Filed: Jan. 18, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1457 KEYSTONE NORTHEAST, INC., f/k/a Pavers Plus GSP, Inc., assignee of Madawaska Brick and Block Corp., Plaintiff - Appellee, v. KEYSTONE RETAINING WALL SYSTEMS, LLC, f/k/a Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, Inc., a division and wholly owned subsidiary of Contech Construction Products, LLC, f/k/a Contech Construction Products, Inc.; CONTECH CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS, LLC, f/k/a Contech Construction Products, Inc., Defendants - A
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1457 KEYSTONE NORTHEAST, INC., f/k/a Pavers Plus GSP, Inc., assignee of Madawaska Brick and Block Corp., Plaintiff - Appellee, v. KEYSTONE RETAINING WALL SYSTEMS, LLC, f/k/a Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, Inc., a division and wholly owned subsidiary of Contech Construction Products, LLC, f/k/a Contech Construction Products, Inc.; CONTECH CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS, LLC, f/k/a Contech Construction Products, Inc., Defendants - Ap..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1457
KEYSTONE NORTHEAST, INC., f/k/a Pavers Plus GSP, Inc.,
assignee of Madawaska Brick and Block Corp.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEYSTONE RETAINING WALL SYSTEMS, LLC, f/k/a Keystone
Retaining Wall Systems, Inc., a division and wholly owned
subsidiary of Contech Construction Products, LLC, f/k/a
Contech Construction Products, Inc.; CONTECH CONSTRUCTION
PRODUCTS, LLC, f/k/a Contech Construction Products, Inc.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Bruce H. Hendricks, District
Judge. (6:12-cv-00720-BHH)
Argued: October 25, 2016 Decided: January 18, 2017
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz
and Senior Judge Davis joined.
ARGUED: Paul Gregory Joyce, COLUCCI & GALLAHER, P.C., Buffalo,
New York, for Appellants. ON BRIEF: Thomas E. Vanderbloemen,
GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellants.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, LLC (“Keystone Wall
Systems”), the designer of a segmental retaining wall system and
holder of intellectual property related to that design, entered
into a “License Agreement” with Keystone Northeast, Inc., to
manufacture and sell the system in Maine, New Hampshire, and the
eastern part of Massachusetts. The License Agreement imposed a
sales quota on Keystone Northeast, which, if not met, justified
immediate termination of the agreement. Otherwise, the
agreement’s term expired at the end of 2010, subject to year-to-
year renewals thereafter upon the establishment of revised
performance goals.
During the License Agreement’s term, Keystone Wall Systems
and Keystone Northeast entered into transfer agreements, which
provided for Keystone Northeast’s transfer of a portion of the
licensed territories back to Keystone Wall Systems, thereby
enabling Keystone Wall Systems to deal directly with local
manufacturers of the blocks used in the system. The transfer
agreements provided for readjustments of performance goals and
compensation.
When Keystone Northeast allegedly failed to meet its sales
quota for 2008, Keystone Wall Systems terminated the License
Agreement, prompting Keystone Northeast to commence this breach
of contract action for damages.
2
The district court granted Keystone Northeast summary
judgment for damages under the License Agreement for the period
from 2008 to 2010, when the agreement expired. It also awarded
damages to Keystone Northeast under three transfer agreements
for obligations that it found continued after the termination of
the License Agreement. Finally, it ordered specific performance
of the three transfer agreements, requiring Keystone Wall
Systems to pay royalties into the future. From the district
court’s judgment, Keystone Wall Systems filed this appeal.
Keystone Northeast has not appeared in this appeal.
Nonetheless, we affirm the district court’s judgment awarding
Keystone Northeast damages through 2010, but we vacate its award
of damages under the transfer agreements after 2010 and its
order of specific performance, and we remand for the
recalculation of damages.
