BAILEY, Judge.
The Locketts present three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following one: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood.
We also address sua sponte the status of the Locketts' claims against McGee.
In early 2010, then seventeen-year-old Angelique suspected she was pregnant and informed her boyfriend's mother, McGee. Present during the conversation with McGee was Raven Francis ("Francis"), the girlfriend of another of McGee's sons. Although unsure if she was pregnant, Angelique discussed with McGee and Francis the possibility of obtaining an abortion at Planned Parenthood. Francis, who was eighteen-years-old at the time, offered to loan Angelique her Indiana State-issued identification ("ID") and Medicaid cards so that Angelique could represent herself to Planned Parenthood as old enough to independently consent to medical treatment. Francis's boyfriend opined that Angelique and Francis resembled each other, even though Angelique weighed twenty pounds less and stood four inches shorter than the weight and height listed on Francis's ID card. Angelique was skeptical that the ruse would work, but took Francis's ID. Angelique did not tell her mother, Lanetra, of her suspected pregnancy or plans to visit Planned Parenthood.
On January 22, 2010, McGee took Angelique to Planned Parenthood's Merrillville
During the visit, Angelique underwent an ultrasound and blood and urine tests. The tests confirmed that Angelique was pregnant and in her first trimester. After undergoing counseling outside of McGee's presence, Angelique forged the name "Raven Francis" on a form consenting to an abortion and acknowledging that she had received the statutorily-prescribed information regarding the procedure and abortion alternatives. Angelique specifically recalled signing this form, further describing it as:
(App. 156-57.) Angelique did not tell anyone at Planned Parenthood that she was actually Angelique Lockett or that McGee was not her mother. McGee paid in advance for the procedure.
Six days later, on January 28, 2010, Angelique returned to Planned Parenthood. Angelique was not asked to present ID during the second appointment, but she again represented herself as Francis. The copy of Francis's ID made on the first visit was included in Angelique's patient file, which the physician reviewed and found "to be in order." (App. 76.) McGee was not present at the beginning of the appointment, but arrived later. An abortion was performed. Lanetra, who was not aware that her daughter was pregnant and considering an abortion, did not consent to the procedure.
On August 30, 2011, Angelique, now an adult, and Lanetra filed a complaint against Planned Parenthood and McGee, alleging that Angelique and Lanetra were harmed when Planned Parenthood's physician performed an abortion on Angelique without Lanetra's consent.
On December 5, 2013, Planned Parenthood filed a motion for summary judgment, in which it argued that an immunity provision of the HCCA
On June 13, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Planned Parenthood's motion for summary judgment. The court also heard argument on the Locketts' motion to strike portions of affidavits designated
On June 20, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting the Locketts' motion to strike certain evidence. The court also found: "There is no genuine issue that the Statute I.C. § 16-34-2-4 [governing parental consent and judicial bypass procedures for abortions performed on minors] does not confer on the Plaintiff a private right of action, which would allow her to bring a civil suit against the Defendants." (App. 1.) The trial court then granted Planned Parenthood's motion for summary judgment. The court also dismissed the Locketts' complaint in its entirety and entered "Judgment for Defendants."
The Locketts now appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood.
Indiana Trial Rule 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Trial Rule 56(C) provides that a trial court shall grant summary judgment for the movant "if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." When we review a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as for the trial court. Asklar v. Gilb, 9 N.E.3d 165, 167 (Ind.2014). The moving party must show there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the moving party carries its burden, then the non-movant must present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
When we decide whether summary judgment was properly granted or denied, we consider only the evidence the parties specifically designated to the trial court. T.R. 56(C), (H). We construe all facts and all reasonable inferences established by the designated evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Asklar, 9 N.E.3d at 167. "As a reviewing court, we are not limited to reviewing the trial court's reasons for granting or denying summary judgment but rather may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by the evidence." Keaton & Keaton v. Keaton, 842 N.E.2d 816, 821 (Ind.2006).
The Locketts argue that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment on the basis that Indiana Code chapter 16-34-2 does not confer upon the Locketts a private cause of action to enforce the statutory provisions.
Indiana Code chapter 16-34-2 is, in essence, a criminal statute that carefully delineates the circumstances under which abortion is legal in Indiana. Section 16-34-2-1 (2008)
I.C. § 16-34-2-1(a)(1). Section 16-34-2-1.1 provides that a physician may only perform an abortion with the "voluntary and informed consent of the pregnant woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed[,]" and specifies an extensive list of procedures that must be followed before a physician is considered to have obtained voluntary and informed consent.
