NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, J.
Plaintiff, Consolidated Grain & Barge, Co. ("Consolidated"), and Defendant, Mark Phillip Hobbs in his individual capacity ("Mark Hobbs"), appeal from the trial court's judgment. Following a trial to the court, the trial court entered a judgment that found in favor of Consolidated on its claims against Mark Hobbs for (1) an implied
In a first amended petition filed in July 2009, Consolidated alleged in Count I that the "equitable powers" of the trial court authorized the trial court to impose a "constructive trust" on "all assets" received by Mark Hobbs from George Hobbs "on an implied, contract (quasi-contract)," and that "Mark Hobbs will be unjustly enriched at the expense of Consolidated unless the [trial court] exercises its equitable powers." Consolidated further alleged in Count II that Mark Hobbs "[misled] Consolidated by negotiating with them to satisfy the outstanding contracts, suggesting he would deliver grain, by suggesting he would roll the wheat contracts, all of which representations were false, were known to be false, [and] reasonably relied upon by Consolidated," and that "[a]s a direct result of the misrepresentations, Consolidated did not file a timely claim in [George Hobbs'] Estate[.]" In Count V of a second amended petition, Consolidated alleged that Mark Hobbs and George Hobbs "were partners in a farming partnership," and that Mark Hobbs "is liable as a partner."
In his answer, Mark Hobbs asserted that Consolidated's claims under Counts I and II of its first amended petition were barred by the probate non-claim statutes of limitation in sections 473.360 and 473.444.
On the morning of the trial, both Consolidated and Mark Hobbs requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court took judicial notice of the probate division's court file for the Estate of George Phillip Hobbs. Counsel for Consolidated acknowledged that Consolidated was not alleging that Mark Hobbs "reached" an agreement to satisfy his father's outstanding contracts to deliver wheat, soybeans, and corn to Consolidated.
Viewed in accordance with our standard of review, the evidence at trial showed the following. George Hobbs is the father of Mark Hobbs. George
Consolidated is a corporation that buys crops from farmers, takes delivery of those crops at facilities along the Mississippi River and a few other rivers in the Midwest, and then transports the crops by barge to New Orleans where Consolidated then sells the crops to others for export.
Before his death, George entered into several contracts with Consolidated for the delivery of wheat, soybeans, corn, and other crops on dates that turned out to be after his death. George entered into these contracts solely in his name. In each contract, Consolidated agreed to pay George a set price for the crops on delivery. Each contract was a "separate" contract.
After George's death, Mark delivered the crop called for under one contract,
Murray Schwieger, an employee of Consolidated who dealt regularly and was "good friends" with George, attended George's wake. Courtney Blackburn, another Consolidated employee, also was "aware of [George's] death." Mark testified he told Murray he was the "executor" of George's estate in February 2008. Murray testified he did not remember Mark telling him he was the executor or otherwise in charge of George's estate.
Murray further testified as follows. At the wake, Mark "mentioned" to Murray that "we needed to have a conversation about his dad's contracts." In subsequent telephone conversations, Mark and Murray talked about "how we were going to handle the contracts. And I told him we have to work, see what we can do to work things out with him. He told me that he had intended to haul the grain to us.... We talked about him bringing the grain. Then he talked about not having enough." Murray also "talked to Mark all of the way a little here and there on rolling the contracts as well. He never did sign them." In late September 2008, Mark told Murray "he wasn't going to bring the grain" because he had been advised by counsel that "he didn't have to, he didn't have any liability because no claim had been filed in his dad's estate." Murray then contacted Consolidated's in-house legal counsel and,
Courtney Blackburn testified at deposition that he thought he was dealing with "George Hobbs Farms" when he was dealing with George. Nothing Mark said "induced" Courtney "not to file a claim" on behalf of Consolidated in George's probate proceeding.
