Filed: Jan. 11, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4436 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MICHAEL RANKINS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00003-BO-1) Argued: October 28, 2016 Decided: January 11, 2017 Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam op
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4436 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MICHAEL RANKINS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00003-BO-1) Argued: October 28, 2016 Decided: January 11, 2017 Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opi..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4436
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL RANKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Terrence W.
Boyle, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00003-BO-1)
Argued: October 28, 2016 Decided: January 11, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Richard Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIRM, PC, Wilmington,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Michael Rankins was charged with armed bank
robbery and aiding and abetting. Prior to being arraigned,
Rankins attended a hearing regarding a motion he had filed.
During this hearing, the district court noted several times that
Rankins was unlikely to reach a plea bargain in the present case
because he had not done so in other cases. The court stated
that Rankins’s case was “open and shut” and that the trial would
only take “a day or two, then he’ll get life in prison.” J.A.
19–20. The court also detailed the government’s evidence
against Rankins.
Rankins eventually signed a plea agreement and pled guilty
to the charges. Rankins now asks this Court to vacate his
guilty plea, arguing that the district court committed plain
error by involving itself in plea negotiations in violation of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1). We agree that the
court’s comments constitute improper involvement in plea
negotiations and were a plain error, and we therefore vacate
Rankins’s guilty plea.
I.
Rankins was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Eastern
District of North Carolina on March 18, 2014, for one count of
armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting in violation of 18
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U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2. Prior to being arraigned,
Rankins filed a pro se Motion to Appoint New Counsel. The
district court conducted a hearing on this motion on December 5,
2014.
At the beginning of the hearing, there was confusion about
whether Rankins had been arraigned yet; it was eventually
established that he had not. The court then noted that the
government had a strong case, particularly because Rankins’s
accomplice had agreed to testify against him, stating, “He’s
going to nail him and tell everything they did together.” J.A.
19. The court said that it was “an open and shut case,” and
then remarked:
[Rankins has] historically gone to trial every time he
has been arrested. That’s his MO. So he’s probably
not going to break that pattern. So we’ll try him in
Elizabeth City. You got all your people down there,
it will take us a day or two, then he’ll get life in
prison.
J.A. 19–20. The court then denied Rankins’s motion for new
counsel, explaining that Rankins seemed to be in the habit of
alleging problems with his appointed counsel and would likely
reject the next attorney appointed to him as well.
Later in the hearing, the court was trying to decide if it
should arraign Rankins that day or at a later time. Rankins’s
attorney requested that they wait, because he had not yet had a
chance to discuss plea options with Rankins. The court stated,
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“He’s taken every case that he’s ever been charged with in any
court to jury trial, and I don’t think he’s going to alter that,
but I don’t know any better.” J.A. 28. The court went on to
proclaim, “It’s an easy case,” and then commented on the
evidence the government had against Rankins, noting that there
was photographic evidence and that Rankins had been caught near
the scene of the crime with the items taken from the bank. J.A.
30. Ultimately, the court decided to arraign Rankins at a later
date. At the end of the hearing, Rankins stated again that he
did not want his appointed attorney to represent him, and said
to the court, “I don’t want to plead guilty, as you know,
right.” J.A. 34.
An arraignment hearing was held on December 18, 2014. When
asked how he wanted to plead, Rankins stated that he did not
know how he was going to plead. Rankins explained that he and
his attorney disagreed about his defense strategy and that
therefore they had not gone over the plea matters at all.
Rankins stated, “I don’t know what to do.” J.A. 39. He later
added, “the circumstances [are] very –- to me, very unique as to
how should I enter a guilty plea or not.” J.A. 41. The court
responded by saying Rankins was intentionally frustrating the
criminal process and trying to cause delays. The court
eventually entered a plea of not guilty on behalf of Rankins.
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On March 25, 2015, Rankins signed a plea agreement under
which he agreed to plead guilty to the indictment. The same
day, a hearing pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure was conducted, at which the court established
that Rankins was competent and that he understood he was waiving
his trial rights and his rights to appeal. Then, Rankins pled
guilty. On July 10, 2015, Rankins was sentenced to 150 months
in prison. On July 11, 2015, Rankins timely noted this appeal.
II.
Rankins contends that his guilty plea should be vacated due
to improper judicial involvement in plea negotiations. Rankins
raises this issue for the first time on appeal, so it will be
reviewed for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). There are
four elements in plain error analysis.
First, there must be an error or defect . . . .
Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the
error must have affected the appellant’s substantial
rights, which in the ordinary case means he must
demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the
district court proceedings. Fourth and finally, [the
error should only be remedied if it] seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
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A.
Under the first two elements of the plain error analysis,
Rankins must show that the district court committed an error,
and that this error was plain. Rankins claims that the district
court’s comments during his December 5th hearing violated
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1). This rule states,
“An attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or
the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a
plea agreement. The court must not participate in these
discussions.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added). We have
explained that this prohibition serves three important
interests: “[1] it diminishes the possibility of judicial
coercion of a guilty plea; [2] it protects against unfairness
and partiality in the judicial process; and [3] it eliminates
the misleading impression that the judge is an advocate for the
agreement rather than a neutral arbiter.” United States v.
Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Rankins contends that the court committed error because its
comments violated Rule 11(c)(1). We agree. The court clearly
brought up the subject of plea bargaining and the likelihood of
Rankins entering into a plea agreement. The court also
commented on the strength of the government’s evidence, the
speed with which Rankins would be convicted, and the
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inevitability of his receiving a life sentence -- all statements
likely to induce Rankins to enter into a plea agreement. Rule
11(c)(1) prohibits judicial involvement in plea discussions.
