NAJAM, Judge.

Statement of the Case

Andy Mohr West, Inc. d/b/a Andy Mohr Toyota (Andy Mohr), Butler Motors, Inc. d/b/a Butler Toyota (Butler), and TW Toy, Inc. d/b/a Tom Wood Toyota (Tom Wood) (collectively, the Dealers) appeal the trial court's judgment affirming the dismissal of declaratory judgment actions the Dealers had filed with the Auto Dealer Services Division of the Office of the Secretary of State (the Division). According to the Dealers' filings with the Division, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota) proposed to relocate Ed Martin Toyota (Ed Martin) from Anderson, Indiana, to Fishers, Indiana, which the Dealers alleged was without good cause. The Division dismissed the Dealers' claims after it interpreted recently enacted provisions of the Indiana Code to deny the Dealers standing. This appeal presents a question of first impression regarding an interpretation of the Indiana Dealer Services statutes. See Ind.Code §§ 9-32.

[2] As the Supreme Court of the United States has reminded us, "[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan." King v. Burwell, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483, 2015 WL 2473448 at *15 (June 25, 2015). Here, the legislative plan as it relates to the proposed relocation of a new-motor-vehicle (NMV) dealer into a new market evinces our legislature's intent that the Division review the effects of the proposed relocation on the marketplace before the relocation may be approved. We conclude, however, that the Division's interpretation of the relevant statutes is inconsistent with the economic rationale of the legislative plan and is not, therefore, a reasonably correct interpretation of the statutes. Instead, the Division has misconstrued the relevant statutes to deny the Dealers standing and potential remedies. In its interpretation, the Division has either disregarded or overlooked the plain text of relevant statutory provisions and, in so doing, has rendered those provisions meaningless. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand to the Division for further proceedings on the Dealers' claims against Toyota.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. Ed Martin is an NMV dealer and has been operating out of Anderson in Madison County for a number of years. Ed Martin is licensed in Indiana to serve as a Toyota dealer. Around September 27, 2013, Toyota informed each of the Dealers, which are also NMV dealers, that it intended to relocate Ed Martin from Anderson to Fishers. Fishers is located in Hamilton County, which has a population in excess of 100,000 people.

[4] The Dealers engaged Toyota in negotiations to avoid the relocation of Ed Martin, but those discussions eventually broke down. As such, on December 23, 2013, Butler filed with the Division its protest against the relocation of Ed Martin and its request for declaratory judgment. Tom Wood and Andy Mohr filed similar requests shortly thereafter. Collectively, the Dealers' requests sought to have the Division determine whether good cause existed for the proposed move of Ed Martin. Subsequently, Toyota moved to dismiss the Dealers' requests on the ground that the Dealers each lacked standing to file their requests with the Division.

[5] On February 25, 2014, the Division entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Taw, Judgment, and Final Order with respect to each of the Dealers. The Division determined that the relevant market area that would apply to Ed Martin's relocated dealership consisted of a six-mile radius around that proposed location1 pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-32-2-20(1). Because each of the Dealers was located outside of that radius, the Division concluded that each Dealer lacked standing to file its declaratory judgment action. The Dealers petitioned the trial court for judicial review of the Division's judgment, and, after consolidating the Dealers' petitions, the court affirmed the Division's judgment. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] This appeal involves a question of an agency's interpretation of the Indiana Code. As we have explained:

Pierce v. Dep't of Corr., 885 N.E.2d 77, 89 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (emphases added). Further, insofar as this appeal is from the judgment of a trial court, "[i]t is well established that, where `only a paper record has been presented to the trial court, we are in as good a position as the trial court. . . and will employ de novo review. . . .'" Norris Ave. Prof'l Bldg. P'ship v. Coordinated Health, LLC, 28 N.E.3d 296, 298 (Ind.Ct.App.2015) (quoting Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005)) (omissions original to Norris), trans. denied.

[7] The only issue on appeal is whether the agency's interpretation of the relevant statutes is reasonably correct. The Indiana Supreme Court has long recognized the "basic principle" that

Park 100 Dev. Co. v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 429 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ind. 1981) (citations omitted). Accordingly, in interpreting statutes "no part should be held to be meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest" of the statutory language. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind.2011). Moreover, "[s]tatutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia (on the same subject) and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme." Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind.2009).

