Filed: Dec. 24, 1997
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 97-20059 _ ANTHONY R. MAGDALENO, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; ROD PAIGE, Dr., Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (H-96-CV-2492) _ December 16, 1997 Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Anthony R. Magdaleno appeals the dismissal of his racial discrimination claim and other claims against the Houston I
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 97-20059 _ ANTHONY R. MAGDALENO, II, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; ROD PAIGE, Dr., Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (H-96-CV-2492) _ December 16, 1997 Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Anthony R. Magdaleno appeals the dismissal of his racial discrimination claim and other claims against the Houston In..
More
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 97-20059
_____________________
ANTHONY R. MAGDALENO, II,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT; ROD PAIGE, Dr.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
(H-96-CV-2492)
_________________________________________________________________
December 16, 1997
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Anthony R. Magdaleno appeals the dismissal of his racial
discrimination claim and other claims against the Houston
Independent School District (“HISD”) and Dr. Rod Paige, its
superintendent. We affirm.
In April 1996, Magdaleno brought claims against Paige and the
HISD pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that he had been
unlawfully discharged on the basis of race. He also claimed that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
he was discharged in retaliation for filing a grievance and
opposing Paige’s appointment as superintendent in violation of his
rights under the First Amendment. Paige responded with a defense
of qualified immunity, and moved for a Rule 7 reply or, in the
alternative, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
The district court took up the question at a Rule 16 pretrial
conference, after specifically informing the parties that it would
deal with all pending motions at that time. At the hearing, the
district court pressed Magdaleno for any additional facts he could
allege to overcome the heightened pleading requirement invoked by
Paige’s assertion of qualified immunity. Magdaleno could not point
to any facts that tended to establish that anyone had acted
unlawfully with respect to his discharge, and the court concluded
that ordering a Rule 7 reply would be futile. It therefore
dismissed the claims against Paige. This was a perfectly
acceptable application of the heightened pleading rule as laid down
in Shultea v. Wood,
47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995), and we
affirm this part of the district court’s judgment without further
comment.
Seeing that Magdaleno truly lacked any evidence of wrongful
action or motives on the part of anyone at the HISD with respect to
his discharge, the district court then proceeded to dismiss the
remainder of his claims against the HISD sua sponte. It is
-2-
2
somewhat unclear from the record whether this dismissal was for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or as a summary
judgment under Rule 56. As Magdaleno’s claims were manifestly
sufficient to survive 12(b)(6) dismissal, we construe the district
court’s action as a sua sponte grant of summary judgment. Because
this grant failed to conform to the notice and other requirements
of Rule 56, it was a procedural error. Nonetheless, this error was
harmless.
In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit,
28 F.3d 1388, 1398 (5th Cir. 1994), we held that
the sua sponte grant of summary judgment without benefit of notice
was a procedural error subject to harmless error review. In this
case, it is clear that Magdaleno simply could not point to any
facts that tended to prove wrongful action or motives on the part
of anyone at HISD with respect to his discharge. Because neither
of his claims against HISD could have succeeded without such a
showing, Magdaleno could not have survived summary judgment in any
event. The sua sponte grant of summary judgment was therefore not
prejudicial, and any procedural irregularities were harmless under
Leatherman. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
A F F I R M E D.
-3-
3