I
The License Agreement between Keystone Wall Systems and
Keystone Northeast, dated January 2, 1998, gives Keystone
Northeast an exclusive license to manufacture and sell Keystone
Wall System’s designed block system in Maine, New Hampshire, and
the eastern part of Massachusetts. The License Agreement fixed
an annual sales quota based on the square footage of block “face
area” and provided that Keystone Wall Systems could terminate
the contract immediately and without notice if Keystone
3
Northeast failed to meet the quota. If not terminated for
failure to meet the sales quota or for any other enumerated
reason, the Agreement was set to expire at the end of 2010,
“with renewals for successive year terms” under newly negotiated
sales quotas.
Possessing this exclusive right to manufacture and sell the
block system, Keystone Northeast contracted with local
manufacturers to produce the blocks in various portions of its
licensed territory. These manufacturers included Gagne & Son
Concrete Blocks, Inc., in Maine; HiWay Concrete Products Co.,
Inc., in Massachusetts; and Adolf Jandris & Sons, Inc., in
Massachusetts. But, as Keystone Northeast’s relationships with
those three manufacturers soured, Keystone Northeast sought to
transfer back to Keystone Wall Systems portions of its licensed
territory to enable Keystone Wall Systems to deal directly with
the local manufacturers. As a result, Keystone Wall Systems,
Keystone Northeast, and the local manufacturers entered into
transfer agreements, which not only transferred territory back
to Keystone Wall Systems but also adjusted royalties and quotas
and provided for other modifications to the License Agreement.
Keystone Northeast, Keystone Wall Systems, and Gagne
entered into the first transfer agreement in December 1999 (the
“Gagne Transfer Agreement”). This agreement (1) renewed the
License Agreement through December 31, 2003; (2) increased sales
4
quotas that would reach a maximum of 500,000 square feet of
block face area in 2003; (3) provided that Gagne’s sales in
Maine would count toward Keystone Northeast’s annual sales quota
for purposes of Keystone Northeast’s obligations under the
License Agreement; (4) provided that Keystone Northeast had the
right of first refusal to expand its licensed territory into
western Massachusetts before Keystone Wall Systems could accept
a third party offer to acquire that territory; and (5) provided
that the License Agreement otherwise continued in full force and
effect. The agreement also provided that if Keystone Northeast
exercised its right of first refusal, 75,000 square feet would
be added to its sales quota. To exercise its right, Keystone
Northeast was required to match the initial license fee offered
by the third party, up to a maximum of $25,000.
Keystone Wall Systems and Keystone Northeast entered into
two other similar transfer agreements in 2000, transferring back
Keystone Northeast’s licensed territory that was served by
Jandris and HiWay. Those transfer agreements (1) set out
schedules for license-fee sharing between Keystone Northeast and
Keystone Wall Systems; (2) provided that Jandris’ and HiWay’s
sales would count toward Keystone Northeast’s annual sales
quota; (3) added western Massachusetts to Keystone Northeast’s
licensed territory; and (4) otherwise provided for the continued
enforcement of the License Agreement.
5
In September 2005, Keystone Wall Systems and Keystone
Northeast renewed the 1998 License Agreement “through December
31, 2010, with no change in the Performance Requirements” and
without any other amendment.
From 2005 to 2007, Keystone Northeast was credited with
sales of more than 575,000 square feet, meaning that it exceeded
its sales quota even if its quota had increased to 575,000
square feet upon exercise of its right of first refusal for
western Massachusetts. In 2008, however, Keystone Northeast was
credited for only 538,037 square feet, which exceeded its quota
if it had not exercised the right of first refusal (500,000
square feet), but fell short of its quota if it had exercised
the right of first refusal (575,000 square feet).
