Filed: Jul. 17, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2194 DARGAN DEWEY HADDOCK, Petitioner, v. J. RANDOLPH BABBITT, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Respondents. Appeal from the Federal Aviation Administration. (SE-18700RM) Submitted: June 13, 2012 Decided: July 17, 2012 Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John A. Hodge, HODGE & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina,
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2194 DARGAN DEWEY HADDOCK, Petitioner, v. J. RANDOLPH BABBITT, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Respondents. Appeal from the Federal Aviation Administration. (SE-18700RM) Submitted: June 13, 2012 Decided: July 17, 2012 Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John A. Hodge, HODGE & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, f..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2194
DARGAN DEWEY HADDOCK,
Petitioner,
v.
J. RANDOLPH BABBITT, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration; FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
Respondents.
Appeal from the Federal Aviation Administration. (SE-18700RM)
Submitted: June 13, 2012 Decided: July 17, 2012
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John A. Hodge, HODGE & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Petitioner. Amanda Kate Bruchs, FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dargan Dewey Haddock appeals a decision of the
National Transportation Safety Board (“Board”) affirming the 60-
day suspension of Haddock’s commercial pilot certificate. The
order affirmed findings by the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) and an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that Haddock
violated federal regulations governing aircraft registration,
operation, and maintenance. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I.
The FAA suspension at issue in this case arose out of
Haddock’s operation of a helicopter that crashed on December 25,
2008. A few days prior, on December 21, 2008, the helicopter
had been obtained from David Moore. The FAA Order of Suspension
concluded that, at the time of the crash, Haddock had not
properly registered the helicopter, in violation of 14 C.F.R.
§ 47.3(b), and that Haddock failed to maintain the aircraft in
an airworthy condition by failing to ensure the helicopter had
an up-to-date condition inspection certifying it was safe to
operate, in violation of §§ 91.403(a) and 91.13(a). According
to the FAA’s Order, the last such inspection occurred on April
18, 2007, approximately 20 months before the crash.
2
Haddock requested a hearing before an ALJ. At that
hearing, the FAA provided the testimony of two aviation safety
inspectors, Sean Mosher and James Franklin, who testified about
aircraft safety requirements. Inspector Mosher testified that
although the helicopter’s logbook indicated the helicopter
underwent maintenance on April 1, 2008, the logbook entry did
not include the requisite language indicating the condition
inspection occurred. Inspector Franklin corroborated this
testimony, and further testified that review of the helicopter’s
registration records indicated that Moore, (not a family
business, Haddock Flying Service), owned the aircraft at the
time of the crash.
The inspector further explained that an aircraft’s
owner must complete a registration form and obtain a bill of
sale, keep the pink carbon copy of the form in the aircraft, and
mail the original white copy of the form along with the bill of
sale to the FAA office in Oklahoma City. Inspector Franklin
testified Haddock did not send the registration form to the FAA
until January 2009, after the crash. He further testified that
he never found the pink copy of the registration form at the
crash site.
Haddock called Moore to testify, who stated that he
built the helicopter at issue and was familiar with the annual
condition inspection requirement. Moore further testified that
3
he performed a condition inspection on April 1, 2008, even
though he did not include explicit language in the aircraft
logbook to that effect. And, he testified that he told Haddock
that he had completed the most recent condition inspection on
April 1, 2008. As to the registration of the helicopter, Moore
stated that he took the original white copy of the registration
form to mail to Oklahoma City and that either he or Haddock
placed the pink carbon copy of the registration form in the
helicopter’s cockpit.
Haddock similarly testified that Moore told him about
the April 2008 inspection and showed him the logbook entry.
Haddock also stated that he completed the registration form with
Moore when he purchased the helicopter on December 21, 2008, but
admitted the original copy was not mailed until after the
accident. He testified that he believed placing the pink copy
of the form in the cockpit satisfied the registration
requirement. Another of Haddock’s witnesses claimed he arrived
at the accident site shortly after Haddock’s crash, gathered the
pink copy of the registration form from a box that was thrown
from the cockpit of the helicopter, and gave it to Inspector
Franklin.
4
The ALJ, on remand from the Board, credited the
testimony of Inspectors Mosher and Franklin. ∗ The ALJ further
concluded, based on Haddock’s own admission that he failed to
mail in the white copy of the registration form prior to the
crash, that the helicopter was not properly registered at the
time of the crash. However, because the ALJ found that Haddock
was attempting to comply with the registration requirement, the
ALJ reduced the FAA’s initial 90-day sanction to 60 days.
Further, the ALJ found that Moore had not completed the required
annual condition inspection because Moore’s log book entry “did
not include . . . the required language, or a similar statement,
indicating that the condition inspection had occurred.” Rather,
the entry differed in language than the entries in April 2006
and April 2007, both of which indicated that Moore had completed
condition inspections.
Relying on the ALJ’s credibility determinations, the
Board affirmed. Haddock timely filed this appeal. We have
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1153.