The chapter contains no provision for civil enforcement or any express indication that the legislature intended to create it.
Based on our examination of the statute, we conclude that the legislature intended the provisions of Indiana Code chapter 16-34-2 to protect the general public from persons who, without the professional training and judgment to make the necessary medical determinations—including post-fertilization age of the fetus, trimester of pregnancy, whether consent is informed, or whether abortion is necessary to preserve a woman's life—would perform illegal abortions. Furthermore, the statute contains a comprehensive enforcement mechanism that provides criminal penalties for statutory violations. The statute contains no civil enforcement provisions. "As a general rule, a private party may not enforce rights under a statute designed to protect the public in general and containing a comprehensive enforcement mechanism." LTV Steel Co., 730 N.E.2d at 1260. Because we find both components here, we hold that Indiana Code chapter 16-34-2 does not confer upon the Locketts a private cause of action to enforce the statute's provisions.
The Locketts argue, however, that the statute confers a private cause of action because "the statute does in fact impose a duty for a particular individual's protection, as opposed to a general public benefit." (Appellants' Br. 15.) However, the fact that a statute incidentally benefits individuals while furthering more general public goals does not alone support the finding of a private cause of action. "[E]ven where a duty benefits an individual, we will not infer a private right of action unless that appears to be the Legislature's intent." F.D. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131, 143 (Ind.2013) (Rush, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Borne ex rel. Borne v. Nw. Allen Cnty. Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (holding that a statute requiring individuals to orally report suspected child abuse and neglect did not create a private cause of action because, even though the reporting requirement individually benefitted potential victims of child abuse and neglect, "there [was] no apparent intent to authorize a civil action for failure of an individual to make the oral report"), trans. denied. Absent legislative intent to create such a right, we will not impose it.
The Locketts contend, however, that the trial court erred in dismissing their entire complaint because they alleged various common law claims that are unaffected by whether the statute confers upon them a private cause of action.
As best we can discern from their arguments on appeal, it appears that the Locketts seek to advance various common law theories arising from Planned Parenthood's performance of an allegedly "unauthorized (or insufficiently authorized) medical procedure" on Angelique. (Appellants' Br. 11.) As summarized in their brief, "the act that is complained of" is Planned Parenthood's "failure to obtain voluntary and informed consent before performing an abortion" and that this failure was "the direct cause of the injuries suffered by both Lanetra and Angelique Lockett." (Appellants' Br. 17.)
We turn first to the Locketts' contention that Lanetra may pursue a common law negligence claim against Planned Parenthood arising out of Planned Parenthood's failure to obtain Lanetra's
It is hornbook law that to prevail on a negligence claim at common law, the plaintiff must show: (1) duty owed to the plaintiff by defendant; (2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty. Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind.2010). Absent a duty, there can be no negligence or liability based on the breach. Id. Whether the law recognizes any duty on the part of a particular defendant to conform his or her conduct to a certain standard for the benefit of the plaintiff is a question of law for the court to decide. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991).
The Locketts do not use the terms "duty," "breach," or "proximate cause," to explain Lanetra's negligence claim against Planned Parenthood. Instead, they couch their discussion in terms of "rights," particularly focusing on the constitutional dimension of parental rights. (See Appellants' Br. 10-14.) The Locketts cite authority affirming the "constitutional dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children[,]" Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), and recognizing "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." Id. at 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The Locketts seem to argue that this constitutional liberty interest creates a corresponding duty owed by a health care provider to a minor's parent to notify and obtain consent from the parent when a minor seeks an abortion. They argue that Section 16-34-2-4 merely codifies, not creates, this duty.
We first observe that, to the extent that Lanetra seeks to protect her constitutional liberty interests, she has not alleged state action to support such a claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children has been relevant to whether parental consent and notification provisions unconstitutionally burden the right to an abortion. "Numerous and significant interests compete when a minor decides whether or not to abort her pregnancy." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 418-19, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). These competing interests include a parent's interest in directing his or her child's upbringing. Id. at 419, 101 S.Ct. 1164.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the Locketts' argument that Lanetra's common law claims, combined with the alleged violation of Indiana Code section 16-34-2-4, provide Lanetra an action for negligence per se that exists regardless of whether the statute affords a private cause of action. "[T]he unexcused violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence per se if the statute or ordinance is intended to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included and to protect against the risk of the type of harm which has occurred as a result of its violation." Kho v. Pennington, 875 N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ind.2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Parental notice and consent requirements generally reflect a legislative judgment that, "[a]s immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences,. . . parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (Bellotti II). Indeed, "the justification for any rule regarding parental involvement in the abortion decision rests entirely on the best interest of the child." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 454, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990) (emphasis added). In other words, parental notice and consent requirements in abortion statutes are intended to benefit the minor woman seeking the abortion, rather than the woman's parent. Parents thus are not included in "the class of persons" intended to be protected by Indiana Code section 16-34-2-4.