By letter dated March 17, 2009, Keystone Wall Systems,
taking the position that Keystone Northeast’s sales quota had
increased to 575,000 square feet, notified Keystone Northeast
that it was “terminating the License Agreement . . . effective
December 31, 2008,” because it failed to meet its quota. The
letter stated that, under the Jandris Transfer Agreement,
Keystone Northeast had obtained the rights to production in
western Massachusetts and therefore had in effect exercised its
right of first refusal as specified in the Gagne Transfer
Agreement. After termination, Keystone Wall Systems stopped
paying Keystone Northeast its share of royalties for sales made
6
by Gagne, Jandris, and HiWay, as specified in the three transfer
agreements.
On March 12, 2012, Keystone Northeast commenced this action
against Keystone Wall Systems for breach of contract, based on
Keystone Wall Systems’ termination of the License Agreement and
for related torts. After the completion of discovery, Keystone
Wall Systems filed a motion for summary judgment on all of
Keystone Northeast’s claims, and Keystone Northeast filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract
claim.
By order dated March 16, 2015, the district court entered
partial summary judgment in favor of Keystone Northeast, ruling
that it was entitled to judgment on its breach of contract claim
because Keystone Northeast had not exercised its right of first
refusal under the License Agreement and therefore its quota had
remained at 500,000 square feet, a number that it satisfied.
The court also ruled that Keystone Northeast was entitled to
royalties under the three transfer agreements so long as the
License Agreement was in force. Because Keystone Wall Systems
“would not have automatically been entitled to terminate the
License Agreement at the end of the term in 2010,” the court
concluded that Keystone Northeast could seek “damages accruing
beyond that time.” Finally, the court concluded that the three
transfer agreements “depend[ed] on the License Agreement,” and
7
thus Keystone Northeast “did not have a perpetual right to
receive royalties regardless of its compliance with the License
Agreement.” The court deferred ruling on the amount of damages.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration, and by
order dated March 25, 2015, the district court revised its
rulings. First, it reversed its earlier ruling that Keystone
Wall Systems would not have unilaterally terminated the License
Agreement at the end of its 2010 term, concluding that in fact
it would have. Accordingly, the court concluded that Keystone
Northeast was entitled to damages for the termination of the
License Agreement only from the end of 2008 (the time of the
breach) to the end of 2010, and not for any “damages for the
future value of the license.” Second, the court reversed its
earlier ruling that Keystone Northeast was entitled to royalties
under the transfer agreements only so long as the License
Agreement was in force. It concluded instead that, because
Keystone Wall Systems’ obligation to pay royalties under the
transfer agreements was not dependent on the License Agreement,
Keystone Wall Systems had a continuing obligation beyond 2010 to
pay Keystone Northeast its share of the royalties.
The next day, the court held a hearing on the damage
calculations, and, following the hearing, awarded Keystone
Northeast $725,775 in damages, calculated to the date of the
court’s order, plus $203,140 in prejudgment interest. Because
8
it concluded that the amount of future royalties would be the
product of speculation, it ordered specific performance,
obligating Keystone Wall Systems to continue paying royalties
under the transfer agreements, based on sales in Keystone
Northeast’s territory.
From the district court’s judgment, entered April 1, 2015,
Keystone Wall Systems filed this appeal.
II
Keystone Wall Systems contends first that Keystone
Northeast in fact exercised its right of first refusal to obtain
the western Massachusetts territory and that therefore its quota
under the License Agreement increased from 500,000 square feet
to 575,000 square feet, a figure that Keystone Northeast did not
meet in 2008. It argues that the district court erred in
concluding that it breached the License Agreement and therefore
that we should reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of
Keystone Northeast and grant summary judgment in favor of it.
The question thus presented is whether the record
demonstrates that Keystone Northeast indeed exercised the right
of first refusal, thereby increasing its quota obligation, as
provided in the Gagne Transfer Agreement.
The district court was unable to find sufficient evidence
to justify a reasonable jury’s finding that Keystone Northeast
9
exercised its right of first refusal. Accordingly, it denied
Keystone Wall Systems’ motion for summary judgment and granted
Keystone Northeast’s motion.