Overview of the Relevant Statutes

[8] Here, the dispute between the parties began shortly after Toyota had informed the Dealers of Toyota's intent to relocate Ed Martin from Anderson to Fishers. Toyota issued these notices pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-32-13-24(d), which states:

The Dealers objected to Toyota's plan, and, after negotiations with Toyota failed, the Dealers each filed a declaratory judgment action before the Division pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-32-13-24(e), which states:

(Emphasis added.)

[9] The very next provision of the Indiana Code states that, in determining "whether good cause exists for establishing or relocating an additional [NMV] dealer for the same line make," the Division:

Ind.Code § 9-32-13-24(f) (2014) (emphasis added).

[10] Thus, the purpose underlying Toyota's notice, the Dealers' declaratory actions, and the Division's review of those actions is to maintain the status quo in a given market until the Division has had the opportunity to fully assess the impact of the proposed change in that market. As the Third Circuit has stated with respect to the federal statutes on which Indiana's statutes are based, these are "remedial statute[s] enacted to redress the economic imbalance and unequal bargaining power between large automobile manufacturers and local dealerships, protecting dealers from unfair termination and other retaliatory and coercive practices." Maschio v. Prestige Motors, 37 F.3d 908, 910 (3d Cir.1994).

[11] By giving the Dealers the notice required under Section 9-32-13-24(d), at least initially Toyota believed the Dealers might be within "the relevant market area" where it had proposed to relocate Ed Martin. See I.C. § 9-32-13-24(d). Under another section of the Indiana Code:

I.C. § 9-32-2-20 (emphases added).

[12] This appeal turns on the meaning of two phrases: "proposed [NMV] dealer" and "in a county." The Division concluded that Ed Martin is not a "proposed [NMV] dealer" but an existing dealer that is relocating "in a county" with a population greater than 100,000 people and, thus, that the relevant market area is six miles around Ed Martin's new location. As explained below, the Division's interpretation of both of these phrases is contrary to law.

"Proposed [NMV] Dealer"

[13] The Division concluded that a "proposed [NMV] dealer" under Section 9-32-2-20(2)(A) can mean only a newly created business. In other words, "proposed [NMV] dealer" cannot mean an existing, but relocating, business. Thus, the Division concluded that the relevant market area for Ed Martin's relocated dealership was a six-mile radius around its new site rather than a ten-mile radius. See id. This, in turn, excluded the Dealers from being affected, as a statutory matter, by the proposed relocation. See id.

[14] But the Division's interpretation of Section 9-32-2-20(2)(A) is contrary to the plain language of Section 9-32-13-24(e)—the only other place in Article 9-32 in which the phrase "proposed [NMV] dealer" appears. See generally I.C. §§ 9-32. Again, Section 9-32-13-24(e) authorizes the Dealers to bring a declaratory judgment action for the Division to determine whether good cause exists "for the . . . relocating of a proposed [NMV] dealer." And Section 9-32-13-24(e) states that Toyota "may not . . . relocate the proposed [NMV] dealer" until the Division has rendered a decision. Thus, Section 9-32-13-24(e) clearly contemplates the relocation of a "proposed [NMV] dealer." The Division's narrow interpretation of "proposed [NMV] dealer" under Section 9-32-2-20(2)(A), however, renders the language of Section 9-32-13-24(e) meaningless because it is not possible to challenge the relocation of a "proposed [NMV] dealer," let alone to halt the proposed relocation or determine whether that relocation is done with good cause, if that dealer does not already exist. An interpretation of statutory text that renders related statutory text meaningless instead of in harmony is to be avoided. See Siwinski, 949 N.E.2d at 828; Klotz, 900 N.E.2d at 5.

[15] A "proposed [NMV] dealer" under Section 9-32-2-20(2)(A) must mean the same thing that it means under Section 9-32-13-24(e). Specifically, a "proposed [NMV] dealer" is a dealer that proposes to enter a market where that dealer is not already doing business. This can occur, as the Division recognizes, through the creation of a new business. But this can also occur, as the Division fails to recognize, through the relocation of an existing business. This interpretation gives meaning to, rather than to render meaningless, Section 9-32-13-24(e)'s authorization for a dealer to challenge a franchisor's "establishing or relocating of a proposed [NMV] dealer" or the franchisor's intent to "establish or relocate the proposed [NMV] dealer." See Siwinski, 949 N.E.2d at 828. Both "establish" and "relocate" in those provisions modify "proposed [NMV] dealer." That is, the statute expressly contemplates the relocation of an existing NMV dealer.

