Filed: Feb. 10, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-4764 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RANDALL H. ROBERTSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:10-cr-00263-DCN-1) Submitted: January 26, 2012 Decided: February 10, 2012 Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant F
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-4764 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RANDALL H. ROBERTSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:10-cr-00263-DCN-1) Submitted: January 26, 2012 Decided: February 10, 2012 Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Fe..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4764
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RANDALL H. ROBERTSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:10-cr-00263-DCN-1)
Submitted: January 26, 2012 Decided: February 10, 2012
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Nettles,
United States Attorney, M. Rhett DeHart, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Randall H. Robertson pled guilty to possessing child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (West
Supp. 2011). Although Robertson’s Guidelines sentencing range
was 87-108 months, Robertson sought a variance to a
noncustodial, supervisory sentence. The district court rejected
Robertson’s request for a noncustodial sentence, but agreed that
a variant sentence was appropriate. It accordingly imposed an
active prison term of forty-two months’ imprisonment. Robertson
challenges the reasonableness of this sentence on appeal. We
affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence.
Id.
First, we assess whether the district court properly calculated
the Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Id. at 49-50; see
United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n
individualized explanation must accompany every sentence.”);
United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(same). An extensive explanation is not required as long as the
appellate court is satisfied “‘that [the district court] has
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considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United
States v. Engle,
592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita
v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
Robertson asserts that the district court failed to
give a particularized explanation for the sentence in open
court. Even assuming, however, that the court’s explanation
during the sentencing hearing did not satisfy Carter and Lynn,
we agree with the Government’s assertion that any procedural
error is harmless.
The district court issued a sentencing order placing
on the record a thorough explanation of the reasons for its
chosen sentence. The sentencing order, as well as the court’s
interactions with the parties and Robertson during the
sentencing hearing, reflects the district court’s familiarity
with Robertson’s particular circumstances. We are unpersuaded
by Robertson’s arguments to the contrary. Thus, any procedural
error occasioned by the court’s articulation of the basis for
the chosen sentence in a written order rather than in open court
did not prejudice any of Robertson’s substantial rights.
Turning to the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, we may presume that a sentence within the Guidelines
range is reasonable; however, we may not presume that a sentence
outside the Guidelines range is unreasonable.
Gall, 552 U.S. at
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51; see United States v. Tucker,
473 F.3d 556, 560-62 (4th Cir.
2007) (reviewing district court’s variance sentence for
reasonableness). Rather, in reviewing a sentence outside the
Guidelines range, this court must “consider whether the
sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its
decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the
extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United
States v. Hernandez-Villanueva,
473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). The substantive reasonableness of the
sentence “entails taking into account the totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.” United States v. Pauley,
511 F.3d 468, 473
(4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court explained its reasons both
for imposing a below-Guidelines sentence and for declining to
grant Robertson’s request for a noncustodial sentence. While
the district court’s explanation was not extensive, it
meaningfully referenced the § 3553(a) factors and provided an
adequate basis for appellate review. Especially considering
that the court’s variant sentence worked significantly to
Robertson’s advantage, we have no difficulty concluding that the
sentence imposed by the district court is substantively
reasonable.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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