Filed: Jun. 19, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-4914 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. STACY DEMORIS JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00332-WO-5) Submitted: June 15, 2012 Decided: June 19, 2012 Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charles L. White, II
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-4914 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. STACY DEMORIS JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00332-WO-5) Submitted: June 15, 2012 Decided: June 19, 2012 Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charles L. White, II,..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4914
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STACY DEMORIS JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00332-WO-5)
Submitted: June 15, 2012 Decided: June 19, 2012
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles L. White, II, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Randall
S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stacy Demoris Johnson appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress entered prior to his
conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least
five kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2006). We affirm.
On appeal, Johnson first argues that the district
court clearly erred when it found that a minivan contained
cocaine, and that a Virginia resident picked up that cocaine.
Johnson secondly argues that he was impermissibly detained after
a traffic stop without reasonable, articulable suspicion of
additional criminal activity.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion
to suppress, this court reviews the district court’s legal
determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear
error. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
2010). Because the district court denied the motion, this court
construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.”
Id. In conducting our review, we give deference
to the district court’s credibility determinations because it is
the role of the district court to observe witnesses and assess
credibility. United States v. Abu Ali,
528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th
Cir. 2008).
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Johnson argues that the district court clearly erred
in reaching its factual conclusions. We disagree. A factual
finding is clearly erroneous only if we are left with the
definite conviction that a mistake has been made. See United
States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008). Our
review of the record leads us to conclude that evidence supports
the district court’s conclusions. We thus cannot conclude that
the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous.
Johnson next argues that the traffic stop was
impermissibly prolonged. A prolonged automobile stop, if not
consented to, requires “a reasonable suspicion that illegal
activity is afoot.” United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d
757, 764 (4th Cir. 2011). The reasonable suspicion standard is
less demanding than that of probable cause. United States v.
Branch,
537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008). The reasonable
suspicion determination is based on all available information
considered in totality.
Id. at 337.
Johnson’s attempt to distinguish Branch is
unpersuasive. The officers in this case were aware of an
ongoing narcotics investigation, the probable transaction that
occurred between the driver of the minivan and Johnson, and
Johnson’s involvement with a known drug dealer. Johnson
provided inaccurate information to the officers and was
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confirmed to be on supervised release from a federal drug
conviction. See United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 247 (4th
Cir. 2011) (although not sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion by itself, knowledge of a criminal record combined
with concrete indicators of current criminal activity can
support reasonable suspicion determination). Further, the
officers discovered a large sum of cash, tied in bundles, in
Johnson’s pockets and observed that Johnson was visibly nervous.
Considering the circumstances in total and crediting
the experience of the law enforcement officers on the scene,
there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Johnson in
order to perform a canine sniff of his vehicle. Further, a
canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is not a “search” and
therefore requires no additional justification. Branch, 537
F.3d at 335. The positive alert from the canine unit was
sufficient to provide probable cause to search Johnson’s car.
Id. at 340 n.2. Johnson’s Fourth Amendment rights were thus not
violated at any point during his detention or the search of his
vehicle and the district court properly denied his motion to
suppress.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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