[16] This interpretation is also consistent with the very next provision of the Indiana Code, Section 9-32-13-24(f), which instructs the Division on how to determine "whether good cause exists for establishing or relocating an additional [NMV] dealer" in a relevant market. (Emphasis added.) Similar to Section 9-32-13-24(e), here "establishing" and "relocating" modify "additional [NMV] dealer." But while subsection (e) identifies the "proposed" NMV dealer, subsection (f) identifies the "additional" NMV dealer in a market. It is clear from reading these two subsections together—again, as is required, see Klotz, 900 N.E.2d at 5—that "proposed" and "additional" are used interchangeably, and it is equally clear that the term "additional [NMV] dealer" includes either an entirely new dealer or a relocating dealer. In other words, a "proposed [NMV] dealer" is simply an additional dealer—whether a new business or a relocating, established business—that proposes to enter a designated market. This interpretation accounts for the very purpose of the statute, namely, to have the Division consider the effect of adding an additional dealer to a given market. And this interpretation takes all relevant statutory provisions into account.

[17] Toyota and the Division assert on appeal that the ordinary meaning of "proposed" excludes established but relocating dealers.2 That is, they assert that the literal meaning of "proposed" indicates a dealer that is contemplated but does not yet exist. But "the literal meaning of a word in isolation is not controlling upon how the statute as a whole must be interpreted." Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind.2014); see Park 100 Dev. Co., 429 N.E.2d at 222-23. Toyota and the Division's reliance on a literal definition of "proposed" disregards the statutory purpose, the context in which the word appears, and other relevant statutory provisions. The legislative plan and express statutory language demonstrate that a "proposed [NMV] dealer" means a dealer that is proposed to be added to a market, whether that dealer is a wholly new business or a relocating, existing business. And the purpose of our statutes is to protect the existing dealers in the relevant market area from franchisor abuse. The introduction of a "proposed [NMV] dealer" into a marketplace is a potential economic threat to a dealer already located within that market, regardless of whether the "proposed [NMV] dealer" is a wholly new business or a relocating, existing business. The Division's interpretation creates an arbitrary and artificial distinction between a proposed, wholly new dealer and a proposed, relocating dealer not present in the statutes, and it disregards the legislative intent underlying the statutory scheme.

[18] The Division also asserts on appeal that this court should rely on Michigan and West Virginia law for the proper definition of a "proposed [NMV] dealer." But those states define "proposed [NMV] dealer" as terms of art within their statutory schemes. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1565(4) (2014); W. Va.Code § 17A-6A-3(13) (2014). Our General Assembly has not defined that term. See generally I.C. §§ 9-32-2-1 to -28. And the Division cites no authority to suggest that this material difference was anything other than intended by our legislature. Cf. Jackson v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1173, 1178-83 (Ind.Ct. App.2015) (holding that our legislature intended certain statutory language to include an unstated element because our statutory language tracked federal statutory language and was enacted after federal courts had read the unstated element into the federal statute).

"In A County"

[19] The Division's interpretation of a "proposed [NMV] dealer" is an error that has trickled down into other relevant statutory language. In particular, because the Division concluded that a "proposed [NMV] dealer" can mean only a newly created business, it likewise misinterpreted Section 9-32-2-20(1). Again, that statute defines the relevant market area for a business that plans "to relocate . . . in a county" with a population greater than 100,000 people as a six-mile radius around the NMV dealer's proposed site. (Emphasis added.)

[20] After it defined a "proposed [NMV] dealer" to exclude a relocating business, the Division compounded that error and interpreted "in a county" to mean a relocation either within a county or into a county exceeding the population limit. But when the correct definition of a "proposed [NMV] dealer," which includes a relocating business, is applied, the Division's definition of "in a county" would mean that a business relocating into a county exceeding the population limit would not fall clearly under either Section 9-32-2-20(1), which defines the business's relevant market area as a six-mile radius, or under Section 9-32-2-20(2), which defines the area as a ten-mile radius.

