Filed: Jan. 20, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1557 NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. EZRA LAMBERT; BETTY JEAN HALE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, Chief District Judge. (2:08-cv-01158-JRG) Argued: November 8, 2011 Decided: January 20, 2012 Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Reversed and remanded
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1557 NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. EZRA LAMBERT; BETTY JEAN HALE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, Chief District Judge. (2:08-cv-01158-JRG) Argued: November 8, 2011 Decided: January 20, 2012 Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Reversed and remanded ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1557
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
EZRA LAMBERT; BETTY JEAN HALE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin,
Chief District Judge. (2:08-cv-01158-JRG)
Argued: November 8, 2011 Decided: January 20, 2012
Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Thomas Paul Mannion, MANNION & GRAY CO., LPA, Cleveland,
Ohio, for Appellant. Brent K. Kesner, KESNER, KESNER & BRAMBLE,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Sylvester
A. Hill, Jr., MANNION & GRAY CO., LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, for
Appellant. Christopher J. Heavens, HEAVENS LAW OFFICES,
Charleston, West Virginia; Gregory K. Smith, Williamson, West
Virginia, for Appellee Betty Jean Hale.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
Betty Jean Hale and Ezra Lambert, ruling that Lambert was
covered under West Virginia’s general insurance policy as a
“volunteer worker.” Because we are convinced that Lambert, a
prison inmate, cannot possibly meet the definition of “volunteer
worker” as found in the policy, we reverse and remand with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the insurer.
I.
A.
Ezra Lambert is an inmate at the Southwestern Regional Jail
(“Jail”) in West Virginia. As a sentenced inmate, Lambert is
required to work at the Jail. He may announce a preference from
a limited menu of options to fulfill his work obligation, but
the assignment is ultimately within the sole discretion of the
Jail. Lambert sought to work in the kitchen, because he wished
“[t]o eat extra food and to get out of [his] cell.” J.A. 118.
He accordingly submitted a written application to Aramark
Correctional Services, Inc., the contractor in charge of kitchen
operations. After interviewing with supervisors from Aramark,
Lambert began work in the Jail’s kitchen.
Lambert generally worked six days a week for eight hours
each day as a cook in the kitchen. He received no financial
2
benefits from his service. Although Lambert considered himself
a volunteer, the Jail’s coercive authority over him was ever
present. Indeed, the Jail provided Lambert with a stark
reminder of its power when it disciplined him for protesting
working conditions. Lambert quit work in the middle of a shift
in an effort to attract attention to his workplace grievances.
The Jail responded by locking him down--i.e., putting him in
“the hole”--for five days.
Betty Jean Hale worked with Lambert in the Jail’s kitchen,
though she was not an inmate. Hale alleges that Lambert injured
her on October 6, 2006. According to Hale, Lambert was pushing
a cart housing a mixer. As Lambert neared Hale, the mixer fell
from the cart, landing on Hale’s foot. Hale alleges that she
suffered a serious injury and incurred medical expenses as a
result.
B.
Pursuant to a comprehensive liability policy (“Policy”),
West Virginia obtained insurance coverage from National Union
Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA. National Union agreed
to “pay on behalf of the ‘insured’ all sums which the ‘insured’
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance
applies, caused by an ‘occurrence.’ ” J.A. 23. It further
3
assumed “the right and duty to defend any suit against the
‘insured’ seeking damages on account of such ‘bodily injury’ or
‘property damage.’ ” Id.
The Policy defined “insured” as “any person or organization
qualifying as an insured in the ‘persons insured’ provision of
the applicable insurance coverage.”
Id. 43. Critical to this
dispute, the Policy enumerated the following entities as
“persons insured”:
(A) The “Named Insured” [i.e., the State of West
Virginia],
(B) Any elected or appointed official, executive
officer, commissioner, director, or member of the
“Named Insured” while acting within the scope of
his duties as such,
(C) Any faculty member, employee, volunteer worker or
student teacher of the “Named Insured” while
acting within the scope of their duties as such.
Id. 25 (emphasis added). This appeal centers on whether Lambert
qualifies as a “volunteer worker” for purposes of the Policy.
C.