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the
district court and conclude that, as a matter of law, Keystone
Northeast did not exercise its right of first refusal and that
therefore Keystone Wall Systems was not justified in terminating
the license agreement based on Keystone Northeast’s failure to
meet its 2008 quota.
The right of first refusal provision in the Gagne Transfer
Agreement provides that Keystone Northeast “shall have a first
right of refusal to obtain the license to the Western
Massachusetts Territory before [Keystone Wall Systems] may
accept a third party offer to acquire that license.” The
provision continues by requiring Northeast, in order to exercise
the right, “to match the initial license fee up to a maximum of
$25,000.00 and an addition of 75,000 square feet to [Keystone
Northeast’s] existing quota.” Under Minnesota law, which
governed the contract, for a right of first refusal to “ripen[]
into an option,” a third party would have to make a bona fide
offer and that offer would have to be communicated to the party
holding the right. Dyrdal v. Golden Nuggets, Inc.,
689 N.W.2d
779, 784 (Minn. 2004).
10
Based on our review of the record, we can find no evidence
either that a third party made a bona fide offer to Keystone
Wall Systems or that Keystone Wall Systems communicated a third-
party offer to Keystone Northeast. Keystone Wall Systems
argues, nonetheless, that circumstantial evidence supports its
position. It maintains that the record shows that Jandris was
interested in acquiring Keystone Wall Systems’ western
Massachusetts territory and that, when the territory was
ultimately granted to Keystone Northeast in the Jandris Transfer
Agreement, Keystone Northeast and Jandris evenly split payment
of the $25,000 license fee. Keystone Wall Systems reasons that
there “would have [been] no reason to offer [Keystone Northeast]
such an arrangement if the parties had not been exercising the
right of first refusal.”
This evidence, however, is not evidence that Jandris or any
other third party actually made an offer or that a third-party
offer was communicated to Keystone Northeast. Indeed, the
direct evidence points in the opposite direction. Keystone
Northeast’s President Dan Albert testified that Keystone
Northeast had not exercised its right of first refusal and that
it had never received notice of a third-party offer. Consistent
with that testimony, Keystone Wall Systems’ former President
Bill Dawson, who actually signed the Gagne and Jandris Transfer
Agreements, testified that he did not recall Keystone Northeast
11
exercising its right of first refusal. To the contrary, he
recalled that Keystone Northeast continued to have a 500,000
square feet quota during the period from 2005 to 2008, which was
indicative of the fact that Keystone Northeast had never
exercised its right of first refusal.
Keystone Wall Systems does point to an affidavit filed in
district court in which Keystone Wall Systems’ Sales Manager
John Schramm stated conclusorily, “As a result of the
Plaintiff’s right of first refusal, the Plaintiff obtained
Superior’s territory in Massachusetts as well as Berkshire
County, making it the sole licensee in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.” This litigation affidavit, however, points to
no evidence to support its bare conclusion. Indeed, Schramm
himself explicitly denied such a conclusion in an e-mail that he
sent during the relevant period. In response to Keystone Wall
Systems’ President’s inquiry whether Keystone Northeast’s quota
had indeed increased by 75,000 square feet, as provided in the
right of first refusal, Schramm responded, “We gave him the west
half of Mass[achusetts] in a later agreement. We had no third
party offer that I am aware of.”
In light of this record, we agree with the district court
that there is no record evidence to support Keystone Wall
Systems’ contention that Keystone Northeast exercised its right
of first refusal over the western Massachusetts territory and
12
thereby increased its quota to 575,000 square feet.
Accordingly, Keystone Wall Systems’ termination of the license
agreement in 2008 constituted a breach of the agreement, for
which Keystone Northeast was entitled to damages.
III
It is uncontroverted that the License Agreement’s term
expired at the end of 2010 and that it was not renewed
thereafter. Nonetheless, the district court ruled that the
three transfer agreements, each of which modified the License
Agreement, constituted separate and independent contracts that
imposed independent and continuing obligations on Keystone Wall
Systems to pay Keystone Northeast royalties beyond 2010.