At the time, Consolidated did not have an employee who was responsible for filing claims in the probate estates of deceased customers. Murray first became aware of the requirement that creditors of a decedent file a claim in the decedent's probate estate when he spoke to legal counsel after Mark informed him that Mark was not going to fulfill George's remaining contracts.
Mark testified that he never "indicate[d] to anybody at Consolidated" that he was going to perform George's contracts.
Following his father's death, Mark applied for and was granted letters of administration for his father's probate estate. At the time the letters of administration were granted, Mark knew that Consolidated was a potential creditor of George's. Notice of the grant of the letters of administration and the requirement that George's creditors file claims within six months from the date of first publication of the notice was published in a local newspaper. The first publication of the notice occurred on February 24, 2008. Mark did not otherwise notify Consolidated of the requirement that creditors file claims. In late September 2008, Mark informed Consolidated that he did not intend to fulfill George's seven contracts that are at issue in this case, and that Consolidated at that point was barred from filing a claim in George's probate estate. On December 12, 2008, the probate division of the circuit court ordered that the property in George's probate estate be distributed to Mark and that Mark be discharged as Personal Representative. Consolidated never filed a claim for its loss on the contracts in George's probate estate, and first filed suit in this case on February 18, 2009. To Murray Schwieger's knowledge, Consolidated never looked at the inventory filed in George's probate estate until after November 12, 2008.
As viewed by the trial court, the evidence at trial showed that Mark omitted significant property from the inventory filed in George's probate estate, and took that property for himself. The omitted property included a half-interest in a "center pivot" that Mark sold in November 2008 for $25,000, a Farm Service Agency payment for the 2007 crop year, 2007 soybeans and milo for which Consolidated paid Mark about $27,000 in 2008 "[a]fter the first of the year," wheat on two separate farms that was planted a short time before George's death, and a lease for a signal tower placed on George's farmstead. Even with these omissions, all George's creditors who filed a claim in the probate estate were paid in full. And, the property listed in the inventory would have been sufficient to pay Consolidated's claim in full if it had been timely filed in the probate proceeding.
Based on this evidence, the trial court found in favor of Consolidated against Mark Hobbs individually on Counts I and II, and against Consolidated on Count V. On Count I, the trial court found that Mark failed to meet his fiduciary duty as personal representative of his father's probate estate to "make a `perfect' inventory
On Count II, the trial court found Mark committed fraud in connection with his father's probate estate in violation of section 472.013, and committed common law fraud in connection with the seven contracts at issue in the case. Specifically, the trial court stated:
On Count V, the trial court found "[t]he key inquiry is whether the parties had the intent to create a partnership," "[t]here
In a court-tried case, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court unless no substantial evidence supports it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Johnson v. Estate of McFarlin, 334 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Mo.App. S.D.2010).
A judgment is supported by substantial evidence when there is evidence from which the trier of fact can reasonably find all facts necessary to sustain the judgment. Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 186 (Mo.App. S.D.2010). In determining whether there is substantial evidence, we view the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, disregard all evidence and inferences contrary to the judgment, and defer to the trial court's credibility determinations. Id.
