Filed: Jan. 20, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-1279 PATRICK HENRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, a West Virginia corporation, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GERALD MILLER, Dr., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, Chief District Judge. (3:08-cv-00175-JPB) Submitted: December 20, 2011 Decided: January 20, 2012 Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges,
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-1279 PATRICK HENRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, a West Virginia corporation, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. GERALD MILLER, Dr., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, Chief District Judge. (3:08-cv-00175-JPB) Submitted: December 20, 2011 Decided: January 20, 2012 Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1279
PATRICK HENRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED,
a West Virginia corporation,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GERALD MILLER, Dr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:08-cv-00175-JPB)
Submitted: December 20, 2011 Decided: January 20, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard G. Gay, Nathan P. Cochran, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD G. GAY,
LC, Berkeley Springs, West Virginia, for Appellant. Braun A.
Hamstead, HAMSTEAD & ASSOCIATES, L.C., Charles Town, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Henry Estates Homeowners Association,
Incorporated (“Association”) brought an action against Dr.
Gerald Miller, the present owner of certain properties within
the residential development, Patrick Henry Estates Subdivision
(“Subdivision”), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as
well as compensatory damages. ∗ Miller appeals the district
court’s order granting the Association permanent injunctions and
compensatory damages. We have thoroughly reviewed the record
and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.
The Subdivision is accessed from U.S. Route 340 over a
short public roadway known as Patrick Henry Way, which becomes a
private road as it enters the Subdivision, running in a northern
direction and providing access to lateral side streets. Miller
obtained ownership of the Subdivision in 1986 and sold Sections
C and D to other developers, but retained ownership of the
common areas, roadways, and Lot C-1. The Declaration of Road
Maintenance Covenants and Restrictions (“Declaration”), which
governs the real property within the Subdivision, provides that
it is the responsibility of the developer “to maintain the
∗
The case was originally filed in the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County, West Virginia, and later removed to the
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia by
Miller, based upon federal diversity jurisdiction.
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streets, and all common properties . . . until such time as
these amenities are dedicated and deeded to the Association.”
In addition, the Declaration provides that the developer “shall
convey the common properties to the Association . . . not later
than January 1, 1987.” Miller attempted to have the State
Highway Department take over road maintenance to avoid his
responsibility to maintain the streets, did not complete
construction of the roads by January 1, 1987, and did not convey
the roadways to the Association once completed. The parties do
not dispute that the roads, as well as the drainage system, were
in need of repair at the time of trial. In addition, Miller
permitted weeds and grass to grow to an excessive height on Lot
C-1.
In July 2008, Miller informed the Association of his
intent to develop land located immediately adjacent to the
Subdivision into a residential apartment complex, known as Sloan
Square Apartments (“Sloan Square”). Miller planned to utilize
Lot C-1, which the plat of Patrick Henry Estates describes as a
residential lot, as a roadway to access Sloan Square. In
addition, approximately 42 acres of the Subdivision, which lie
immediately adjacent to the existing residential development to
the north, were never developed. In 2006, Miller annexed the
42-acre undeveloped parcel into the City of Ranson, West
Virginia, intending to construct a residential and commercial
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development on the parcel, known as the Village of Shenandoah
Springs (“Village”). Miller purchased a lot in the adjacent
existing Shenandoah Springs Development to use as one of two
access points to the Village. Prior to this litigation, Miller
anticipated annexing Patrick Henry Way into the City of Ranson
as well, to serve as the second access point. In order to
complete this construction, however, Miller needed to reserve
unrestricted rights of way through the Subdivision streets.
Upon discovery of Miller’s intended construction, the
Association filed a complaint against Miller, seeking: (1) a
permanent injunction requiring Miller to maintain the roads in
the Subdivision, or, alternatively, damages to conduct the
necessary repairs; (2) a permanent injunction requiring Miller
to dedicate and deed the common elements within the Subdivision
to the Association; (3) a permanent injunction prohibiting
Miller from using Lot C-1 as an access roadway to Sloan Square;
(4) a permanent injunction requiring Miller to maintain Lot C-1
in accordance with the Declaration; and (5) compensatory damages
of not less than $250,000 for the Association’s previous
expenditures to maintain the roadways from 1985 to the filing of
the instant lawsuit.