Because Planned Parenthood owes Lanetra no duty at common law and Lanetra is not in the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute, Lanetra may not maintain against Planned Parenthood either common law negligence or negligence per se claims based on Planned Parenthood's failure to obtain her consent before providing abortion services to Angelique.
Having concluded that Lanetra's claims, if any, are not independent of Angelique's claims, we turn next to Angelique's common law claims against Planned Parenthood for negligence, assault, battery, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, Planned Parenthood reasserts two defenses originally presented to, but not explicitly adopted by, the trial court: an immunity provision of the HCCA and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. We address both defenses as they apply to Angelique's claims.
The facts of this case establish that Angelique presented herself to Planned Parenthood as an individual authorized to consent to her own health care, that is, eighteen-year-old Raven Francis. Based on this representation, Planned Parenthood obtained consent only from the patient. The Locketts now seek to recover damages resulting from Planned Parenthood's provision of health care on the ground that Angelique was unauthorized to consent due to her minority.
The HCCA contains "extensive" immunity provisions for health care providers relying on individuals they believe in good faith are authorized to consent to health care. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 43 (Ind.1991). At the time Angelique obtained services at Planned Parenthood, the HCCA provided:
I.C. § 16-36-1-10(a) (2008). Planned Parenthood contends that this provision immunizes the organization from civil liability on the ground that Angelique lacked authority or capacity to consent.
The Locketts first argue that the HCCA does not apply in this case because the HCCA "is clearly meant to provide health care providers some measure of immunity for their actions when relying on third parties who make health care decisions for someone else. In other words, its [sic] about advance directives." (Appellants' Br. 20.)
The overarching principle in statutory interpretation is to first decide "whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question." Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Ind.2011) (quoting Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Phelps Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ind.2001)). If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we do not apply any rules of construction other than giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language. Id. Thus, we will not delve into legislative intent unnecessarily if no ambiguity exists. Id.
Here, nothing in the statutory language limits the Section's application
The Locketts next argue that Section 16-36-1-12(d) of the HCCA, which provides "[t]his chapter does not affect any requirement of notice to others of proposed health care under any other Indiana law[,]" precludes the HCCA's application to this case. They baldly assert, without citation to authority, that Section 16-34-2-4 is a notice provision, and then argue that because the HCCA does not "affect" the notice provisions of Indiana abortion law, the HCCA cannot provide Planned Parenthood immunity for a failure to comply with Section 16-34-2-4.
First, Section 16-34-2-4 is a consent, not a notice, provision, as demonstrated by the inclusion of a confidential judicial bypass procedure that does not require parental notice. To the extent the Locketts argue that application of the HCCA would override substantive law related to notice, we decline the invitation to construe as substantive that which is procedural. Finally, even if we accepted the argument that a parental notice requirement is implicitly included within the consent provision, we observe that Planned Parenthood had no reason to comply with Section 16-34-2-4 because Angelique misrepresented herself to be an adult authorized to consent to her own health care, and Chapter 16-34-2 does not require notice to another person when an adult woman seeks an abortion. In sum, nothing in the arguments presented on appeal persuades us that the immunity provision does not apply here, where Planned Parenthood administered health care in reliance on the consent of an individual that the organization believed had authority to consent.
The Locketts next argue that even if the HCCA applies, Planned Parenthood has failed to establish that it believed in good faith that Angelique was authorized to consent. "Good faith" is not defined in the HCCA, but generally refers to a state of mind consisting of "(1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage." Black's Law Dictionary 808 (10th ed. 2014). The absence of good faith is bad faith. Young v. Williamson, 497 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Ind.Ct. App.1986), trans. denied. "The phrase `bad faith' is commonly understood to mean `lack of honesty and trust' and `intent to deceive.'" WellPoint, Inc. v. Nat'l Union. Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 29 N.E.3d 716, 726 (Ind.2015) (quoting The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 154 (2d ed. 1987) & 1 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 921 (6th ed. 2007) respectively), modified on reh'g, No. 49S05-1404-PL-244, 38 N.E.3d 981, 2015 WL 4571544 (Ind. July 29, 2015). As this Court has explained:
Young, 497 N.E.2d at 617. See also Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind.2005) ("As a general proposition, a finding of bad faith requires evidence of a state of mind reflecting dishonest
The Locketts argue that "[w]ith no training provided to its employees and no facts alleged regarding any efforts on the part of Planned Parenthood staff, beyond making a copy of the identification, Planned Parenthood has made no allegation regarding its own good faith in the matter." (Appellants' Br. 23.)
