Filed: Aug. 24, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-5157 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ILDEFONSO MALDONADO-GONZALEZ, a/k/a Gabriel Rivera-Vega, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:09-cr-00019-RLV-DCK-1) Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: August 24, 2011 Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublis
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-5157 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ILDEFONSO MALDONADO-GONZALEZ, a/k/a Gabriel Rivera-Vega, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:09-cr-00019-RLV-DCK-1) Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: August 24, 2011 Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublish..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5157
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ILDEFONSO MALDONADO-GONZALEZ, a/k/a Gabriel Rivera-Vega,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:09-cr-00019-RLV-DCK-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: August 24, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
D. Baker McIntyre III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, J. George Guise,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ildefonso Maldonado-Gonzalez entered a guilty plea to
possession of a pseudoephedrine knowing it would be used to
manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(c)(2) (2006), reserving the right to challenge the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the contraband
seized during the search of his vehicle. Maldonado-Gonzalez
claims he did not give his consent to the police officer to
search his vehicle. We affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Maldonado-
Gonzalez’s suppression motion, we review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. See United States v. Blake,
571 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir.
2009). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if this court “on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Harvey,
532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because the district court denied Maldonado-
Gonzalez’s motion, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. Farrior,
535 F.3d
210, 217 (4th Cir. 2008). We also defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations. United States v. Abu Ali,
528 F.3d
210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008).
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Although the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits
warrantless searches, the general requirement for a warrant does
not apply where valid consent to the search is given.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); United
States v. Buckner,
473 F.3d 551, 553–54 (4th Cir. 2007).
“Consent to search is valid if it is (1) knowing and voluntary
and (2) given by one with authority to consent.”
Buckner, 473
F.3d at 554 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Whether a defendant’s consent to a search is voluntary is a
factual question determined under the totality of the
circumstances and, accordingly, is reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248–49; United
States v. Jones,
356 F.3d 529, 533 n.* (4th Cir. 2004).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, we conclude that the district court did not
clearly err in determining that Maldonado-Gonzalez voluntarily
consented to the search of his vehicle. Because the district
court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, we affirm
the judgment of conviction. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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