Hale filed suit in state court in 2007 (“Underlying
Action”), alleging various claims arising out of the mixer
incident. She named as defendants Lambert, Aramark, the West
Virginia Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, and
the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility
Authority.
4
Notified of Hale’s suit, National Union filed a declaratory
action in federal court, seeking a declaration that it has no
duty to defend or indemnify Lambert with regard to the
Underlying Action. “Based on the plain and unambiguous language
of [the Policy],” alleged National Union, it “has no contractual
duty to defend or provide any other policy benefits to . . .
Lambert.” J.A. 18. In response, Hale asked the court to
declare that Lambert is an “insured” under the Policy and
therefore entitled to a defense and indemnification. Lambert
independently sought an identical declaration.
National Union and Hale filed competing motions for summary
judgment. A single issue confronted the district court--whether
Lambert qualified as a “volunteer worker” under the Policy. The
court answered that question in the affirmative, first
determining that the term was unambiguous and then finding that
Lambert “qualifies as a ‘volunteer worker’ under any reasonable
definition of the term.” Id. 196. Because Lambert worked
without compensation, elected to work in the kitchen rather than
elsewhere, and considered himself a volunteer, the court ruled
that the term “volunteer worker” encompassed him.
The court accordingly entered judgment in favor of Hale and
Lambert (“Appellees”), denying National Union’s motion for
summary judgment. From this order National Union appeals.
5
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standards as the district court. The News & Observer
Publ’g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576
(4th Cir. 2010). The Federal Rules’ familiar command guides our
analysis, and summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Appellees admit that Lambert is an “insured” under the
Policy--and therefore entitled to a defense and indemnification-
-only if he is considered a “volunteer worker.” Further
conceding that Lambert was obligated to work at the Jail in some
capacity, Appellees nevertheless contend that Lambert’s choice
to work in the kitchen counsels a finding that he qualifies as a
“volunteer worker” under the Policy. We, however, are convinced
that Appellees’ argument obscures the broader portrait of
institutional confinement, which is hallmarked by the Jail’s
coercive authority over inmates like Lambert. Attention to the
realities of Lambert’s status as an inmate--in particular, his
duty to work--compels reversal. Because we hold that the
ordinary definition of “volunteer worker” does not include
Lambert, we reverse and remand to the district court with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of National Union.
6
A.
Under West Virginia law, 1 courts must enforce the plain and
unambiguous provisions of an insurance policy, refusing to
become ensnared in the parties’ intricate interpretative
debates. Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639,
642 (W. Va. 1985). Recognizing that a comprehensive insurance
policy cannot possibly include a definition for every term used,
courts applying West Virginia law must “accord the language of
an insurance policy its common and customary meaning.” Boggs v.
Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp. Corp.,
693 S.E.2d 53, 57–58 (W. Va.
2010). In other words, “ ‘[l]anguage in an insurance policy
should be given its plain, ordinary meaning.’ ”
Id. at 58
(quoting Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins,
599 S.E.2d 720, 724 (W.
Va. 2004)).
Only where a term is ambiguous--“ ‘reasonably susceptible of
two different meanings or . . . of such doubtful meaning that
reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its
1
The parties agree that West Virginia law governs
interpretation of the Policy, with good reason. We apply the
substantive law of the forum state, including the state’s
choice-of-law rules, when sitting in diversity. Colgan Air,
Inc. v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 507 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.
2007). Under the law of West Virginia--the forum state here--
the law of the state in which the contract is executed and to be
performed governs adjudication of claims arising out of that
agreement. Howe v. Howe,
625 S.E.2d 716, 721 (W. Va. 2005). In
this case, that state is West Virginia.
7
meaning’ ”--will a court construe the policy “ ‘strictly against
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.’ ” Shamblin,
332 S.E.2d at 642 (quoting Surbaugh v. Stonewall Cas. Co.,
283
S.E.2d 859, 860–61 (W. Va. 1981)). But West Virginia courts are
not predisposed to adjudge a term ambiguous, and “ ‘agreements
are not necessarily ambiguous [just] because the parties
disagree as to the meaning of the language of the agreement.’ ”
Tri-State Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Dravo Corp.,
412 S.E.2d 225,
230 (W. Va. 1991) (quoting Orteza v. Monongalia Cnty. Gen.
