Filed: Jan. 17, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4304 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DANIEL NICHOLAS BUCZKOWSKI, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (5:08-cr-00159-F-1) Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: January 17, 2013 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4304 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DANIEL NICHOLAS BUCZKOWSKI, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (5:08-cr-00159-F-1) Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: January 17, 2013 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion...
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4304
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL NICHOLAS BUCZKOWSKI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:08-cr-00159-F-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: January 17, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Research and
Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Nicholas Buczkowski appeals the district
court’s imposition of a 360-month sentence imposed after remand.
After a jury trial, Buczkowski was convicted of twenty-seven
counts of transportation of child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Counts One through Seventeen and Nineteen
through Twenty-Eight) and one count of possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Count
Twenty-Nine). The district court sentenced Buczkowski to 240
months’ imprisonment on Count One; 240 months’ imprisonment on
Count Two, to run consecutively to Count One; 240 months’
imprisonment on each of Counts Three through Seventeen and
Nineteen through Twenty-Eight, to run concurrently to Count Two;
and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count Twenty-Nine, to run
concurrently to Count Two.
Buczkowski did not challenge his conviction and
sentence for possession of child pornography, but he did appeal
the twenty-seven transportation counts. We affirmed the
conviction and sentence for the first transportation count,
Count One. We vacated the convictions and sentences for Counts
Two through Seventeen and Nineteen through Twenty-Eight as
multiplicitous and remanded for resentencing. See United States
v. Buczkowski, 458 F. App’x 311 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4938).
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On remand, the district court sentenced Buczkowski to
consecutive sentences of 240 months’ imprisonment on Count One
and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count Twenty-Nine, for a total
sentence of 360 months. Buczkowski appeals, challenging the
reasonableness of the sentence imposed on remand.
We review the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). “Procedural reasonableness evaluates the method used to
determine a defendant’s sentence. A sentencing determination
that does not conform to the procedural framework outlined [in
Gall] is procedurally unreasonable.” United States v. Mendoza-
Mendoza,
597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). “Substantive
reasonableness examines the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding
that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” Id.
Buczkowski contends that the sentence was procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to sufficiently
address his arguments that a below-Guidelines sentence would be
appropriate given the twenty-year state sentence imposed for the
sexual abuse of his grand-niece and the possibility of civil
commitment after the completion of any federal sentence. See
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
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(“Procedural errors include . . . failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence - including an explanation for any deviation
from the Guidelines range.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We disagree.
The transcript of the re-sentencing hearing
establishes that the court fully considered Buczkowski’s
arguments. The court engaged both attorneys with questions
about the state sentence and the possibility of civil commitment
and about other issues raised by Buczkowski. Noting that the
offense of conviction involved 27 images of child pornography
and that Buczkowski repeatedly had sexually abused his grand-
niece, the district court concluded that Buczkowski was “a
sexual predator who presents a danger to society.” (J.A. 667).
And before announcing its sentence, the district court expressly
adopted the findings of the revised presentence report and
stated that it had considered the advisory sentencing range and
the § 3553(a) factors. It is thus clear from the record that
the district court considered but ultimately rejected
Buczkowski’s sentencing arguments. See United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (sentencing court “must
demonstrate that it considered the parties’ arguments and had a
reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking
authority” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
The court’s explanation of the within-Guideline sentence may not
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have been lengthy, but it was sufficient. See United States v.
Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Although every
sentence requires an adequate explanation, . . . . the
explanation [for a within-Guidelines sentence] need not be
elaborate or lengthy . . . .”). We therefore reject
Buczkowski’s claim of procedural error.
We likewise reject Buczkowski’s claim that the
sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was greater
than necessary to serve the statutory sentencing purposes. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). While the sentence imposed by the court is
undeniably lengthy, it is within the Guidelines’ advisory
sentencing range and is therefore presumptively reasonable. See
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d at 216. Buczkowski’s appellate
arguments do not show error by the district court and are
insufficient to overcome this presumption. Considering the
totality of the circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that
the district court “abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” Id.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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