UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                        No. 97-4279
WILLIE MAE THOMAS-INGRAM, a/k/a
Willie Mae White, a/k/a Poochie
Thomas,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Richard L. Voorhees, Chief District Judge.
(CR-96-83-V)

Submitted: April 30, 1998

Decided: May 18, 1998

Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Randolph Marshall Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Thomas G. Walker, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Willie Mae Thomas-Ingram appeals the sixty-three month sentence
she received after pleading guilty to bank fraud and aiding and abet-
ting bank fraud. Thomas-Ingram contends that the district court's fac-
tual findings at the sentencing hearing were erroneous because the
court accepted the Government's hearsay evidence over her own testi-
mony in determining to impose certain Guidelines 1 enhancements and
deny certain reductions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review a district court's factual findings underlying sentencing
for clear error. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp. 1998). The
statute directs appellate courts to give "due deference" to a court's
application of the Guidelines to the facts of each case. Id. "Due defer-
ence" is a phrase of flexible interpretation, ranging from clear error
review for factual findings to de novo review for legal determinations.
United States v. Daughtrey, 

, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989). In
determining facts relevant to sentencing, courts are not limited to con-
sideration of evidence which would be admissible at trial. See 18
U.S.C. § 3661 (1994). Thus, the sentencing court may even consider
uncorroborated hearsay, so long as the defendant is provided an
opportunity to rebut or explain it. See United States v. Falesbork, 

, 722 (4th Cir. 1993). Section 6A1.3(a) of the Guidelines,
which provides that otherwise inadmissible evidence may be consid-
ered so long as the information contains "sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity to support its probable accuracy," does not restrict the court's
ability to consider reliable hearsay. See United States v. Bowman, 

, 381 (4th Cir. 1991). For sentencing purposes, judges may
consider any reliable information. Id. (finding reliable uncorroborated
testimony of confidential informant).
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1 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ("U.S.S.G. or Guidelines")
(1995).

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Thomas-Ingram, pursuant to the recommendation of the presen-
tence report ("PSR"), received a 4-level enhancement as an organizer
and a 2-level enhancement for obstructing justice, see USSG
§§ 3B1.1(a), 3C1.1, and was denied a reduction for being a minor or
minimal participant. See USSG § 3B1.2. She alleges that the district
court erred in denying her objection to the PSR based upon its flawed
credibility determinations at the sentencing hearing. At the hearing,
a Secret Service agent testified based upon statements made to him
by Thomas-Ingram's co-conspirators and other evidence gathered in
the investigation. According to the agent's testimony, Thomas-Ingram
was the instigator and organizer of the bank fraud scheme. She
encouraged her co-conspirators to open the various fraudulent
accounts, supplied fraudulent checks to deposit in these accounts, and
divided the ill-gotten funds between the co-conspirators. Despite her
counsel's cross-examination of the agent and Thomas-Ingram's testi-
mony to the contrary, the sentencing judge accepted the Govern-
ment's evidence and imposed sentence accordingly. 2 The credibility
of Thomas-Ingram's testimony is best resolved by the trial judge, and
we will not second guess the court's findings of fact under these cir-
cumstances. See Bowman, 926 F.2d at 381.

Accordingly, we affirm Thomas-Ingram's sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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2 Thomas-Ingram alleges no error in the court's interpretation or appli-
cation of the Guidelines other than its factual findings at the sentencing
hearing.

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