Filed: Jan. 24, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2065 ZONG MING ZHU, Petitioner, v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Submitted: January 12, 2012 Decided: January 24, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Zong Ming Zhu, Petitioner Pro Se. Kiley L. Kane, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2065 ZONG MING ZHU, Petitioner, v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Submitted: January 12, 2012 Decided: January 24, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Zong Ming Zhu, Petitioner Pro Se. Kiley L. Kane, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2065
ZONG MING ZHU,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 12, 2012 Decided: January 24, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Zong Ming Zhu, Petitioner Pro Se. Kiley L. Kane, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Zong Ming Zhu, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the
immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person
unwilling or unable to return to his or her native country
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). “Persecution involves the infliction
or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or
freedom, on account of one of the enumerated grounds[.]” Qiao
Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2011), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in his native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
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“An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject of past
persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004).
Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Id. at 187. The well-founded fear standard contains
both a subjective and an objective component. The objective
element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that
would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear
persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales,
445 F.3d 351, 353
(4th Cir. 2006). “The subjective component can be met through
the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . [It] must have
some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be validated
with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be mere
irrational apprehension[.]” Qiao Hua
Li, 405 F.3d at 176
(internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted).
A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
on credibility grounds must offer “specific, cogent reason[s]”
for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989).
“Examples of specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent
statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable
testimony[.]” Tewabe v. Gonzales,
446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.
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2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court accords
broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings
supported by substantial evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d
361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004).
The REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the law regarding
credibility determinations for applications for asylum and
withholding of removal filed after May 11, 2005, as is the case
here. Such determinations are to be made based on the totality
of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including:
the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the
applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the
applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency
between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
statements (whenever made and whether or not under
oath, and considering the circumstances under which
the statements were made), the internal consistency of
each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with other evidence of record . . . and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
claim[.]
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative
findings of fact, including findings on credibility, are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006).
4
This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS,
296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
We conclude that the adverse credibility finding is
supported by substantial evidence. The record shows that the
authenticity of some of Zhu’s documents was called into
question. The record also shows that Zhu was non-responsive to
several questions. We also conclude that substantial evidence
supports the finding that even if Zhu was credible, he did not
show that he was the victim of past persecution. “Persecution
is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of
treatment that our society regards as offensive.” Qiao Hua Li,
405 F.3d at 177. Brief detentions and repeated interrogations,
even those occurring over a substantial period of time, do not
necessarily amount to persecution. Id.; see also Kondakova v.
Ashcroft,
383 F.3d 792, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that
“[m]inor beatings and brief detentions” do not constitute
persecution). In addition, we find no error with the finding
that Zhu did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
Accordingly, the record does not compel us to reach a different
conclusion.
5
We also conclude that substantial evidence supports
the finding that Zhu did not establish eligibility for relief
under the CAT.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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