Filed: Mar. 03, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1548 MARICHMAN BUDHA MAGAR, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Submitted: January 14, 2016 Decided: March 3, 2016 Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1548 MARICHMAN BUDHA MAGAR, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Submitted: January 14, 2016 Decided: March 3, 2016 Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, New York, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant A..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1548
MARICHMAN BUDHA MAGAR,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 14, 2016 Decided: March 3, 2016
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, New York, for Petitioner.
Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Keith I. McManus, Senior Litigation Counsel, Tracie N. Jones,
Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marichman Budha Magar, a native and citizen of Nepal,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration
judge’s (IJ) order denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition for review.
To be eligible for asylum, Magar must show that he has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected
ground if he returns to Nepal. Hui Pan v. Holder,
737 F.3d 921,
927 (4th Cir. 2013). Magar can meet his burden either by
establishing his past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution.
Id. Magar faces a higher burden of proof
to establish entitlement to withholding of removal because he
must show a clear probability of persecution on account of a
protected ground. Djadjou v. Holder,
662 F.3d 265, 272 (4th
Cir. 2011). If Magar fails to prove his eligibility for asylum,
he is also ineligible for withholding of removal.
Id.
The IJ, after “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances, and all relevant factors,” may make an adverse
credibility determination based on the plausibility of the
applicant’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s
written and oral statements, the internal consistency of each
such statement, the consistency of such statements with other
2
evidence of record, or any other relevant factor. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012); Hui
Pan, 737 F.3d at 928. A
credibility determination may rest on any relevant factor, even
one that does not “go[ ] to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “The existence of only a few
such inconsistencies, omissions, or contradictions can be
sufficient” to support an adverse credibility finding.
Djadjou,
662 F.3d at 273-74.
The scope of our review is narrow. Hui
Pan, 737 F.3d at
926. We will affirm so long as the decision “is not manifestly
contrary to law.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A]dministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012). We must affirm a
determination regarding eligibility for asylum or withholding of
removal that is supported by substantial evidence in the record
considered as a whole. INS v. Elias Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992). We will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.”
Id. at 483-84.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
adverse credibility finding, particularly in light of the fact
that Magar gave different accounts of what caused him to leave
Nepal, which is not a minor detail. We also conclude that
3
substantial evidence supports the finding that Magar did not
establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal
through independent evidence. Ilunga v. Holder,
777 F.3d 199,
213 (4th Cir. 2015). Additionally, to the extent Magar
challenges the denial of protection under the CAT, we conclude
that the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
4