Filed: Jun. 15, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2348 EDDY R. BAILEY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. THE CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK; OFFICER Y. MORENO; CHIEF CHRIS MITCHELL, Defendants – Appellees, v. THE CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK, INCORPORATED; CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMSON, Movants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:10-cv-00129-RAJ-TEM) Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2348 EDDY R. BAILEY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. THE CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK; OFFICER Y. MORENO; CHIEF CHRIS MITCHELL, Defendants – Appellees, v. THE CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK, INCORPORATED; CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMSON, Movants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:10-cv-00129-RAJ-TEM) Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 1..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2348
EDDY R. BAILEY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
THE CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK; OFFICER Y. MORENO;
CHIEF CHRIS MITCHELL,
Defendants – Appellees,
v.
THE CHRISTIAN BROADCASTING NETWORK, INCORPORATED;
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMSON,
Movants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:10-cv-00129-RAJ-TEM)
Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 15, 2012
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Eddy R. Bailey, Appellant Pro Se. David Drake Hudgins, Juliane
Corroon Miller, HUDGINS LAW FIRM, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Eddy Bailey appeals the district court’s judgment
denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) claims against
Appellees Christian Broadcasting Network, Officer Yahzin Moreno,
and Chief Christopher Mitchell. Bailey also appeals certain
orders and rulings leading to the final judgment. We affirm in
part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Bailey challenges several of the district court’s
discovery rulings. “We afford substantial discretion to a
district court in managing discovery and review discovery
rulings only for abuse of that discretion.” United States ex
rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284,
290 (4th Cir. 2002). “A district court abuses its discretion
only where it has acted arbitrarily or irrationally, has failed
to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its
exercise of discretion, or when it has relied on erroneous
factual or legal premises.” L.J. v. Wilbon,
633 F.3d 297, 304
(4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted),
cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 757 (2011).
Bailey claims that he should have been granted an
extension of time in which to file his responses to the
Appellees’ Requests for Admission (“RFAs”). “A party may serve
on any other party a written request to admit . . . facts, the
application of law to fact, or opinions about either” that are
3
within the permissible scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(1)(A). If the party served with the RFAs does not respond
within thirty days following service, the matters are deemed
admitted and “conclusively established unless the court, on
motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 36(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Withdrawal or
amendment is permissible “if it would promote the presentation
of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded
that it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or
defending the action on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).
In ruling on Bailey’s motion, the magistrate judge
heard arguments from both parties regarding prejudice and
excusable neglect but made no factual findings as to these
issues. The magistrate judge’s holding appears to have been
based on his conclusion that he was bound by the language of
Rule 36(a), rather than any consideration of the discretionary
factors established by Rule 36(b). However, as the motion for
extension of time to respond to RFAs was, in essence, a motion
to withdraw deemed admissions, the Rule 36(b) factors were
integral to the court’s determination. See Gutting v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 710 F.2d 1309, 1313 (8th Cir. 1983). Reliance on
an erroneous legal premise and failure to consider the Rule
36(b) factors in ruling on a motion to file RFAs out of time
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Wilbon, 633 F.3d at
4
304; Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 2007).
Although the district court was required to correct the
magistrate judge’s ruling if it found the ruling “clearly
erroneous or . . . contrary to law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), the
court denied Bailey’s objections summarily and without further
explanation. Thus, we conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in denying Bailey’s motion for an extension of
time and in deeming the RFAs admitted on this basis.
We conclude that the court’s error is harmless with
regard to the grant of summary judgment in favor of Mitchell, as
Bailey’s proposed responses to the RFAs would not have been
sufficient to avoid summary dismissal even if accepted. In
granting judgment for Moreno as a matter of law, however, the
district court’s factual findings relied significantly on the
deemed-admitted RFAs. Because we are unable to determine the
effect of these RFAs on the court’s findings, we can accord no
deference to the court’s factual findings or to its ultimate
conclusion that the trial testimony required judgment as a
matter of law in favor of Moreno. We therefore vacate that
portion of the discovery order deeming the RFAs admitted, as
well as the judgment in favor of Moreno, and remand for
consideration of the Rule 36(b) factors in ruling on Bailey’s
motion for an extension of time to file responses to the RFAs.