A judgment should be set aside as "against the weight of the evidence" only with caution and only when the reviewing court has a firm belief that the judgment is wrong. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32; Houston, 317 S.W.3d at 186. Weight of the evidence refers to "weight" in probative value and not quantity or amount. Houston, 317 S.W.3d at 186. Weight of the evidence is determined by the evidence's effect in inducing belief in the proposition at issue when viewed in the context of all the evidence, and not by mathematics. Id.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In his four points relied on, Mark Hobbs claims that the trial court erred in (1) granting Consolidated equitable relief because Consolidated had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a breach of contract claim against Mark's father's probate estate that was barred by a statute of limitations, (2) granting Consolidated relief for fraud in connection with his father's probate estate because Consolidated "did not rely" on the inventory for Mark's father's probate estate and "could not have been damaged" by omissions in the inventory, (3) granting Consolidated relief for fraud in connection with the contracts at issue because "the act of delivering grain does not constitute a false statement of existing fact[]" and Consolidated did not "have the right to rely on" that act "in choosing not to file a claim in [Mark's
In the trial court, Consolidated requested equitable relief based on its claim that a noncontractual obligation (i.e., a quasi or implied-in-law contract) should be imposed to prevent the unjust enrichment of George Hobbs and, ultimately, Mark Hobbs as an heir of George Hobbs' probate estate. See Johnson, 334 S.W.3d at 474 (discussing an implied-in-law contract); US Bank National Assoc. v. Cox, 341 S.W.3d 846, 853 & n. 7 (Mo.App. W.D. 2011) (stating that an action for unjust enrichment is based on a theory of quasi contract or contract implied in law). This claim arises from George Hobbs' failure to deliver crops to Consolidated required by seven contracts in George Hobbs' name alone. Consolidated alleges that failure, in some manner, resulted in the unjust enrichment of George and, through George, his heirs. The claim clearly is a claim against George's probate estate in the first instance, but was never filed in the probate proceeding even though Consolidated was (1) aware through its employees of George Hobbs' death shortly after George died, and (2) informed by Mark that he did not intend to fulfill his father's contracts that are at issue in this case more than one month before the one-year anniversary of his father's death.
As relevant in this case, section 473.444.1 provides in part:
Section 472.010(3) further provides, as is relevant in this case, that "`[c]laims' include liabilities of the decedent which survive whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise[.]"
Section 473.444 does not violate the due process clause of the Missouri or United States Constitutions because it is a self-executing statute of limitation and does not involve sufficient state involvement to implicate due process protection. State ex rel. Houska v. Dickhaner, 323 S.W.3d 29, 32-33 (Mo. banc 2010). Further, in Hatfield v. McCluney, 893 S.W.2d 822, 824-27 (Mo. banc 1995), the Supreme Court of Missouri held that section 473.444 was effective to bar a claim by a judgment creditor against the estate filed more than one year after the decedent's death even when letters testamentary were not issued until the first anniversary of the decedent's death where the creditor independently knew of the decedent's death and knew the decedent owned assets at her death.
Similarly to Hatfield, Consolidated through its employees was aware of George's death shortly after George died, but never filed its claim for a noncontractual obligation to prevent unjust enrichment in George's probate proceeding. We also note that Mark informed Consolidated he did not intend to fulfill his father's contracts that are at issue in this case more than one month before the one-year
We also note that Consolidated had the burden to prove its unjust enrichment claim, and one of the elements of an unjust enrichment claim is that the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant. Johnson, 334 S.W.3d at 474. The seven contracts for delivery of crops at issue in this case were, and remained, wholly executory as neither party performed any of the acts the party was obligated to perform under the contracts. Consolidated conferred no benefit on George Hobbs, his probate estate, or his heirs under the contracts, and failed to prove its unjust enrichment claim.
We reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Consolidated on Consolidated's claim of unjust enrichment.
The trial court also ruled that Consolidated was entitled to judgment against Mark Hobbs because Mark committed fraud in connection with his father's probate estate under section 472.013. Section 472.013 provides in relevant part:
Section 472.013 expressly requires that the plaintiff be "injured" by the fraud. Further, under applicable case law, fraud, whether actual or constructive based on a breach of a fiduciary duty, requires an injury caused by the fraud to be actionable. See In re Estate of Caldwell, 794 S.W.2d 257, 263-64 (Mo.App. E.D.1990) (indicating that the elements of actual fraud under section 472.013 include reliance on the truth of a representation and "injury"); Matter of Estate of Snyder, 880 S.W.2d 596, 597, 600 (Mo.App. E.D.1994) (indicating a breach of a fiduciary duty as a personal representative of a decedent's estate is a constructive fraud under section 472.013); Western Blue Print Co., LLC v. Roberts, 367 S.W.3d 7, 14-15 (Mo. banc 2012) (indicating that the elements of breach of fiduciary duty when asserted as a tort claim include that "the breach caused the proponent to suffer harm").
