Filed: Mar. 28, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-1306 LINDA M. BENNETT, Executrix for the Estate of Elizabeth H. Maynard and on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE’S GROUP LIFE INSURANCE; METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., Senio
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-1306 LINDA M. BENNETT, Executrix for the Estate of Elizabeth H. Maynard and on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE’S GROUP LIFE INSURANCE; METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., Senior..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1306
LINDA M. BENNETT, Executrix for the Estate of Elizabeth H.
Maynard and on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE’S GROUP LIFE INSURANCE;
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:14-cv-00137-JAB-JLW)
Submitted: October 28, 2016 Decided: March 28, 2017
Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with
instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Linda M. Bennett, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth J. Bondurant,
WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Atlanta, Georgia;
Katherine Thompson Lange, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC,
Charlotte, North Carolina; Joan Brodish Childs, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Linda M. Bennett filed a complaint in her capacity as
Executrix of the Estate of Elizabeth H. Maynard and on behalf of
herself and others similarly situated. Bennett appeals the
district court’s orders adopting the recommendations of the
magistrate judge and dismissing her claims against the Office of
Personnel Management (“OPM”) as barred by sovereign immunity and
dismissing as moot her claims against the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company (“MetLife”). 1 We affirm the district court’s
order dismissing OPM, vacate the district court’s order
dismissing as moot the claims against MetLife, and remand this
case for further proceedings.
I.
Before deciding whether the doctrines of sovereign immunity
and mootness apply in this case, we must first determine the
nature of Bennett’s claims. While Bennett’s complaint asserted
various causes of action against Defendants arising out of their
handling of Bennett’s claim for life insurance benefits under
Maynard’s policy, Defendants contend that Bennett may only raise
a claim under the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act
1 Bennett also named the Office of Federal Employee’s Group
Life Insurance (“OFEGLI”) as a defendant. Because OFEGLI is
part of MetLife, we refer to both OFEGLI and MetLife simply as
MetLife. We refer to OPM, OFEGLI, and MetLife, collectively, as
Defendants.
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(“FEGLIA”), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8701 to 8716 (West 2007 & Supp. 2016).
We agree.
FEGLIA provides that
[t]he provisions of any contract under [FEGLIA] which
relate to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits
(including payments with respect to benefits) shall
supersede and preempt any law of any State or
political subdivision thereof, . . . which relates to
group life insurance to the extent that the law . . .
is inconsistent with the contractual provisions.
5 U.S.C.A. § 8709(d)(1). In interpreting a similar preemption
provision in the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012), 2 we have concluded
that ERISA preempts a state law claim when the “claim may fairly
be viewed as an alternative means of recovering benefits
allegedly due under ERISA.” Gresham v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas.
Co., 404 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2005). Similarly, the Second
Circuit has found a claim was not preempted by FEGLIA when it
did “not seek to function as an alternative enforcement
mechanism to obtain benefits under a FEGLIA policy.” Devlin v.
United States,
352 F.3d 525, 544 (2d Cir. 2003).
Applying these principles, although Bennett expressed
dissatisfaction with Defendants’ handling of her claim, all of
her claims related to Maynard’s insurance policy. Absent this
2ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they
. . . relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a).
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policy, Bennett would have no right to enforce any claims of
unfair dealing, bad faith, negligence, or fraud. Moreover,
Bennett expressly sought benefits under the policy and further
contends that MetLife has improperly paid another beneficiary.
Thus, we conclude Bennett’s claims arise solely under FEGLIA.
II.
We review a district court’s dismissal of an action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Pornomo v. United
States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016). “The district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction . . . of a civil
action or claim against the United States founded on [FEGLIA].”
5 U.S.C.A. § 8715. Our sister Courts of Appeals have found that
this provision constitutes a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Lewis v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
301 F.3d
1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Atkins,
225
F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2000); Barnes v. United States,
307 F.2d
655, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
We agree with the magistrate judge and the district court
that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity
with respect to Bennett’s claims against OPM. Those claims
center on Bennett’s allegation that Maynard’s beneficiary forms
were invalid because of undue influence. “Neither FEGLIA nor
the related administrative regulations impose a duty on the
Government to review designation of beneficiary forms for
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fraud.” Argent v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 96 Civ. 2516, 1997
WL 473975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1997). Rather, OPM’s duties
under FEGLIA are limited to “maintain[ing] the designation of
beneficiary forms turned over to its care.”
Atkins, 225 F.3d at
514. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
OPM.
Turning to the district court’s order dismissing MetLife,
“[a] case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer
live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 809 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When a case or controversy
ceases to exist, thereby mooting the litigation, the federal
court no longer possesses jurisdiction to proceed.
Id. “The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement
of the litigation . . . must continue throughout its existence
. . . .” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S.
43, 68 n.22 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court found that MetLife’s offer of
settlement, which included tendering a check for the benefits
Bennett asserted she was due, mooted Bennett’s claims. However,
in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016), the
Supreme Court held that “an unaccepted offer to satisfy the
named plaintiff’s individual claim [is insufficient] to render a
case moot when the complaint seeks relief on behalf of the
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plaintiff and a class of persons similarly situated.” Id. at
666. We note that the magistrate judge did not have the benefit
of Campbell-Ewald when recommending dismissal as moot of the
claims against MetLife. In light of Campbell-Ewald, we conclude
that Bennett’s claims are not moot. However, we conclude that
the district court did not err in dismissing Bennett’s class
claims because Bennett failed to comply with M.D.N.C.R. Civ. P.
23.l(b). See United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey,
792
F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e may affirm a district
court’s ruling on any ground apparent in the record.”).
III.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order adopting
the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing OPM, vacate
the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and dismissing as moot the claims against
MetLife, and remand to the district court for further
proceedings and with instructions to dismiss Bennett’s class
claims with prejudice. By this disposition, we express no view
on the merits of Bennett’s individual claims or whether future
developments may moot Bennett’s claims against MetLife. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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