UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                         No. 95-5469

EDDIE YOUNG, III, a/k/a Bobo,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                         No. 95-5561

DIANE YOUNG CURRY,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                         No. 95-5571

TYRONE YATES,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.
Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CR-94-30136)

Submitted: March 12, 1996

Decided: March 27, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Tracy Weese, Shepherdstown, West Virginia; Christopher P. Riley,
Wheeling, West Virginia; Jeffrey W. McCamic, MCCAMIC &
MCCAMIC, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellants. William D.
Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United
States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Eddie Young, III, Diane Young Curry, and Tyrone
Yates ("Appellants") each pled guilty to one count of distributing
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988) and were
sentenced respectively to 135 months, 108 months, and 87 months.
They contend that the disparity in sentencing guidelines for cocaine
base and cocaine powder resulted in an equal protection violation, and
that they should be resentenced because the trial court allegedly failed
to make a finding of fact that the substance they distributed was
"crack" cocaine. Additionally, Curry also appeals the district court's
refusal to depart downward under USSG § 5K2.13 (Nov. 1995) for
her reduced mental capacity. She claims the district court failed to
realize it had the authority to depart. Finding no error, we affirm.

We reject the Appellants' first argument, as we specifically have
held that the cocaine base/cocaine powder disparity does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United
States v. Fisher, 

 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 

 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1995) (No. 95-5923); United States v.

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Bynum, 

 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 

 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1994) (No. 93-7295).

We also reject the Appellants' second argument, since they each
accepted plea agreements specifically characterizing the substance
they distributed as "crack," fully agreed to the plea agreements during
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquys, and stipulated to relevant conduct
involving "crack" cocaine.

Finally, we also reject Curry's argument regarding the downward
departure. This court may not review a district court's refusal to
depart downward unless it was based on an erroneous belief that it
lacked the authority to do so. United States v. Hypolite, 

,
1159 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Bayerle, 

 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 

 (1990)). In rejecting Curry's motion
for a downward departure, the court stated

          [w]hile I might have the authority for some discretion to
          apply the Guideline, I simply believe that the facts in this
          case do not justify or warrant the reduction in sentence,
          using this policy statement of this Guideline. So, I am going
          to deny the motion for a downward departure.

The statement does not reflect an erroneous belief by the district court
that it lacked the authority to depart, but a belief that Curry did not
deserve the departure. Accordingly, the district court's decision is not
reviewable. Hypolite, 65 F.3d at 1159.

Accordingly, we affirm the Appellants' sentences. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the material before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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