Filed: Oct. 29, 1997
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: CORRECTED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No.96-31262 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TYRONE LAWSON, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana (96-CR-27) October 22, 1997 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. POLITZ, Chief Judge:* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion * should not be published and is not precedent exc
Summary: CORRECTED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No.96-31262 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TYRONE LAWSON, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana (96-CR-27) October 22, 1997 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. POLITZ, Chief Judge:* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion * should not be published and is not precedent exce..
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CORRECTED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No.96-31262
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TYRONE LAWSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(96-CR-27)
October 22, 1997
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion
*
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Tyrone Lawson appeals his sentence following a jury conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
He contends that: (1) the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that he
played a supervisory role in procuring others to transport cocaine and, based
thereon, added a two-level increase to his offense level; and (2) the district court
did not have sufficient proof to find that he distributed more than five kilograms of
cocaine. Finding neither error of law nor clearly erroneous finding of fact in the
sentencing procedure, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1995 Lawson recruited Chrystyle Jones to transport cocaine from Houston
to Baton Rouge. On one trip Jones asked a friend, Shontay Stansberry, to
accompany her. Thereafter, both women began transporting cocaine for Lawson.
On some of their trips Lawson gave the women money to give to Jonathon Beal,
his designated supplier in Houston. The women would pick up the cocaine in
Houston and deliver it to Lawson in Baton Rouge.
On one such trip in March of 1996 the women were stopped by law-
enforcement agents who found cocaine after Jones consented to the search of her
car. The women confessed that they were transporting the cocaine for Lawson and
agreed to cooperate with the authorities. Shortly therafter, after Lawson left Jones’
2
apartment in Baton Rouge with the cocaine he was arrested. Lawson was charged
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with intent
to distribute cocaine, and unlawful use of a communications facility.1 The jury
found Lawson guilty of possession with intent to distribute, returned a verdict of
not guilty of the charge of unlawful use of a communications facility, and
deadlocked on the conspiracy count. After a sentencing hearing, the district court
departed upwards from the sentencing guidelines and sentenced Lawson to prison
for 235 months and imposed a five year term of supervised release. The district
court also ordered the statutory assessment of $50.00. Lawson timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Lawson’s contention that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding
that he played a supervisory role in procuring others to transport cocaine for him,
thus warranting a two-level increase in the guideline offense level, is totally devoid
of merit. Jones and Stansberry testified that Lawson paid them to transport cocaine
on his behalf. The women, on numerous occasions, took Lawson’s money to
Houston, made a prearranged payment and pick up of cocaine, and returned the
contraband to Lawson in Baton Rouge, where they received payment for their
courier services. The district court heard this testimony and obviously found the
1
21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
3
women credible. Its finding that Lawson was a supervisor as envisioned by the
sentencing guidelines is well founded and, patently, is not clearly erroneous. 2
Lawson maintains that in sentencing the district court erroneously relied on
the presentence report to determine the quantity of cocaine that he possessed.
Lawson objects to the conclusion reached in the report regarding the quantity of
cocaine because it ostensibly was based solely on the statements of Jones and
Stansberry. We otherwise view the record. The district court had more than
sufficient proof to find that Lawson distributed in excess of five kilograms of
cocaine. Jones and Stansberry delivered 2.79 kilograms of the drug to him on the
day he was arrested. This, coupled with their testimony that they delivered cocaine
to him in kilo quantities on multiple occasions, provided abundant evidence for the
determination that Lawson was involved in the distribution of over five kilograms
of cocaine.
The sentence imposed by the district court is AFFIRMED.
2
United States v. Barreto,
871 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1989)
4