FERREN, Senior Judge:

In this suit claiming compensatory and punitive damages for age discrimination, the plaintiff-appellant, Bonnie Cain, appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the appellees, Deputy Mayor Victor Reinoso and the District of Columbia. The incidents at issue arose after the mayoral election of 2007 and the subsequent passage of the Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007.1 Cain had worked on behalf of Mayor Adrian Fenty's campaign, and Reinoso—newly named though not yet confirmed as Deputy Mayor for Education—hired her on January 7, 2007, as an education policy analyst (formally titled a "Special Assistant to the Deputy Mayor").2 Cain remained in that position at the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Education (ODME) for nearly one year until December 14, 2007, when, at age sixty-two, she was discharged by Reinoso. She alleges that, in terminating her employment, Reinoso violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA).3 She argues that she has established a prima facie case and rebutted appellees' pretextual explanation for retaining a younger special assistant instead of her during a period of downsizing at ODME. Concluding that summary judgment was properly granted, we affirm.

I.

Before addressing the particulars of Cain's claim, it will be useful to establish the legal framework for analysis. "In considering claims of discrimination under the DCHRA, we employ the same three-part, burden-shifting test articulated by the Supreme Court for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."4

Age discrimination must have "actually played a role in [the employer's decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome."6 Therefore, to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination,

Once the employee has made such a showing "by a preponderance of the evidence"—creating a "rebuttable presumption that the employer's conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination"8—the "burden of production," not persuasion, shifts to the employer.9 The employer can then satisfy its burden "by producing admissible evidence from which the trier of fact [can] rationally conclude that the employment action [was not] motivated by discriminatory animus" but, rather, reflected a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action.10 If the employer meets that burden, "the presumption of discrimination" raised by the employee's prima facie showing "is rebutted and drops from the case."11 At this point, the employee's burden to show that the employer's stated reason for its action was pretextual—a disguise for discrimination—"merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of intentional discrimination."12 Thus, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."13

This case is before us on summary judgment, which we review de novo.14 To prevail on appeal, defendants "must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law."15 Although "we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, `[c]onclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of summary judgment.'"16 The question, therefore, is whether there is any record evidence, after discovery, on which a jury could properly reach a verdict for the party with the burden of persuasion.17

II.

Very briefly summarized, Cain presents the following prima facie case: at age sixty-two she was a member of a protected class;18 she was qualified for her job;19 but she was fired nonetheless because of her age, as evidenced by (1) a "bogus" performance evaluation, (2) Reinoso's decision to hire an unqualified young woman in her thirties to replace Cain, and (3) a pattern of firing older employees and hiring only younger ones.

The trial court initially denied appellees' motion for summary judgment, but, after a hearing and supplementary briefing, granted the motion on the ground that Cain had "not established a prima facie case of age discrimination."20 We are not prepared to evaluate Cain's prima facie case and the trial court's judgment of it without understanding the larger context from which it arose—a context from which we can also discern and evaluate appellees' effort to refute Cain's case by establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for terminating Cain's employment. We shall therefore assume for sake of argument that Cain has established her prima facie case and address whether, in response, appellees have articulated a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis" for terminating Cain's employment at ODME.21

III.

It is undisputed that pursuant to the Reform Amendment Act22 adopted three months after Cain was hired, the Mayor gained control over the newly reorganized District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), through creation of a separate cabinet-level agency to replace the traditional, elected school board. The Act also gave the Deputy Mayor for Education the authority to reorganize and oversee the Office of the State Superintendent for Education (OSSE) and the Office of Public Education Facilities Modernization, as well as to create and staff a new Office of Ombudsman for Public Education.23