We disagree. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Planned Parenthood designated an affidavit of a front desk employee who averred that she accepted the ID Angelique presented, ensured that it was an authentic State-issued ID, compared the ID photograph to Angelique, and concluded that the patient was who she represented herself to be, that is, eighteen-year-old Raven Francis. Angelique was then presented with a consent form that included the statutorily-prescribed voluntary and informed consent information, to which Angelique forged the name "Raven Francis." The designated consent form stated in part:
(App. 96.) When Angelique returned to Planned Parenthood six days later, Angelique again represented herself as Francis. Planned Parenthood's physician reviewed her chart, including the copy of the ID Angelique provided, and "found the patient's file and test results to be in order." (App. 76.)
The Locketts argue that "the good faith requirement of the HCCA means that the health care provider should at least confirm that the decision maker is who they claim to be." (Appellants' Br. 22.) However, the Locketts designated no evidence that Planned Parenthood's employees failed to check ID. Instead, the Locketts direct us to other statutes that require persons working in certain fields to undergo training on effective methods to check IDs,
However, the allegation that Planned Parenthood should have done more to detect Angelique's lies does not establish an absence of good faith. The designated facts establish that Planned Parenthood provided Angelique with an abortion because of a mistaken belief—based on Angelique's intentional misrepresentations—about Angelique's identity and age. A mistake of fact based on information provided by the patient does not demonstrate conscious wrongdoing for dishonest purpose, Young, 497 N.E.2d at 617, or lack of honesty and trust or intent to deceive. WellPoint, 29 N.E.3d at 726. In short, none of the evidence to which the Locketts point indicates an absence of good faith.
While Planned Parenthood's designated evidence establishes good faith, the Locketts have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Planned Parenthood's good faith belief. Planned Parenthood thus has shown its entitlement to summary judgment under the immunity provision of the HCCA.
Moreover, even if Planned Parenthood were not immune from civil liability under the HCCA, we conclude that Angelique should be equitably estopped from pursuing her claims due to her fraudulent acts.
Estoppel is a judicial doctrine sounding in equity. Brown v. Branch, 758 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind.2001). It is a concept by which one's own acts or conduct prevents the claiming of a right to the detriment of another party who was entitled to and did rely on the conduct. Id. at 52 (citing In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 715 (Ind.1998)). There are various estoppel doctrines, including estoppel by record, estoppel by deed, collateral estoppel, equitable estoppel (sometimes called estoppel in pais), promissory estoppel, and judicial estoppel. Id. All are based on the same underlying principle: "one who by deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position, attitude, or course of conduct that causes injury to such other." Id.
The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and is designed to aid in the administration of justice where, without its aid, injustice might result. Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ind.1994). Equitable estoppel is available only as a defense. Town of New Chicago v. City of Lake Station, 939 N.E.2d 638, 653 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). The party claiming estoppel has the burden to show all facts necessary to establish it.
The basis for equitable estoppel is fraud, either actual or constructive, on the part of the person estopped. Paramo v. Edwards, 563 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind.1990) (citing Lawshe v. Glen Park Lumber Co., Inc., 176 Ind.App. 344, 347, 375 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1978)). Constructive fraud arises by operation of law from conduct that, if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. New Chicago, 939 N.E.2d at 653 (citing Paramo, 563 N.E.2d at 598). Whether certain conduct actually prevents inquiry, eludes investigation, or misleads, reflects upon the unconscionability of the resulting advantage. Paramo, 563 N.E.2d at 599. "Whether conduct rises to the level sufficient to justify the application of equitable estoppel depends on the facts and circumstances of that particular case." Davis v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 957 N.E.2d 995, 999 (Ind. Ct.App.2011), trans. denied.
There is no dispute that Angelique fraudulently misrepresented herself as eighteen-year-old Raven Francis during her interactions with Planned Parenthood. The designated evidence shows that Planned Parenthood lacked knowledge of Angelique's true identity and age because Angelique concealed those facts. Planned Parenthood then relied on Angelique's misrepresentations and provided her with medical services after obtaining only her consent. Angelique now argues that her consent was insufficient, and she seeks to recover damages arising from Planned Parenthood's provision of services. Having shown the requisite elements of equitable estoppel, Planned Parenthood has carried its burden that summary judgment is appropriate on this ground.