Accordingly, the court awarded damages for royalties up to the
date of its order and specific performance for a payment of
royalties in the future.
Keystone Wall Systems contends that the district court also
erred in these rulings, as the three transfer agreements were
amendments to the License Agreement, and when the License
Agreement ended, so did the three transfer agreements. We
agree.
In substance, the transfer agreements effected transfers of
portions of territory licensed under the License Agreement.
Therefore, they would be meaningless without the existence of
13
the underlying License Agreement. This is made explicit in the
terms of the various transfer agreements. Each begins with the
recital that the parties “entered a License Agreement dated
January 2, 1998” and that Keystone Northeast and Keystone Wall
Systems “desire to accomplish a transfer” of some of Keystone
Northeast’s rights under that License Agreement. The parties
thus clearly treated the License Agreement as the premise of the
transfer agreements.
Again, after the recitals, each agreement makes clear that
the transfer agreement transferred a portion of Keystone
Northeast’s “right, title and interest in and to the License
Agreement pertaining to the Transferred Territory to [Keystone
Wall Systems] subject to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement. . . . The License Agreement, except to the extent
amended by this Agreement, shall continue in full force and
effect.” (Emphasis added).
And yet again, the transfer agreements provide that, if the
third party license in the transferred territory “is terminated
for any reason,” Keystone Northeast’s “then current License
Agreement” would be amended to include the transferred
territory.
Finally, apart from the language in the transfer
agreements, the parties’ extension of the underlying License
Agreement in 2005, extending it to 2010, indicates that the
14
parties viewed the transfer agreements simply as amendments to
the License Agreement. The renewal agreement refers to “the
License Agreement, as amended by the transfer agreements.”
(Emphasis added).
Because we conclude that the district court erred in
holding that the transfer agreements imposed independent and
continuing obligations beyond the termination of the License
Agreement, we reverse its ruling in that regard. We thus vacate
the award of damages and the order of specific performance and
remand for the recalculation of damages only through the end of
2010.
IV
Finally, Keystone Wall Systems challenges the district
court’s calculation of damages during the 2008 to 2010 period.
Specifically, it claims that the district court incorrectly
assumed that -- after Keystone Wall Systems breached the License
Agreement in 2008 -- Keystone Northeast would meet its quota of
500,000 in both 2009 and 2010, as third-party sales data for
those years suggests that Keystone Northeast would not have met
its quota unless it began manufacturing blocks itself. Keystone
Wall Systems concludes, therefore, that the court should not
have awarded damages based on royalties and interest for 2009
and 2010. We disagree.
15
In estimating lost profit, a court should not assume that a
party is unable to fulfill its end of the bargain. See
Williston on Contracts § 64:10 (4th ed. 2002) (“[T]he fact that
the plaintiff’s damage is uncertain in amount or even that it is
uncertain that substantial damage has been caused should not
deprive the plaintiff of a right to compensation for the loss of
the defendant’s performance that would have given the plaintiff
a chance to make a profit or avoid damage”). The License
Agreement contemplated continued performance until 2010. And
because Keystone Northeast had met its 500,000 square feet quota
each year preceding Keystone Wall System’s purported breach, the
district court did not err in assuming that Keystone Northeast
would continue to meet that quota for the following two years.
* * *
In sum, we agree with the district court that Keystone Wall
Systems breached the License Agreement and that Keystone
Northeast was entitled to damages through 2010. But because we
find that the transfer agreements depended on the continued
existence of the License Agreement, Keystone Wall Systems was
not obligated to make royalty payments beyond 2010 when the
License Agreement’s term ended. We therefore vacate the
district court’s award of damages and its order of specific
16
performance, and we remand for the recalculation of damages,
limiting damages to the period ending December 31, 2010.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
17