Filed: Dec. 11, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-4746 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LAMBERT DORELL SWEAT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior District Judge. (2:09-cr-00685-PMD-1) Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: December 11, 2012 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinio
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-4746 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LAMBERT DORELL SWEAT, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior District Judge. (2:09-cr-00685-PMD-1) Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: December 11, 2012 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4746
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAMBERT DORELL SWEAT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00685-PMD-1)
Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: December 11, 2012
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Cameron Jane Blazer, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Jeffrey
Mikell Johnson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Matthew J.
Modica, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lambert Dorell Sweat pleaded guilty to various drug and
firearm charges. On appeal, he challenges the reasonableness of
his 262-month sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I.
In January 2009, a confidential informant with the
Clarendon County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) purchased 1.1 grams
of cocaine, a bootleg copy of a DVD, and a bottle of liquor from
Sweat at Sweat’s residence. Several days later, the CCSO
executed a search warrant at Sweat’s residence, which revealed
an additional 18.73 grams of cocaine, 22.89 grams of marijuana,
a 12-gauge shotgun and shotgun shells, $4,708 in US currency,
404 counterfeit DVDs, and 79 bottles of liquor. Sweat was
charged with various state offenses related to the drugs,
alcohol, and DVDs. While on bond for these state charges, Sweat
was federally indicted and a bench warrant was issued. The
three-count indictment charged Sweat with possession with intent
to distribute marijuana and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1); possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and possession of a firearm
in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1).
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When Clarendon County investigators subsequently happened
upon Sweat in a Wal-Mart store and attempted to arrest him on
the outstanding bench warrant, Sweat eluded the investigators
and fled to his home, where he barricaded himself inside. The
investigators proceeded to Sweat’s residence. After knocking on
the door of the residence and announcing their presence proved
unsuccessful, the investigators used the public address system
from a marked patrol car to demand that Sweat exit his home. At
that point, Sweat opened the door, yelled “F--- you,” and went
back inside. A captain with the CCSO then arrived on the scene
with tactical equipment and launched several canisters of pepper
spray into Sweat’s residence. Sweat cursed at the officers
again but eventually exited his home and was arrested. After
securing the residence, law enforcement officers found an
additional .23 grams of cocaine and 216 additional counterfeit
DVDs. Sweat ultimately pleaded guilty to each count in the
indictment.
Sweat’s Sentencing Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months’
imprisonment, which took into account his acceptance of
responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2010), and the fact that
he qualified as a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Both
before and at sentencing, Sweat sought a below-Guidelines
sentence. He did not challenge application of the career
offender Guideline but argued instead that a within-Guidelines
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sentence would be more than necessary to achieve the sentencing
purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, Sweat
argued that he was susceptible to rehabilitation and that he had
used his pre-sentence incarceration wisely by completing a drug
treatment program, leading Bible studies, and mentoring other
inmates. The government opposed any deviation below the
Guidelines range and contested Sweat’s characterization of
himself by emphasizing Sweat’s conduct in eluding and cursing at
law enforcement officers when they attempted to arrest him. The
district court ultimately sentenced Sweat to a bottom-of-the-
Guidelines sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment. Sweat now
challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of this
sentence.
II.
We review a sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007). We “first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error.”
Id. at 51. A sentence is
procedurally unreasonable if, inter alia, the district court
fails to recognize its authority to deviate from the Guidelines,
see
id., or fails to provide an individualized sentence, see
United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328-30 (4th Cir. 2009).
If we find that the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we will
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then consider its substantive reasonableness, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51. “An appellate court may presume that a within-Guideline
sentence is substantively reasonable . . . .”
Carter, 564 F.3d
at 330 n.2 (emphasis omitted).
III.
Sweat argues that the district court procedurally erred at
sentencing for two independent reasons. He first contends that
the district court failed to recognize its authority to deviate
from the Guidelines. Because the Guidelines are “effectively
advisory,” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), a
sentencing court has the discretion to deviate from the
Guidelines range in order to impose a sentence that is
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” Kimbrough v.
United States,
552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A sentencing court that treats the Guidelines range
as mandatory, however, commits procedural error. See
Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. Sweat also argues that the district court committed
procedural error by failing to provide an individualized
sentence. A district court “must make an individualized
assessment” and “must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the specific circumstances of the case.”
Carter, 564 F.3d at
328 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). However,
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when a within-Guidelines sentence is imposed, the
“individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy,”
id. at 330, “because guidelines sentences themselves are in many
ways tailored to the individual and reflect approximately two
decades of close attention to federal sentencing policy,” United
States v. Johnson,
587 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The government disputes that the
district court failed to provide an adequately individualized
sentence and also argues, in the alternative, that any such
error would be harmless. See United States v. Boulware,
604
F.3d 832, 837-40 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying harmless error
analysis to procedural error involving failure to provide
individualized sentence).
At sentencing in the instant case, the district court spoke
to Sweat at length about his personal circumstances and his
specific offenses. In doing so, the court clearly and carefully
responded to the arguments presented by defense counsel and by
the defendant himself. Defense counsel presented the best
reasons she could for a sentence below the Guidelines, but those
arguments were, in the final analysis, weak, as in Boulware.
Thus, we can safely say that to the extent any error occurred,
it was harmless.
With respect to the argument that the district court failed
to recognize its discretion to decline imposition of a sentence
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under the career offender Guidelines, as occurred in United
States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2010), we have reviewed
the totality of the court’s comments, during the taking of
Sweat’s plea and at sentencing, and we are satisfied that the
court understood its discretion in this regard and understood
that it was not bound to follow the Guidelines, even in a career
offender context.
IV.
Sweat’s remaining challenge is to the substantive
reasonableness of his within-Guidelines sentence. By relying on
our decision in United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (4th Cir.
2010), Sweat contends that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because the district court relied on a single
sentencing factor—the Guidelines range in this case—to the
exclusion of the other relevant factors. We disagree. The
district court considered a variety of the sentencing factors,
and Sweat simply disagrees with how the court evaluated those
factors and arrived at the sentence. Therefore, the sentence
was substantively reasonable.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sweat’s sentence.
AFFIRMED
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