UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DOLORES A. VELTEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JESSE BROWN, Secretary, Department
of Veterans Affairs; D. MARK
                                                                   No. 97-2123
CATLETT; ALLAN LOUIS DRUCKER;
RAY SNOW; ROBERT J. WOODS,
Commissioner, Federal
Telecommunications Services;
SHERMAN NAIDORF,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Frank A. Kaufman, Senior District Judge.
(CA-96-935-K)

Submitted: May 29, 1998

Decided: September 2, 1998

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Linda Koerber Boyd, SCHWARTZ, BOYD & METZ, P.A., Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States
Attorney, A. David Copperthite, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Dolores A. Velten appeals from the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Defendants in her Title VII action
alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. Finding no error in the
district court's order, we affirm.

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. See
Higgins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 

(4th Cir.
1988). Summary judgment is properly granted when there are no gen-
uine issues of material fact and when the record, taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

, 323 (1986). All reason-
able inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See
Cole v. Cole, 

, 1092 (4th Cir. 1980).

Velten filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging
that she was subject to gender and reprisal discrimination during her
employment with the Veterans' Administration ("VA"). The VA
offered Velten a unilateral promise of full relief, providing her with
fifteen days in which to respond. At the end of this time period, Vel-
ten rejected the offer and issued a counter-offer which the VA
rejected. Given Velten's rejection, the ALJ remanded Velten's case
to the agency with instructions to dismiss it as moot. Velten claims
that prior to the expiration of the fifteen-day consideration period, the
VA orally withdrew the unilateral promise. She therefore contends
that there was no viable offer at the time of her"rejection" and that
dismissal of her claim on that basis was improper.

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A federal employee is required to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to commencement of suit for employment discrimination. If the
employee rejects a settlement offer for full relief, she has not
exhausted her remedies and therefore may not bring suit under Title
VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.220(b) (1997); see also Francis v. Brown,

, 193 (5th Cir. 1995). Because Velten will bear the burden
of proof on this issue at trial, she must offer verified evidence that the
VA withdrew its offer in order to survive the VA's motion for sum-
mary judgment. See 

(1986). The joint
appendix contains no such evidence. In addition, even if Velten's
claims were before the court, the court properly concluded that they
failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the VA. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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