In his testimony before the Council of the District of Columbia (Council) on July 7, 2007 (and later under oath on deposition), Reinoso described his task as the Mayor's principal appointee charged with responsibility for these entities through ODME. He explained how he intended to modernize his office in an effort to ensure that ODME provided educational services to the District in a more efficient and effective manner. Among his goals, Reinoso sought to bring to the District a "central, coordinated, and aligned service delivery across all education levels." Implementation of this plan, in addition to oversight of OSSE and the "facilities modernization agency," would require organization of "five core functions" within ODME: (1) advise the mayor on educational strategy; (2) "[c]oordinate across [District] agencies for education-related initiatives"; (3) "[h]ouse and oversee an ombudsman to serve as the point of contact for residents"; (4) "[d]evelop partnerships in a systematic way" among the public and private sectors and non-profit agencies; and (5) "[c]oordinate parent and community involvement initiatives."

Reinoso informed the Council that, as guiding principles, ODME would provide a "lean" structure, and eliminate "redundant activities." ODME, according to Reinoso, had to "remain dynamic and flexible" and "only employ[] as many people as are necessary to accomplish [this] mission." He emphasized maintaining a staff with "a broad range of experience and skills sets, with a particular emphasis on the ability to jump into any issue to move it forward." ODME would also seek to avoid activities that duplicated those of OSSE or DCPS. The timeline for the transition, Reinoso added, would "occur[] over the next couple of months."24

There is a dispute as to when Reinoso informed ODME staff members of impending personnel changes. Reinoso says June 2007; Cain recalls "the end of July or right at the beginning of September."25 In any event, according to Cain's deposition, Reinoso told everyone that the Mayor required that ODME "downsize," and that he, Reinoso, would help staff members who wished to do so attempt to transfer to OSSE.26 Cain was interested in working at OSSE, informed Reinoso of that interest and, as a result, was detailed there.27 In the meantime, Reinoso was trying to figure out who was going to stay at ODME.28

On October 26, 2007, Reinoso informed the personnel office that he wished to dismiss Cain and Jackie Pinckney-Hackett (a woman in her fifties) effective November 30, 2007 (although Cain's leave date was later extended to December 14, 2007). Cain apparently did not learn of her impending separation from service until she received a notice of termination on November 14, 2007, the same day that Pinckney-Hackett received her notice.29

The parties dispute why Reinoso ended Cain's employment. Cain acknowledges on deposition, however, that neither Reinoso nor Eric Lerum, Reinoso's chief of staff, ever made any age-related or discriminatory remark to her. Reinoso offers the following explanations.

Reorganization, Including Downsizing

In the first place, Reinoso planned to reorganize ODME and downsize to three, or perhaps two, principal "special assistant" positions that would cover three of Reinoso's five proposed core functions: "interagency" relationships, "partnership" development, and "education strategy."30 Two of the older special assistants whose employments were eliminated along with Cain's at the end of 2007, Pinckney-Hackett and Julia Lara (a woman over age forty), were not qualified for any of the three positions. Reinoso had hired both of these other senior employees at about the time he hired Cain, but according to his deposition, Pinckney-Hackett's principal responsibility, "responding to parent complaints," was to be shifted from ODME to the new Ombudsman's Office, and "she was not qualified" by education or professional experience for any other position at ODME. Nor was ODME to continue dealing with the issues that Julia Lara had been handling-issues to be transferred to OSSE.

Cain does not dispute Reinoso's judgment, expressed at his deposition, that she was not "qualified either for the interagency position or the partnership position relative to other staff." The issue before us, therefore, concerns her qualifications for one of the newly designed, "education strategy" positions at ODME.

Cain's Performance Evaluation

On November 9, 2007, almost two weeks after Reinoso had asked personnel to prepare her termination papers, Reinoso gave Cain her first formal performance evaluation.31 According to Cain's affidavit, she left the evaluation meeting with no sense that her performance was anything but "commensurate with [her] position and responsibilities." As to the results, however, the record shows that Cain had the lowest scores in the office. Her evaluation showed a number of "threes," rather than the higher ranking "fours" and "fives." Reinoso testified on deposition that he had given Cain "threes" because she "[m]et expectations." A "five" meant one "exceed[ed] expectations." By contrast, the younger woman who received the education strategy position that Cain sought, Abigail Smith (aged thirty-seven), received mostly fours and fives.