Here, the court was extensively involving itself in such
discussions. This violates Rule 11(c)(1), and was an error.
The government contends that Rule 11(c) does not apply in
this situation, because plea negotiations between the government
and Rankins were not ongoing when the court made the comments in
question. This argument is unavailing -- the fact that
government-defendant negotiations were not already ongoing does
not change our analysis. Rule 11(c)(1) states that the
government and a defendant may participate in plea discussions,
and that the court must not. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). If the
court itself initiates plea discussions, it is clearly still
participating in them. The district court’s behavior falls
squarely within the scope of Rule 11(c)(1)’s prohibition.
Under the plain error standard, an error must also be
“plain,” meaning that it “must be clear or obvious, rather than
subject to reasonable dispute.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.
Here, the error is plain. The court openly brought up plea
bargaining and made a variety of harsh comments that would tend
to make Rankins more likely to plead guilty. This is a clear
violation of Rule 11(c)(1).
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B.
Under the third element of the plain error test, Rankins
must show that the error affected his substantial rights,
meaning that he “must show a reasonable probability that, but
for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338,
1343 (2016) (internal quotations marks omitted). To show a
violation of substantial rights by a Rule 11 violation, a
defendant “need only demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that
he would not have pleaded guilty absent the court’s comments.”
United States v. Sanya,
774 F.3d 812, 820 (4th Cir. 2014)
(quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 83
(2004)). In assessing a defendant’s showing, “particular facts
and circumstances matter.” United States v. Davila,
133 S. Ct.
2139, 2149 (2013). With that said, we have previously explained
that “it will be rare that a clear violation of Rule 11’s
prohibition against judicial involvement in plea negotiations
does not affect substantial rights.”
Bradley, 455 F.3d at 463.
The government first argues that because three months
passed between the court’s comments and Rankins’s decision to
plea, there is not a “reasonable probability” that he would not
have pleaded guilty absent the court’s comments. It is true
that, in the past, we have considered the passage of time
between judicial intervention and a defendant’s guilty plea to
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be an important factor in determining whether the above-
described “reasonable probability” exists. Sanya, 774 F.3d at
818. In this case, however, Rankins and his attorney had major
problems with communication up until his decision to plea.
Because this may have contributed to the temporal gap in this
case, we decline to place great weight on the three-month
passage of time.
The government next asserts that Rankins’s own comments
show that he was not swayed by the court. In Sanya, we noted
that the defendant’s “sudden and significant shift in attitude
. . . strongly suggest[ed] that his . . . change of heart was
the product of the district court’s urging.” Id. Here, the
government argues that in the time after the court’s comments,
Rankins made statements that suggest that the comments had not
affected him. At the end of the December 5th hearing, after the
court made the statements in question, Rankins stated that he
did not want to plead guilty. This statement does indicate that
the comments did not immediately change Rankins’s mind.
Then, at the December 14th hearing, Rankins stated that he
did not know how to plead and that his circumstances were “very
unique.” J.A. 41. The government argues that these statements
also show that the court’s comments did not have an effect on
Rankins. However, although these statements do indicate that
Rankins still did not want to plead guilty at the December 14th
9
hearing, they also show that that between December 5th and
December 14th, Rankins changed from definitively wanting to
plead not guilty, to feeling confused and not knowing how to
plead. Thus, these statements can also be interpreted as a sign
that the court’s comments did have an effect on Rankins. At
best, these two statements by Rankins are ambiguous, and
therefore are not particularly probative as to the effect that
the court’s comments had on him.
Moreover, the decisive factor in this case is the
egregiousness of the court’s comments themselves. Common sense
dictates that if the court emphasizes the strength of the
government’s case, and then tells a defendant that his case is
“open and shut” and that he is going to receive life in prison,
these statements are highly likely to cause the defendant to
enter into a plea agreement to avoid trial. Such blatant
commentary regarding the defendant’s guilt and likelihood of
conviction weighs heavily in favor of finding a “reasonable
probability” that the comments here caused Rankins to agree to a
plea.
In sum, Rankins did not want to plead guilty initially, was
then exposed to highly inappropriate commentary by the court
regarding the likelihood of conviction and a life sentence, soon
after expressed confusion about what he should do, and
eventually signed a plea agreement. In our view, this sequence
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of events creates more than a “reasonable probability” that the
court’s statements led Rankins to plead guilty, and the
government’s arguments to the contrary do not convince us
otherwise. The fact that Rankins did not immediately change his
mind does not overcome the obvious impact that these harsh
statements were likely to have on someone in Rankins’s position.
C.
Finally, to prevail under the plain error standard, Rankins
must also show that the error seriously affects “the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This standard is undoubtedly met. When a defendant, before he
has even been arraigned, is told by the court -- the neutral
arbiter -- that he will certainly be convicted and receive life
in prison, the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of
that proceeding are all gravely damaged. See
Bradley, 455 F.3d
at 460-61.
Notwithstanding the court’s apparent frustration with
Rankins’s conduct, these comments are astonishing and wholly
inappropriate. Such behavior is antithetical to the very role
that the court is meant to serve, and does nothing but undermine
“the fairness, integrity [and] public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (internal quotation
11
marks omitted). As a result, the fourth and final prong of the
standard is met.
III.
The district court’s comments constitute plain error that
cannot go uncorrected. Accordingly, the conviction below is
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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