Filed: Jun. 26, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 18-4807 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER RAY PARRISH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00099-FL-1) Submitted: June 18, 2019 Decided: June 26, 2019 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. G. Alan DuBois, Federal
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 18-4807 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER RAY PARRISH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00099-FL-1) Submitted: June 18, 2019 Decided: June 26, 2019 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. G. Alan DuBois, Federal P..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4807
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER RAY PARRISH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00099-FL-1)
Submitted: June 18, 2019 Decided: June 26, 2019
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Ray Parrish pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime. In December 2008, the district court sentenced Parrish to 262 months
of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. Parrish’s sentence was
reduced twice, ultimately to 94 months’ imprisonment. After his release from
incarceration, Parrish was convicted of possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent
to distribute and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court
sentenced Parrish to 74 months for the new federal convictions, then revoked his
supervised release from his 2008 convictions and imposed a 42-month term to be served
consecutively. On appeal, Parrish argues that the revocation of his supervised release and
resulting sentence violate the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against successive
punishments for the same offense because the same underlying conduct formed the basis
for his new federal convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.
“We review de novo questions concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United
States v. Schnittker,
807 F.3d 77, 81 (4th Cir. 2015). As the government correctly
observes, Parrish’s argument is foreclosed by binding precedent. We have previously
determined that the “sentence imposed upon revocation of a term of supervised release is
an authorized part of the original sentence,” intended to sanction the defendant’s breach
of the court’s trust in violating the terms of his release, “leaving the punishment for any
new criminal conduct to the court responsible for imposing the sentence for that offense.”
United States v. Woodrup,
86 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis and internal
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quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. United States,
529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000)
(“We therefore attribute postrevocation penalties to the original conviction.”). Therefore,
a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release does not implicate the Double
Jeopardy Clause as to the sentence imposed for the new substantive offense.
Woodrup,
86 F.3d at 361-63.
It is well-settled that “[a] decision of a panel of this court becomes the law of the
circuit and is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by a subsequent en banc
opinion of this court or a superseding contrary decision of the Supreme Court.” United
States v. Collins,
415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As Woodrup has not been impacted by any intervening en banc or Supreme Court
decision, Parrish’s argument is unavailing.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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