Reinoso had several concerns about Cain's performance, including her relationships within the office. As to "teamwork," her evaluation (scored a "three") stated that she "need[ed] to improve in this area by working well with all team players." Specifically, Reinoso stressed on deposition that Cain had "worked well with some members of the team but not others." He identified tensions between Cain and another staff member with whom she was working on a project, and he explained how he had to counsel each on how to work more effectively together "to ensure that the team could move forward on its work."

Furthermore, Cain's evaluation stated (again, scored a "three") that she "need[ed] to improve on her ability to work on projects with less supervision." In advocating for her qualifications, Cain has emphasized that she drafted a well-received Business Plan for the new Ombudsman's Office that was posted on the Mayor's website in April 2007 and was still a "fixture" there. In commenting on Cain's development of that plan, however, Reinoso noted that Cain's initial efforts did not have "clarity and structure." Reinoso himself had to undertake research, provide business plan templates, show Cain how to adapt them to a government setting, and become "more involved than [he] should have been as a manager."

Superiority of Another Applicant

Especially important to Reinoso's decision to end Cain's employment was her qualifications vis-à-vis other candidates for the education strategy position. Reinoso's deposition reveals that even though Cain "was broadly qualified . . . around the education strategy position" (the focus of her ODME work), Reinoso concluded that, "relative to the other staff members who were also broadly qualified for the education strategy position, her performance was not of the caliber to make her a finalist." Reinoso continued:

Reinoso then compared Cain's qualifications to those of the successful applicant, Abigail Smith, who:

Reinoso ultimately separated Cain, Lara, and Pinckney-Hackett from employment with ODME.33 They left at around the same time in December 200734 after Reinoso had attempted unsuccessfully to find Cain and Lara positions with OSSE.35

ODME was no longer to function in the areas staffed initially by Lara and Pinckney-Hackett, and although Cain "was broadly qualified . . . around the education strategy position" retained within ODME, Reinoso articulated strong reasons, based on evidence, showing why she was distinctly less qualified than another member of the staff, Abigail Smith. As noted earlier, moreover, Cain acknowledged on deposition that neither Reinoso nor his chief of staff ever disparaged her with reference to her age or ever made any other age-related or discriminatory remark to her. And Reinoso expressly denied under oath that he had let Cain go because of her age.

We must conclude, therefore, that appellees have responded with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for Reinoso's decision to separate Cain from ODME employment premised on his respective evaluations of Cain's and Smith's professional abilities, work experience, and promise for the remaining, but newly designed, "education strategy" position at ODME. If Cain is to prevail, she must do so by reference to material facts of record that suggest a genuine issue as to whether appellees' explanation was pretextual—an undertaking, as we have noted, that "merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of intentional discrimination."36

IV.

When we address whether the employer's actions were pretextual, the analysis proceeds as follows:

Usually, "a prima facie case plus sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation will suffice without more to overcome a motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law."38 Nonetheless, we have cautioned that "the emphasis is on the need for evidence: As courts are not free to second-guess an employer's business judgment, a plaintiff's mere speculations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer's articulated reasons for its decisions."39 Accordingly, at this "pretextual" stage of the proceeding, the nonmoving party—here, Cain—must designate from her own affidavit, the deposition testimony, and other discovery material (including exhibits), the "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."40

Cain's foremost argument on appeal—and thus in her effort to characterize Reinoso's explanation for terminating her employment as pretextual—begins with her contention that Reinoso's evaluation of her performance at ODME was "bogus." That evaluation, Cain says, covered up his real motivation: to discriminate against her on the basis of age by terminating her employment in favor of a less-qualified, younger woman, Abigail Smith. Cain's principal evidence comes from Reinoso's preparation of ODME's "Academic Plan," which, Cain alleges, Smith largely crafted out of plagiarized material.