[21] In order to give effect to the legislative distinction between Sections 9-32-2-20(1) and (2), "in a county" under Section 9-32-2-20(1) must mean "within" a county and cannot mean "into" a county. If the proposed relocation is within the same county, our legislature has designed a smaller relevant market area for that business than if the proposed relocation involves a business moving into the county. See I.C. § 9-32-2-20. The legislative rationale for the distinction between an intra-county and inter-county relocation is clear. The relocation of a business that already has an established customer base within a county will likely present less of a threat to other businesses located within that county because the businesses are already competing within the same market. On the other hand, when an inter-county relocation is proposed, an additional business entering the area will attract new customers, and those customers are likely to come from other dealers already located in that market.3 Thus, our legislature has provided businesses established in a market with the greater protection of a ten-mile relevant market area against an additional business entering that market, whether the "proposed [NMV] dealer" is a newly created dealer or a relocating dealer.

[22] The Division asserts that this interpretation of "in a county" reads "an arbitrary significance to crossing a county line. . . ." Appellee Division's Br. at 16. To the contrary, whether a business is new to a market because it is newly created or because it has relocated from elsewhere, the business is still new to the market, and there is no apparent reason why the same statutory protection provided by our legislature should not apply in both instances. Under the Division's interpretation, however, a ten-mile relevant market area applies to a business that is new to a market merely because it is newly created, but a six-mile relevant market area applies to a business that is new to a market simply because it relocated from elsewhere. "[I]t is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the court presumes that the legislature does not intend that application of the statute should work irrational consequences." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bathe, 715 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied. Given the economic rationale and the remedial purpose underlying the legislative plan, our legislature could not have intended the Division's disparate, if not irrational, treatment of dealers that propose to locate or relocate into a market.

Conclusion

[23] In sum, the Division's interpretation of Sections 9-32-2-20 and 9-32-13-24(e) is unreasonable and incorrect as a matter of law. The Division misunderstands the meaning of the word "proposed" within the legislative plan. A "proposed [NMV] dealer" cannot mean only a newly created business. The Division's misinterpretation renders other relevant statutory provisions meaningless, contrary to the basic principles of statutory construction that every word and phrase be given meaning and be harmonized with other related provisions. The Division disregards the statutory scheme and fails to account for the fact that the relocation of an existing dealer into the relevant market is every bit as much a threat, if not a greater threat, to the existing dealers within that area as the establishment of a new dealership. An agency's interpretation that is contrary to law is entitled to no deference. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand to the Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BAKER, J., concurs.

FRIEDLANDER, J., dissents with separate opinion.

FRIEDLANDER, Judge dissenting.

[24] I respectfully dissent. The Indiana Dealer Services statutes are undoubtedly inartful, but I am convinced that the Division's interpretation is reasonable. Accordingly, I would defer to the Division's interpretation of the statutes it is tasked with enforcing. See Chrysler Group, LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 124 (Ind. 2012) ("we defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of such a statute even over an equally reasonable interpretation by another party"); Ind. Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. State ex rel. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 695 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind.1998) (once the reviewing court determined that the agency interpretation was reasonable, the court "should have terminated its analysis" and not addressed the reasonableness of other proposed interpretations).

[25] The majority finds that the purpose of the relevant statutes is to maintain the status quo in a "given market" until the Division has had an opportunity to fully assess the impact of the proposed change in that market. Op. at 708. What is unclear to me is whether "given market" (as well as the majority's other general market references) is intended to be synonymous with the statutorily-defined term "relevant market area". If it is, then I agree with my colleagues' general statement of legislative purpose.

[26] This purpose is satisfied by the Division's interpretation of the relevant statutes, which allows for review by the Division when an NMV dealer is establishing or relocating within or into a relevant market area (i.e., whenever the status quo is affected in the relevant market area). The majority's interpretation, on the other hand, does not provide for review of a proposed relocation within a relevant market area because the relocating dealer is not a "proposed [NMV] dealer".

[27] Pursuant to I.C. § 9-32-13-24(d), before a franchisor, such as Toyota, enters into a franchise establishing or relocating an NMV dealer "within a relevant market area" in which the same line make is already represented, the franchisor must give written notice to such existing dealer(s) of the franchisor's "intention to establish an additional dealer or to relocate an existing dealer within that relevant market area". Following notice, I.C. § 9-32-13-24(e) allows the existing dealer(s) to "bring a declaratory judgment action before the division to determine whether good cause exists for the establishing or relocating of a proposed [NMV] dealer."