∗
The ALJ, in its initial decision, failed to make explicit
credibility determinations, and the Board remanded the matter
for the ALJ to make such findings.
5
II.
We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The “arbitrary
and capricious” standard is a “narrow” one and a court may not
“substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Inova
Alexandria Hosp. v. Shalala, 244 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). The Board’s
factual findings must be supported by “substantial evidence,”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), which is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Platone v. U.S. Dept. of Labor,
548 F.3d 322, 326
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)).
On appeal, Haddock contends the Board acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by concluding that the helicopter
was not registered to Haddock at the time of the crash. We
disagree. The Board concluded, based on Haddock’s own admission
before the ALJ, that Haddock had not submitted to the FAA the
requisite registration forms and fee prior to the crash.
Although FAA regulations allow for a “temporary authorization”
before an aircraft is officially registered with the FAA, see 14
C.F.R. § 47.3(b), Haddock failed to comply with the
6
requirements. Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 47.31(c), after an
applicant for registration submits an aircraft registration
application along with the original bill of sale and requisite
registration fee, that applicant can carry the “second copy” of
the registration application, i.e., the pink carbon copy, aboard
the aircraft “as temporary authority to operate without
registration.” 14 C.F.R. § 47.31(a),(c). Thus, even if, as
Haddock claims, he had the pink copy of the registration
application on board the helicopter at the time of the crash,
that would not have given him temporary authority to operate the
aircraft because he, admittedly, had not yet submitted the
requisite forms and fee. See Adm’r v. Excalibur Aviation, Inc.,
NTSB Order No. EA-4465, 1996 WL 360096 at *4 (June 20, 1996)
(explaining the “second copy” of a registration application
carried aboard an aircraft can serve as a temporary registration
only “after an applicant has submitted his Aircraft Registration
Application to the FAA”).
In any event, the ALJ credited the testimony of
Inspector Franklin who testified that he was unable to locate
the pink copy of the registration form from the crash site.
Thus, the Board concluded, deferring to the ALJ’s credibility
findings, that “the pink copy was not in the cockpit when
[Haddock] was operating” the helicopter. Based on our review of
7
the record, we find that substantial evidence supports this
finding.
Haddock next challenges the Board’s determination,
also based on the ALJ’s credibility findings, that Moore failed
to conduct a condition inspection of the helicopter in April
2008 and, thus, left the aircraft in an unairworthy condition.
Again, we do not agree with Haddock’s contention that the Board
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reaching this
determination. There is no dispute that Moore’s April 2008
logbook entry did not state explicitly that he had performed a
condition inspection. Further, the April 2008 entry differed
significantly from Moore’s entries in April 2006 and April 2007,
which clearly indicated he had performed condition inspections
at those times. In light of the ALJ’s adverse credibility
determination regarding Moore’s testimony, we cannot hold that
the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in affirming the
ALJ’s finding.
Further, we conclude that the Board did not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that Haddock could
not reasonably rely on Moore’s alleged assertions that he had
conducted a condition inspection in April 2008. The Board
relied on its precedent that “reasonable reliance is a narrow
doctrine applicable in cases ‘involving specialized, technical
expertise where a flight crew member could not be expected to
8
have the necessary knowledge.’” JA 517 (quoting Adm’r v. Fay &
Takacs, NTSB Order No. EA-3501, 1992 WL 40523 at *4 (February 1,
1992)). Thus, the Board has “rejected the defense of reasonable
reliance” in previous “cases addressing a pilot’s failure to
verify a mechanic properly certified the aircraft’s logbook
after maintenance work.” The Board has determined that “[o]ne
of a pilot’s duties prior to operating an aircraft is the
‘responsibility to ensure that maintenance records were
completed by the mechanic.’” JA 518 (quoting Adm’r v. Easton,
NTSB Order No. EA-4732,
1998 WL 892248 at *3 (December 15,
1998)).
Here, the Board found that “Moore was neither
[Haddock’s] co-pilot nor crew member,” and Haddock, “as the
owner and operator of the aircraft, had a duty to ensure the
aircraft complied with its type certificate and was in a safe
condition for operation.” The Board concluded that Haddock
neglected this duty. This conclusion was not arbitrary and
capricious. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s conclusion that
Haddock violated 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.403(a) and 91.13(a).
Lastly, we reject Haddock’s suggestion that the ALJ’s
treatment of Inspector Franklin’s testimony regarding the
requirements of § 43.7(b) as expert testimony was prejudicial to
Haddock’s case. At the hearing, the FAA did not offer Inspector
Franklin as an expert, but the ALJ, in overruling Haddock’s
9
objection during Inspector Franklin’s testimony, stated, “[t]he
witness is an expert in this area. He may answer.” As the Board
concluded, “Inspector Franklin’s testimony concerning § 43.7(b)”
did not “require[] expertise.” In any event, any error in this
regard was harmless.
III.
Because the Board did not abuse its discretion in
affirming Haddock’s 60-day suspension, we affirm its decision.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
10