Following a bench trial, the district court found that
the Declaration unequivocally required Miller to maintain the
roads and common properties in the Subdivision, and ordered
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Miller to bring the roads, drainage, and other common elements
of Patrick Henry Estates up to the condition that would have
existed had they been properly maintained since their
construction. In the alternative, the court ordered Miller to
pay the Association an amount equal to the cost provided by the
Association’s contractor to perform the work. The court also
awarded the Association an injunction requiring Miller to
execute a deed conveying the common elements of the Subdivision
to the Association.
With respect to the scope of Miller’s easement, the
court found that Miller may utilize a reserved right of way over
Patrick Henry Way to access the residue of his property to the
north for limited commercial purposes, but may not use
Beauregard Boulevard or Greene Avenue, lateral side streets in
the Subdivision, to access any commercial development, as these
roadways exist to access single-family homes. Additionally, the
court ruled that Miller may not utilize Patrick Henry Way to
access property in addition to the residual portion of Patrick
Henry Estates, as this would cause the roadway to become a
“through road,” greatly increasing the traffic and extending the
easement to other lands owned by Miller. The court granted the
Association an injunction prohibiting Miller from utilizing Lot
C-1 as a roadway, as it would be impossible to access Sloan
Square through Lot C-1 without crossing the “Walking and Buffer
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Area” directly behind the lot, which is a common element of the
Subdivision owned by the Association. Further, the court
ordered Miller to maintain Lot C-1 “in such a manner that the
grass or other vegetation thereupon does not reach a height of
eight (8) inches.” Finally, the court awarded the Association
compensatory damages in the amount of $51,387 for expenses
incurred by the Association in maintaining the Subdivision since
1998, but denied the Association’s request for attorney’s fees.
We review a district court’s conclusions of law at a
bench trial de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
Roanoke Cement Co. v. Falk Corp., 413 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir.
2005). On appeal, Miller contends that the district court
erroneously prohibited the use of Patrick Henry Way to access
property in addition to the residual portion of the Subdivision—
the 42 acres of undeveloped land. Miller first contends that
the district court misinterpreted the plain language of the
Declaration and the Subdivision deeds. The deed from the
original grantor (Shendo) reserving an easement over the
Subdivision’s roadways, which appears in the chain of title for
all of the lots located in Section B and D of the Subdivision,
states in relevant part: “The Grantees acknowledge that Shendo
has reserved and retained the right to provide within the
Patrick Henry Estates Subdivision areas for commercial,
educational, civic, social, charitable, medical and other
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purposes.” Based upon this language, Miller argues that he is
entitled to reserve unrestricted easements and rights of way
that would allow him to complete the development of the 42-acre
property.
Pursuant to West Virginia law, which governs this
diversity lawsuit, “[t]he fundamental rule in construing
covenants and restrictive agreements is that the intention of
the parties governs. That intention is gathered from the entire
instrument by which the restriction is created, the surrounding
circumstances and the objects which the covenant is designed to
accomplish.” G. Corp., Inc. v. MackJo, Inc., 466 S.E.2d 820,
825 (W.Va. 1995) (citing Wallace v. St. Clair,
127 S.E.2d 742,
751 (W.Va. 1962)). Further, the owner of an easement “cannot
materially increase the burden of it upon the servient estate,
nor impose a new or additional burden thereon.” Nat’l Lead Co.
v. Kanawha Block Co.,
288 F. Supp. 357, 365 (S.D.W. Va. 1968).
“An easement of a right of way over another’s property . . . is
not personal to the owner, authorizing him to use it in
connection with other real estate he may own.” Dorsey v.
Dorsey,
153 S.E. 146, 146 (W.Va. 1930); see also Ratcliff v.
Cyrus,
544 S.E.2d 93, 97 (W.Va. 2001) (“[A]n easement cannot be
extended as a matter of right, by the owner of the dominant
estate, to other lands owned by him.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
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The district court correctly held that Miller’s
intended use of Patrick Henry Way to connect his planned
Village, located on the 42-acre undeveloped parcel of the
Subdivision, to the adjoining existing Shenandoah Springs
Development, would overburden the easement and exceed its
intended scope. The deed language reserves an easement over the
Subdivision roadways for future commercial, educational, civic,
social, charitable, or medical developments “within the Patrick
Henry Estates Subdivision areas.” (emphasis added). Miller
seeks to impermissibly extend the reserved easement through
Patrick Henry Way beyond the dominant property—Patrick Henry
Estates—into the adjacent Shenandoah Springs Development lot
owned by Miller, so as to access the City of Ranson. As the
district court correctly found, Miller cannot utilize his
reserved easement to access property he owns outside of Patrick
Henry Estates. Moreover, we find unimpeachable the court’s
finding that Miller’s intended use of Patrick Henry Way to
connect his planned Village to the Shenandoah Springs
Development and the City of Ranson would expose the Subdivision
to traffic from a major highway, Flowing Springs Road, thereby
significantly increasing the roadway traffic and overburdening
the easement.
