Filed: Dec. 03, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4208 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. RONALD ATKINS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00228-JAB-1) Submitted: October 22, 2012 Decided: December 3, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen, II
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4208 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. RONALD ATKINS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00228-JAB-1) Submitted: October 22, 2012 Decided: December 3, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen, III..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4208
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RONALD ATKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00228-JAB-1)
Submitted: October 22, 2012 Decided: December 3, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P.
Clough, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Atkins appeals his conviction and thirty-seven
month sentence imposed following his conditional guilty plea to
travelling in interstate commerce and failing to register or
update a registration as required by the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006). Atkins argues that his charge was
adjudicated in an improper venue and that Congress, in enacting
SORNA, violated the non-delegation doctrine, the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). For the reasons that
follow, we reject these arguments and affirm.
Atkins first argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the indictment or to grant a
change of venue because the District of Maryland, in which he
was required to register, is the proper venue for his
prosecution. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss an indictment based purely on legal grounds.
United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2009). We
also review the district court’s venue determination de novo.
United States v. Wilson,
262 F.3d 305, 320 (4th Cir. 2001).
Venue lies in the state and district where the offense
was “committed.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Fed. R.
Crim. P. 18. Where an offense is “committed” is to be
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determined with reference to the criminal act proscribed by the
statute. Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956).
If the statute does not provide explicit guidance, the location
of the offense for venue purposes “must be determined from the
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts
constituting it.” United States v. Anderson,
328 U.S. 699, 703
(1946).
A convicted sex offender’s act of interstate travel
both “serve[s] as a jurisdictional predicate for § 2250, [and]
is also . . . the very conduct at which Congress took aim” in
enacting the statute. Carr v. United States, __ U.S. __, 130 S.
Ct. 2229, 2240 (2010). Atkins’s offense necessarily involved
more than one district because it required interstate travel
between North Carolina and Maryland. In this situation, venue
is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2006), which provides that
“any offense against the United States begun in one district and
completed in another, or committed in more than one district,
may be . . . prosecuted in any district in which such offense
was begun, continued, or completed.”
Atkins’s offense commenced when he moved from North
Carolina, which gave rise to his obligation to register in
Maryland, and was completed when he failed to register in
Maryland. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c) (2006). Because Atkins’s
offense began when he moved from the Middle District of North
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Carolina, venue was proper. See United States v. Howell, 552
F.3d 709, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that venue over a
§ 2250 violation was proper in the district from which defendant
moved, based in part on the commencement of the offense in that
district); United States v. Leach,
639 F.3d 769, 771-72 (7th
Cir. 2011) (same). Accordingly, Atkins’s venue challenge is
without merit.
Atkins also challenges the district court’s rejection
of his motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional
grounds. Properly preserved constitutional claims also are
reviewed de novo. United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 266 (4th
Cir. 2009).
“The non-delegation doctrine is based on the principle
of preserving the separation of powers between the coordinate
branches of government.” United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d
1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 2009). Congress’s delegation of authority
to another branch of government does not offend the
non-delegation doctrine as long as Congress has delineated an
“intelligible principle” guiding the exercise of that authority.
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928). Even a general legislative directive is a
constitutionally sufficient “intelligible principle” so long as
Congress “clearly delineates the general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this
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delegated authority.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
372-73 (1989).
Atkins contends that there is no intelligible
principle guiding the Attorney General’s exercise of his
discretion. Although this court has not addressed this argument
in published authority, we have rejected it in unpublished
decisions. See United States v. Clark, No. 11-5098, 2012 WL
2109246 (4th Cir. June 12, 2012), petition for cert. filed, __
U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Aug. 30, 2012) (No. 12-6067); United States v.
Rogers, 468 F. App’x 359, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-5099)
(argued but unpublished), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __ (U.S. Oct.
1, 2012) (No. 11-10450); United States v. Stewart, 461 F. App’x
349, 351-52 (4th Cir.) (Nos. 11-4420/4471) (per curiam), cert.
denied,
132 S. Ct. 2446 (2012); United States v. Burns, 418 F.
App’x 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4909) (argued but
unpublished). Additionally, circuits that have considered the
issue have dismissed this claim. See, e.g., United States v.
Guzman,
591 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 3487
(2010); United States v. Whaley,
577 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir.
2009);
Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1213-14. Based on these persuasive
authorities, we likewise reject Atkins’s non-delegation
challenge.
Atkins further challenges SORNA under the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the APA. However, Atkins
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concedes that these issues are foreclosed by this court’s
decision in United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir.
2009). Because “a panel of this court cannot overrule,
explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of
this court,” United States v. Rivers,
595 F.3d 558, 564 n.3 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), we
hold that Atkins’s challenges on these grounds must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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