On summary judgment, if the movant carries its burden to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-movant to present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Asklar, 9 N.E.3d at 167. The Locketts now point to the instrument of Angelique's fraud—Francis's ID—and argue that this document gave Planned Parenthood the "means of knowledge" as to the facts in question. Specifically, they argue that because the height and weight listed on Francis's ID differs from those recorded in Angelique's medical chart, Planned Parenthood "fail[ed] to avail itself of the information in its possession" in order to "detect the lie." (Appellants' Br. 25.) They also argue that Planned Parenthood should have adopted better training procedures to detect Angelique's use of another's ID. Having not done so, the Locketts argue that Planned Parenthood was negligent when it failed to root out Angelique's lie.
The designated evidence shows that Angelique not only withheld vital information, but engaged in a course of conduct designed to deceive Planned Parenthood.
As plainly stated in Angelique's deposition:
(App. 155.)
A health care provider, in the course of rendering treatment based on a patient's undetected misrepresentations, should not be held liable for failing to discover the patient's lies. See, e.g., Town of New Chicago, 939 N.E.2d at 641, 654 (where plaintiff gave "no indication that anything was wrong," holding that defendant invoking equitable estoppel did not have "means of knowledge" simply because defendant could have asked for more information from plaintiff). Nor should a health care provider be liable for failing to protect the patient from her own intentional acts. See, e.g., McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 910-12 (Ind.2009) (holding that there was no breach of a hospital's duty to protect a patient from domestic violence where, despite staff members' suspicions and signs that patient's ex-husband inflicted her wounds, hospital staff assented to patient's firm and unwavering insistence on departing with ex-husband, who killed her on the way home). To hold otherwise would be inequitable and unjust.
Under these facts and circumstances, where the negligence the Locketts allege is a failure to detect Angelique's lies, Planned Parenthood has established the defense of equitable estoppel, the Locketts have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and Planned Parenthood is entitled to summary judgment on Angelique's claims.
We turn our attention now to the Locketts' claims against McGee. In its order, the trial court granted Planned Parenthood's motion for summary judgment. The court also purportedly dismissed the Locketts' complaint in its entirety and entered "Judgment for Defendants," even though McGee may not have been served.
The Locketts' statement of the case asserts that "McGee has never appeared and no default was entered against her[.]" (Appellants' Br. 1.) We note that Trial Rule 55(B) requires that "[i]n all
Moreover, to the Locketts' point that McGee has not appeared, it is unclear whether the Locketts have ever successfully served McGee. The Chronological Case Summary ("CCS") contains two entries on September 30, 2011, showing that service of the summons and complaint was attempted on McGee by certified mail on September 6, 2011 and returned on September 30, 2011. One entry states "ACCEPTED," while the other indicates "Unsuccessful—Unclaimed." (App. 6.) Then, on August 16, 2012, the CCS contains an entry showing that the Locketts attempted to serve by sheriff an alias summons and complaint. According to an August 27, 2012 entry in the CCS, service by sheriff was returned as "Unsuccessful—Moved" with the comment "BOARDED UP ABANDONED PER SGT. L. SMITH ON 8/24/201[2]." (App. 6.) Thereafter, the CCS contains no additional entries of attempted service on McGee, but notes "returned mail addressed to Cathy McGee" on February 25, 2014 (App. 4), and "MAILE[D] PLEADINGS OF 6-20-14 RETURNED UNABLE TO FORWARD ON CATH[Y] MCGEE RECEIVED 7-14-14" on July 16, 2014. (App. 3.)
Because it appears that McGee has not been served, we think the court's order granting "Judgment for Defendants" and dismissing the complaint entirely was premature and therefore erroneous. We accordingly remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings with respect to McGee.
Indiana Code chapter 16-34-2 does not confer on the Locketts a private cause of action to sue Planned Parenthood for violations of the statute; accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood on the Locketts' claims brought to enforce the statutory provisions. Because Planned Parenthood did not owe Lanetra a duty at common law to obtain her consent to the abortion and because Lanetra is not in the class of persons intended to be protected by the parental consent provisions, Lanetra may not maintain against Planned Parenthood actions for negligence or negligence per se. Under these facts and circumstances, the HCCA provides Planned Parenthood immunity from civil liability. In addition, Angelique is equitably estopped from bringing her claims against Planned Parenthood due to her fraudulent acts. However, because the court's order was premature with respect to Angelique's claims brought against defendant McGee, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