Miller next contends that the district court’s failure
to consider the City of Ranson’s Annexation Order, which annexed
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Miller’s 42-acre undeveloped property into the Ranson city
limits, “usurp[ed] the plenary power of the City of Ranson.”
According to Miller, “the District Court ruled that Miller
cannot connect his undeveloped property (now lying totally
within Ranson) to the Ranson city streets.” However, Miller
plainly misconstrues the holding of the district court; the
court’s order prohibits Miller from utilizing Patrick Henry Way
to access property beyond the 42-acre undeveloped parcel,
namely, the existing Shenandoah Springs Development, which
connects to the highway of Flowing Springs Road.
Notwithstanding the court’s order, Miller may still utilize the
lot purchased in the adjacent existing Shenandoah Springs
Development to access the planned Village, thereby connecting
the Village to the City of Ranson.
Miller next argues that the district court erroneously
found that Miller may not use Lot C-1 as an access point to
reach Sloan Square. Miller asserts that the Declaration permits
him to change the use of Lot C-1 from residential to street
access. However, a “Walking and Buffer Area” is located
immediately behind Lot C-1, which is a “common element” of
Patrick Henry Estates subject to the court-ordered conveyance to
the Association. Therefore, the district court correctly held
that Miller may not construct a roadway on Lot C-1 across the
9
“Walking and Buffer Area,” now owned by the Association, without
the Association’s permission.
Miller next argues that the district court erred in
awarding the Association permanent injunctions prohibiting
Miller from using Patrick Henry Way to access property in
addition to the residual portion of Patrick Henry Estates,
prohibiting Miller from using other lateral side streets of the
Subdivision to access commercial development, and prohibiting
Miller from using Lot C-1 to access Sloan Square. According to
Miller, the court’s injunctions have the effect of prohibiting
his intended development on the 42-acre property, as well as
Sloan Square, because current subdivision regulations require
two entrances, and the court-ordered injunctions leave both
developments with only one entrance. Thus, Miller argues, the
injunctions are more burdensome than necessary and broader in
scope than necessary.
The grant of a permanent injunction is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379, 392 (4th Cir. 2001). In doing
so, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo.
Id. Under West
Virginia law, a permanent injunction is appropriate “where the
right of an applicant seeking relief is clear and the necessity
for such relief is urgent.” Sams v. Goff,
540 S.E.2d 532, 535
10
(W.Va. 1999) (citing State Rd. Comm’n v. Oakes, 149 S.E.2d 293
(W.Va. 1966)). Further, “[f]or the existence of a legal remedy
to bar injunctive relief, it must appear that the legal remedy
is as practical and efficient to secure the ends of justice and
its prompt administration as injunctive relief.”
Id. (citing
Consumers Gas Util. Co. v. Wright,
44 S.E.2d 584 (W.Va. 1947)).
In deciding whether to grant a mandatory injunction, a court
should consider “the nature of the controversy, the object for
which the injunction is being sought, and the comparative
hardship or convenience to the respective parties involved.”
Foster v. Orchard Dev. Co., LLC,
705 S.E.2d 816, 827 (W.Va.
2010). We find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding the Association permanent injunctions, as
a remedy at law would be inadequate.
Miller next asserts that the district court abused its
discretion in awarding the Association damages at law for prior
maintenance provided by the Association, while also awarding the
Association permanent injunctions prohibiting Miller from
utilizing Lot C-1 to access Sloan Square or Patrick Henry Way to
access property beyond the 42-acre parcel, as well as ordering
Miller to bring the roadways up to the condition that would have
existed had the roads been properly maintained since their
construction.
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We review a district court’s award of damages under a
clearly erroneous standard. See Kolkhorst v. Tilghman, 897 F.2d
1282, 1288 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The trial court, as a fact-finder,
possesses considerable discretion in fixing damages, and its
decision will be upheld absent clear error.”) (citing Little
Beaver Enter. v. Humphreys Rys., Inc.,
719 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir.
1983)). We find that the court’s award of damages at law, as
well as an injunction requiring compliance with the Declaration,
was within the court’s discretion.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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