Hosp.,
318 S.E.2d 40, 43 (W. Va. 1984)). Moreover, even a
provision facially amenable to alternative interpretations
“should never be interpreted so as to create an absurd result.”
D’Annunzio v. Security-Conn. Life Ins. Co.,
410 S.E.2d 275, 279
(W. Va. 1991) (quoting Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co.,
345
S.E.2d 33, 35 (W. Va. 1986)). Instead, such language “should
receive a reasonable interpretation, consistent with the intent
of the parties.”
Id. at 41 n.1 (quoting
Soliva, 345 S.E.2d at
35).
B.
Concluding, consistent with the parties and the district
court, that the term “volunteer worker” is unambiguous, we next
consider the appropriate contours of its meaning.
8
We first look to the “common and customary meaning,” Boggs,
693 S.E.2d at 58, of “volunteer.” Freedom from coercion and
absence of legal obligation compose the bedrock of definitions
of “volunteer.” For instance, Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“volunteer” as “[a] voluntary actor,” one who acts
“[u]nconstrained by interference . . . [or] outside influence”
and has no legal obligation. Black’s Law Dictionary 1711 (9th
ed. 2009). Webster’s defines “volunteer” as “a person whose
actions are not founded on any legal obligation so to act” and
who acts “by free choice[,] . . . without compulsion or
obligation.” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 2131 (2d ed.
2001). And in the federal statutory context, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) considers as volunteers only those
individuals whose “services are offered freely and without
pressure or coercion, direct or implied.” 29 C.F.R. §
553.101(c).
Although no court has squarely applied the commonsense
definition of “volunteer” to the prison context, judicial
appraisal of the status of inmates for FLSA purposes guides our
inquiry. Courts have soundly rejected prisoners’ claims that
compulsion to work for less than the federal minimum wage
contravenes the FLSA, holding that inmates are not “employees”
9
for purposes of the statutory scheme. 2 The Seventh Circuit
provided a cogent explication for refusing to extend the term
“employee” to cover an incarcerated individual:
Put simply, the [jail’s] “control” over [the inmate]
does not stem from any remunerative relationship or
bargained-for exchange of labor for consideration, but
from incarceration itself. The control that the
[jail] exercises over a prisoner is nearly total, and
control over his work is merely incidental to that
general control. Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment’s
specific exclusion of prisoner labor supports the idea
that a prisoner performing required work for the
prison is actually engaged in involuntary servitude,
not employment. . . . [T]here is too much control to
classify the relationship as one of employment.
Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809–10 (7th Cir. 1992)
(footnote omitted).
We looked to Vanskike with approval when we rejected an
inmate’s argument that he was covered by the FLSA’s definition
of “employee.” Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133
(4th Cir. 1993). We held “categorically” that the FLSA does not
apply “to work done by inmates behind prison walls for any type
of prison-operated industry or for the prison itself.”
Id. at
135. Characterizing the jail-inmate relationship as
2
Appellees urge us not to rely on FLSA cases, because the
cases do not involve insurance policies and are limited to
disputes over the federal minimum wage. This view is
shortsighted. Judicial evaluation of the argument that an
inmate qualifies as an “employee” under the FLSA necessarily
implicates questions of coercion and control, elements essential
to disposition of this case.
10
“custodial,” we reasoned that the jail “wields virtually
absolute control over [inmates] to a degree simply not found in
the free labor situation of true employment.” Id. at 133. That
inmates may voluntarily apply for particular positions was of no
moment to our analysis, as inmates “certainly are not free to
walk off the job site and look for other work.”
Id. We further
found noteworthy that, “[w]hen a shift ends, inmates do not
leave [jail] supervision, but rather proceed to the next part of
their regimented day.”
Id. Our analysis harmonizes with that
of other circuits to later consider the issue. See Burleson v.
California,
83 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1996); McMaster v.
Minnesota,
30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994).
C.
Viewing the plain meaning of “volunteer worker” through the
prism of West Virginia’s rules of insurance-policy construction,
we find that Lambert assuredly does not qualify as a “volunteer
worker” under the Policy.