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In so doing, we express no opinion as to the propriety of
granting such a motion in this instance.
Bailey raises three additional challenges to the
court’s disposition of the parties’ requests for sanctions
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that “[i]f a party fails to provide
information or identify a witness as required by [Fed. R. Civ.
P.] 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that
information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a
hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The court
is further authorized to “impose other appropriate sanctions”
upon the opposing party’s motion and after providing an
opportunity to be heard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(C).
Appropriate sanctions may include “directing that . . .
designated facts be taken as established,” “prohibiting the
disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims
or defenses,” and “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii), 37(c)(1)(C). The party
facing sanctions carries the burden of demonstrating that his
failure to comply was harmless or substantially justified, and
the district court has “broad discretion” in determining whether
such a burden has been met. Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593, 602
(4th Cir. 2006).
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Bailey specifically argues that the district court
erred in denying his claims for damages based on loss of future
wages; in limiting the testimony of Dr. David Reid; and in
denying his motion for sanctions. We conclude that the court
abused its discretion in ruling on these motions. In
sanctioning Bailey by denying his claims for future wages and
limiting Dr. Reid’s testimony, the magistrate judge failed to
expressly consider whether Bailey demonstrated that his
noncompliance with discovery rules was substantially justified
or harmless. Similarly, in denying Bailey’s motion for
sanctions, the magistrate judge did not expressly find that
Appellees violated their duty to disclose or supplement
disclosure; nor did he announce the basis for the sanction he
imposed. The district court overruled Bailey’s objections
summarily and provided no further explanation in upholding these
rulings. In the absence of evidence that the court considered
“the factors constraining its exercise of discretion” as set out
in Rule 37(c)(1)(C), we conclude that the record is insufficient
to permit meaningful judicial review. See Wilbon, 633 F.3d at
304. Additionally, to the extent the court relied on the
magistrate judge’s conclusion that Bailey could not support a
finding of damages based on lost future wages, we note that this
determination on the merits was not supported by proper
fact-finding. We therefore vacate the court’s rulings on these
7
motions and remand for further consideration in accordance with
Rule 37(c). 1 Again, we express no opinion about the appropriate
disposition as to these motions.
Turning to the remaining issues Bailey raises on
appeal, we have reviewed the record and conclude that there is
no reversible error in (1) the district court’s orders granting
in part Appellees’ motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), and granting in part Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment; (2) the court’s discovery rulings pertaining to a
witness’s address, eye examination reports, and the RFAs
relating to Appellee Mitchell; and (3) the court’s exclusion of
certain witnesses and evidence at trial. Accordingly, we affirm
these rulings for the reasons stated by the district court and
the magistrate judge. (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 3, 2011 & entered
Feb. 4, 2011; May 23, 2011; filed June 21, 2011 & entered
June 22, 2011; Aug. 30, 2011; filed Aug. 31, 2011 & entered
Sept. 1, 2011; filed Sept. 9, 2011 & entered Sept. 12, 2011;
Trial Tr. dated Sept. 13, 2011, at 10-17, 41-42, 59-60).
We deny Bailey’s motions for transcripts at the
Government’s expense and for leave to file documents
1
To the extent Bailey asks this court to impose sanctions
against the Appellees, we conclude he has failed to establish
any valid basis for imposing sanctions in this appeal, and we
deny such request.
8
electronically, and we deny the Appellees’ motion to strike. 2 We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
2
Although the documents with which Bailey seeks to
supplement the record on appeal are not properly before us, see
Fed. R. App. P. 10; United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318,
335-36 (6th Cir. 2007); see Lowry v. Barnhart,
329 F.3d 1019,
1024-25 (9th Cir. 2003), we conclude that striking these
documents is unnecessary, as we simply decline to consider them.
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