[28] I.C. § 9-32-2-20 determines the relevant market area applicable in any given case, which is either a six- or ten-mile radius. The statute provides:

[29] With respect to I.C. § 9-32-2-20(1), the majority interprets "in a county" to include only moves from one location to another location in the same county. Although the majority's interpretation may be reasonable, the Division's interpretation that "in a county" includes both relocations within a county and to a different county4 is also reasonable and, therefore, entitled to substantial deference. See Chrysler Group, LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118.

[30] Relying upon the legislative plan, the majority further concludes that a "proposed [NMV] dealer" under I.C. § 9-32-2-20(2)(A) is "a dealer that proposes to enter a market where that dealer is not already doing business." Op. at 710. This definition, however, begs the essential question. What is the applicable relevant market area?

[31] Further, I agree with the Division that the majority's interpretation is not consistent with the ordinary meaning of "proposed". I.C. § 9-32-2-20(2) speaks of "proposed" dealers and "relocated" dealers, clearly implying that the former is a planned/projected dealer while the latter is an established/existing dealer. Similarly, the notice provision addresses a franchiser's "intention to establish an additional dealer or to relocate an existing dealer". I.C. § 9-32-13-24(d) (emphasis supplied).

[32] The Division's interpretation of "proposed [NMV] dealer" is also consistent with the definition used in other states, such as Michigan and West Virginia. For example, Michigan defines a proposed NMV dealer as: "a person who has an application pending for a new dealer agreement with a manufacturer or distributor. Proposed motor vehicle dealer does not include a person whose dealer agreement is being renewed or continued." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1565(4). See also W. Va.Code Ann. § 17A-6A-3(13) (same definition).

[33] Although both the West Virginia and Michigan statutes expressly differentiate between a proposed dealer and a relocating dealer, their statutes regarding notice and the right to declaratory action are virtually identical to ours. Specifically, notice must be given to same line-make dealers in a relevant market area of a manufacturer/distributor's intention to "establish an additional dealer" or to "relocate an existing dealer" within the same relevant market area. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1576(2); W. Va.Code Ann. § 17A-6A-12(2). Following notice, affected dealers have the right to bring a declaratory judgment action to "determine whether good cause exists for the establishing or relocating of a proposed [NMV] dealer." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1576(3) (emphasis supplied). See also W. Va.Code Ann. § 17A-6A-12(3).

[34] The reference to proposed NMV dealer in Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1576(3) and W. Va.Code Ann. § 17A-6A-12(3) is, of course, perplexing, as the express statutory definitions necessarily foreclose the possibility of a proposed NMV dealer relocating. Further, a strict reading leads to the absurd result that although entitled to notice of a planned relocation, an affected dealer is not entitled to bring a declaratory judgment action because the relocating dealer is not a proposed NMV dealer. Despite the puzzling (and seemingly mistaken) reference to proposed NMV dealer in the Michigan statute, however, the right to protest has been applied "equally to new dealerships and dealerships that are relocating to a new location." Chrysler Group LLC v. Fox Hills Motor Sales, Inc., 776 F.3d 411, 425 n. 9 (6th Cir.2015).

[35] The majority's interpretation of the non-statutorily-defined term and its reliance upon the imprecise language of I.C. § 9-32-13-24(e) leads to similarly troubling results. That is, an existing dealer—though clearly entitled to notice—has no protest rights with respect to an intra-county relocation into the existing dealer's relevant market area because the move would not involve "the establishing or relocating of a proposed [NMV] dealer". I.C. § 9-32-13-24(e) (emphasis supplied). This, of course, renders the definitions of relevant market area contained in I.C. § 9-32-2-20(1) and (2)(B) effectively useless. The majority's interpretation also makes meaningless I.C. § 9-32-13-24(a) and (c), which address relocations within a given market area. As already observed, intra-market relocations are never subject to the declaratory judgment provision when the majority's analysis is taken to its logical conclusion. This could not have been the intent of the legislature.

[36] In my mind, the clear intent of I.C. § 9-32-13-24 is to provide protest rights to affected NMV dealers regardless of whether the franchisor intends to relocate an existing dealer in/to/within the relevant market area or establish an entirely new dealer in the relevant market area. The applicable relevant market area, in turn, determines which dealers have protest rights.

[37] Under its reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes, the Division determined that the applicable relevant market area in this case was the six-mile radius set out in I.C. § 9-32-2-20(1). The Dealers do not dispute that they are outside this area. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's judgment based upon lack of standing.