continuance after
another -- to prepare his case, to consult with counsel, to
request prosecutorial discretion, to receive a hearing on his
mental competency. There being no defect in these proceedings,
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we need not reach the question of prejudice. 2 The petition for
review is hereby denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED
2 We also decline to consider petitioner’s argument
regarding withholding of removal. The BIA found that Diop failed
to raise his withholding claim before the IJ and failed to
submit the relevant application for relief or show prima facie
eligibility for relief in his appeal to the BIA. The Board did
not err in refusing to remand the case to permit him to apply
for withholding.
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