The trial court concluded that Mark Hobbs defrauded Consolidated under section 472.013 by omitting significant assets from the inventory filed in his father's probate proceeding. However, the
In these circumstances, Consolidated failed to prove it relied on the truth of the inventory filed by Mark Hobbs in his father's probate proceeding, or that it was injured by its reliance or by any breach by Mark of his fiduciary duty as personal representative of his father's estate.
We reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Consolidated under section 472.013.
The trial court further ruled that Consolidated was entitled to judgment against Mark Hobbs because Mark committed common law fraud in that Consolidated "reasonably relied on Mark's delivery of Hobb's grain under [contracts that are not at issue in this case] until after the claims bar date," and that "Mark never intended to perform the contracts [at issue in this case] from shortly after George's death."
The elements of common law fraud include, among other elements, (1) a representation by the defendant that is false, (2) the plaintiff's reliance on the truth of the representation, (3) the plaintiff's right to rely on the truth of the representation, and (4) injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the reliance. Next Day Motor Freight, Inc. v. Hirst, 950 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Mo.App. E.D.1997). A promise is not a representation unless the promisor did not intend to perform when the promise was made, or made the promise with reckless disregard of whether he could perform. Urologic Surgeons, Inc. v. Bullock, 117 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Mo.App. E.D.2003).
The trial court did not identify a specific false representation that Mark made, and the uncontested evidence shows that Mark made no representation or promise to Consolidated with respect to the performance of his father's contracts that are at issue in this case. Indeed, at the start of the trial, counsel for Consolidated acknowledged to the trial court that Consolidated was not alleging that Mark Hobbs "reached" an agreement to satisfy his father's outstanding contracts to deliver wheat, soybeans, and corn to Consolidated.
The most that can be inferred from the trial court's judgment is that Mark's performance of one or more of his father's contracts that are not at issue in this case constituted a false representation or promise that he would perform his father's other, separate contracts that are at issue in this case. The short answer to this inference is that Mark's performance of one contract represents or promises nothing about his intention to perform another separate contract. Further, there was nothing false about Mark's performance of the contracts he did perform.
Lastly, in view of the fact Mark's performance of one contract represents or promises nothing about his intention to perform another separate contract, Consolidated, even if it had done so, would not have had a right to rely on Mark's performance of contracts that are not at issue in this case.
We reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Consolidated based on common law fraud.
In view of our reversal of all grounds on which the trial court ruled in Consolidated's favor, it is unnecessary to address Mark Hobbs' claim that the trial court also erred in awarding attorney fees to Consolidated. The trial court's award of attorney fees to Consolidated is reversed, and Consolidated's motion in this Court for attorney fees on appeal is denied, because Consolidated did not prevail on any ground before the trial court.
In its sole point relied on, Consolidated challenges the trial court's denial of Consolidated's claim that George and Mark were partners, and Mark was liable as a partner on his father's contracts at issue in this case.
In Winslow v. Nolan, 319 S.W.3d 497, 501-02 (Mo.App. E.D.2010), the Eastern District of this Court stated:
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Further, "the intention of the parties is the primary criterion in deciding whether a partnership exists." Nesler v. Reed, 703 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Mo.App. E.D.1985).
Mark Hobbs strongly contested the existence of a partnership with his father and there was evidence that Mark and his father did not intend or desire to operate as a partnership. In the absence of uncontested facts that entitle a party who bears the burden of proof (i.e., Consolidated on this issue) to judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party (i.e., Mark Hobbs on this issue) is not required to present any evidence to prevail because, once a fact is contested, the trial court is free to disbelieve any, all or none of the evidence related to that fact. Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36, 44, 52, 53, 54-55
Consolidated's point relied on is denied, and the trial court's judgment denying Consolidated's request for relief on this ground is affirmed.
GARY W. LYNCH, P.J. and WILLIAM W. FRANCIS, JR., J., concur.