In the spring of 2007, before Reinoso's confirmation hearing, the Council asked Reinoso to prepare an Academic Plan for its perusal. Rejecting Cain's overture to Eric Lerum, Reinoso's chief of staff, to help formulate the plan, Reinoso sought assistance from Smith because of her experience as national public policy director at Teach for America. According to Reinoso on deposition, the turnaround time was tight, and thus he provided Smith with a "dump of information" he had created from "cutting and pasting" anything he found interesting. Cain reviewed the final draft at the request of Lerum, and, according to Cain's deposition, she advised against its submission to the Council because it "had multiple voices and . . . it was clear it came from many sources." Lerum replied that the document could not be changed because it was already on the Mayor's website.

Before Reinoso's confirmation hearing on June 27, 2007, the press reported that the Academic Plan contained plagiarized portions of a work product from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina public school system—a revelation that led to a contentious Council hearing that triggered a delay of Reinoso's confirmation for another four months. Responsibility for the failure of attribution became an issue. In response to a Council inquiry, Reinoso replied that the staff member responsible (whom he did not identify) had been "verbally reprimanded" and that he, Reinoso, took "full responsibility." Later, however, in his deposition testimony in this case, Reinoso testified under oath that he himself was the "staff" who had been "appropriately reprimanded" for the plagiarism at a meeting with the Mayor and the City Administrator. Said Reinoso: "I'm responsible for any language in here having come from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg plan."

Cain argues that Reinoso either lied to the Council by implying that he had verbally reprimanded a third party or lied on deposition in this case to protect Smith. For purposes of summary judgment, says Cain, she "was entitled to the benefit of the inference Reinoso had lied in deposition because he understood that truthful testimony . . . would bolster Cain's claim[ ]. . . that Reinoso had retained Smith over Cain despite her role in the plagiarism debacle." And, adds Cain, the taint attributable to Reinoso as a result would put the lie to his rating of "Smith's performance much more highly than Cain in areas including `Dependability' and `Integrity and Trust.'"

Cain's animadversions against Reinoso and Smith do not reflect evidence that Smith was involved in the plagiarism. Reinoso's sworn testimony is to the contrary, and Smith herself, on deposition under oath, stated her understanding that the language supplied by Reinoso had been written by Reinoso himself. Cain proffers no evidence to contradict the two, only speculation that Reinoso had been covering up for Smith. Speculation, however, does not entitle Cain to the inference of Smith's culpability that Cain claims. Reinoso perhaps can be faulted for not being entirely candid with the Council about who was responsible for the plagiarized inserts, but this failure did not undermine the basic truth of his statement that the culprit had been reprimanded. Nor did Reinoso's testimony before the Council reflect adversely on Smith. In sum, the incident on which Cain relies to undermine Reinoso's motives and Smith's qualifications may reveal poor judgment by Reinoso in pursuit of his confirmation, but it does not provide evidence that Smith was less qualified than Cain for the position at issue, or create an implication that Reinoso fired Cain because of her age.

Nor do Reinoso's evaluations of Cain and Smith evince discriminatory motive. Cain does not effectively dispute Reinoso's judgments—elaborated above in Part III—that she needed to improve both her working relationships with others and her ability to work with less supervision.41 While it apparently is true that Reinoso asked personnel to prepare Cain's employment termination papers before he generated her formal evaluation—understandably causing Cain to take personal offense—that sequence does not, in itself, manifest a false evaluation. Just as likely, the sequence reflected a delayed documentation of Reinoso's long-held views. Considered in light of Cain's failure to rebut Reinoso's criticisms of her work, no genuine issue of material fact is raised with respect to the timing of her evaluation at ODME.