As the foregoing makes clear, absence of coercion is the
thread uniting the disparate definitions of “volunteer.” To be
considered a “volunteer worker,” then, Lambert must have elected
to work of his own volition. A close look at West Virginia
statutes and the nature of Lambert’s confinement reveals that
his work in the kitchen was anything but voluntary. As an
11
initial matter, Lambert conceded that he was obligated to work
at the Jail in some capacity. The Jail’s policy is wholly
consistent with West Virginia law, which requires inmates to
participate in jail work assignments, W. Va. Code R. § 95-1-
21.3. 3 Because Lambert was compelled to work at the Jail, he
cannot be considered a “volunteer worker” under the Policy. 4
The nature of incarceration and the jail-inmate
relationship further underscores that Lambert is by no means a
“volunteer worker.” We have emphasized that, “[b]ecause . . .
inmates are involuntarily incarcerated, the [jail] wields
virtually absolute control over them to a degree simply not
3
Appellees argue that a West Virginia regulation, W. Va.
Code R. § 95-1-20.2, gives an inmate like Lambert the option of
volunteering for work assignments. They mistakenly view this
regulation out of context. In full, the regulation states,
“Pre-trial and unsentenced detainees shall not be required to
work except to do personal housekeeping. Any inmate may
volunteer for work assignments or institutional programs.” Id.
By its very terms, the regulation gives the option of
volunteering for work assignments only to pre-trial and
unsentenced detainees, a class that does not include Lambert.
Indeed, for inmates who have already been sentenced, West
Virginia regulations impose a duty to work.
Id. § 95-1-21.3.
4
Appellees’ reliance on In re Wissink, 81 P.3d 865 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2003), misses the mark. The court in Wissink held that
an inmate was properly classified as a volunteer where the jail
did not require participation in work assignments, a factor
critical to the court’s conclusion that the inmate “made an
active and reasoned decision to work. . . . [and] was not
coerced or forced to work in contravention of his own will.”
Id. at 869. In stark contrast to the regime at issue in
Wissink, the Jail required Lambert to work. Wissink is thus
readily distinguishable.
12
found in the free labor situation of true employment.” Harker,
990 F.2d at 133; accord
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 810 (“[T]here is
too much control to classify the [jail-inmate] relationship as
one of employment.”). Because a volunteer generally enjoys more
freedom than an employee and courts uniformly hold that a jail’s
absolute authority over an inmate precludes a finding that an
inmate is an employee, we have little trouble concluding that an
inmate is not a “volunteer worker.” Indeed, Lambert’s thwarted
protest provides a case study in the coercive authority of
jails. Whereas a volunteer worker under the ordinary meaning of
the term would have been free to leave his shift at his
discretion without suffering a concrete penalty, Lambert was put
in “the hole” for five days when he refused to finish his
kitchen shift. At bottom, the Jail’s “virtually absolute
control” over Lambert,
Harker, 990 F.2d at 133, which renders
Lambert’s status as a worker something approximating involuntary
servitude,
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809, yields an impossible fit
between his role and the definition of “volunteer worker.”
That Lambert succeeded in his efforts to obtain a work
assignment in the kitchen does not undermine his exclusion from
Policy coverage. To be sure, Lambert submitted an application
to work in the kitchen out of a desire “[t]o eat extra food and
to get out of [his] cell.” J.A. 118. But his ability to
express an assignment preference does not convert the
13
overarching obligation to work from required to optional. See
Burleson, 83 F.3d at 314 (“[P]laintiffs mistakenly equate the
ability to choose between various work programs offered by the
[jail], with the freedom to ‘sell’ their labor.”). Had Lambert
failed to submit an application or had the Jail denied his
request to serve in the kitchen, he still would have been forced
to work in some capacity. Nor does Lambert’s choice to apply
for a job in the kitchen alter the Jail’s broader coercive
authority and “virtually absolute control” over him, see
Harker,
990 F.2d at 133, factors that we find make Lambert anything but
a “volunteer worker.”
III.
The common and customary meaning of “volunteer worker”
forecloses Lambert’s classification as an “insured” under the
Policy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of National
Union.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
14