Next, Cain stresses that Reinoso hired Smith for the new education strategy position knowing that she would soon leave for a position at DCPS—evidence, she says, supporting her argument that Reinoso had hired Smith as a mere excuse to fire the older Cain. The record is unclear as to when Reinoso learned that Smith might, or would, be leaving.42 But even if he hired her for the new position knowing that she would be a short-timer, that does not suggest that he did so, rather than select Cain, because of Cain's age. In the first place, there is no direct evidence that Reinoso sought to separate Cain or anyone else from employment with ODME because of age; as noted earlier, Cain acknowledged that she never heard anything like that from Reinoso or his chief of staff. Second, early in his tenure at ODME, Reinoso hired three women over age forty—Cain, Pinckney-Hackett, and Lara— hiring decisions that make it highly unlikely that he would fire any, let alone all three, less than a year later because of age.43 Third, Reinoso's hiring decision was a business judgment to which the courts ordinarily defer.44 Even if he knew that Smith would be leaving once her arrangement at DCPS could be finalized, it would not have been irrational, let alone discriminatory, to hire Smith for the short-term value of her expertise (while looking for an equally able successor), rather than keeping a less satisfactory employee indefinitely.

Particularly given the plagiarism controversy and Cain's formal evaluation after her termination papers were underway, we understand Cain's feelings. But those two incidents—without more—do not supply evidence, as required to forestall summary judgment, that Reinoso let Cain go because of her age.

But there is "more," says Cain; the pattern of firings and hirings at ODME confirms Reinoso's discriminatory aversion to older employees. Cain alleges in support of her prima facie case that, in the thirteen months following her departure from ODME (as well as the departures of Lara, Pinckney-Hackett, and a month later, Smith), the following employment actions occurred:

Appellees reply that Cain's statistics alone-few in number and subordinate in strength to Reinoso's proffered reasons for his employment actions-do not in themselves undermine Reinoso's legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds for terminating Cain's employment. In any event, add appellees, contrary to Cain's representations:

Cain, in her reply brief, does not dispute appellees' responses other than to argue that Reinoso's hiring of Briggs should not count because her place at ODME was a temporary "holding action" for eventual employment at OSSE; that Tonya Kinlow's appointment as Ombudsman should not count because that is a Mayoral appointment;45 and that Wayne Cole's employment in the Ombudsman's office should not count because he reports to Kinlow, as well as because he is a civil service, not excepted service, employee.46 These distinctions are noticeably thin, however, for two reasons: first, they do not undercut Reinoso's evident willingness to hire employees over age forty, all of whom would be under Reinoso's supervisory jurisdiction; and, second, Cain's emphasis on the youth of the new social workers affords no basis for believing that older applicants applied for those positions, let alone that the jobs were relevant to a claim of age discrimination by a former employee, like Cain, unqualified for such a position—indeed, a position in D.C. START not existing at ODME when she was employed. Finally, given the diversity of titles (e.g., "special assistants," "policy analysts") embracing a variety of tasks (e.g., "education specialist," "social worker")47 —and further given the "limited sample"48 of statistical evidence Cain cites—we must conclude that the parties' dispute over "fires" and "hires" at ODME, particularly in light of the merit-based reasons for terminating Cain's employment, adds no genuine issue of material fact supporting a claim of age-based discrimination.

V.

We have reviewed Cain's claims about her evaluations, about the hiring of Abigail Smith, and about the pattern of "fires" and "hires" during Cain's tenure at ODME and thereafter. We are satisfied that appellees have answered her allegations of a prima facie case with a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for Reinoso's employment actions, and that on the record of sworn testimony during discovery and related exhibits Cain has not adduced evidence of specific facts demonstrating that those actions were pretextual. Thus, Cain has not shown that age discrimination "actually played a role" and had "a determinative influence" in Reinoso's decision to end Cain's employment.49 We must agree with appellees, therefore, that no genuine issue of material fact supports Cain's claim of discrimination based on her age. Accordingly, the trial court's entry of summary judgment must be affirmed.

So ordered.