985 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1993), citing USSG § 5K2.0,
18 U.S.C. § 3533(b).
Additionally, the guidelines either forbid, discourage, or encourage several factors as bases
for departure. See id; See USSG § 5H1. Forbidden factors, such as race, sex, and national origin,
may never be considered by a sentencing court. See § USSG 5H1.10. Discouraged factors, including
employment records and family ties, are considered “not ordinarily relevant” and may only be
considered “in exceptional cases.” See USSG § 5H1.5, ch.5, pt. H; Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045.
Alternatively, a sentencing court may depart from the guidelines if “it finds an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the sentencing guidelines.” See id. To determine whether a circumstance
was adequately considered by the Commission, courts may “consider only the sentencing guidelines,
policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Koon,
116 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (1996), quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
1. Mandatory 60 Month Gun Charge As Basis for Departure
The district court determined that in light of the mandatory sixty month sentence required for
the gun charge, following the guidelines on the other charges would impose too harsh a sentence.
Therefore, the district court departed downward from the guidelines on the sentences for the civil
rights and obstruction of justice charges.
No permissible basis for departure was provided by the gun charge. In United States v.
Caldwell, this court considered whether the fact that a defendant faced a mandatory minimum
6
sentence for the use of a firearm during a crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), could justify a
downward departure from the guidelines for the underlying crime. See United States v. Caldwell,
985 F.2d 763, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1993). It cannot.
The defendant in Caldwell had been caught exchanging drugs in a hotel room , where law
enforcement officers found a gun. See Caldwell, 985 F.2d at 764. Caldwell pleaded guilty to a drug
offense and to the use of a firearm in the commission of that crime (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
See
id. The district court noted that the gun charge carried a mandatory minimum sentence of sixty
months’ imprisonment. See
id. The district court determined that, because the gun played only a
minimal role in the crime, following the guidelines on the drug offense would result in an unduly harsh
sentence. See
id. Since the court was not able to depart downward on the gun charge, the court
departed downward from the guidelines on the underlying drug offense. See
id.
This court reversed. See
id. at 765. The guidelines permit departure only where a mitigating
or aggravating factor is not adequately taken into consideration by the guidelines themselves. See
id. In the case of a § 924(c) charge, however, “the guidelines do consider the interplay of § 924(c)
and themselves.” See
id. As we previously explained, the guidelines specifically control the
sentencing of defendants convicted under § 924(c) and the underlying offense. See
id. See also
USSG § 2K2.4 (limiting additional offense-specific enhancement for use or possession of a weapon
where a defendant has also been sentenced under § 924(c)). Furthermore, the guidelines anticipate
that the underlying offense level will already be reduced when there is a separate gun charge because
the underlying offense-level will not include any applicable weapons enhancement.2 Accordingly, the
2
See id., Application Note 4.
“Where there is also a conviction for the underlying offense, a
consolidated fine guideline is determined by the offense level that
7
defendant in Caldwell had not been sent enced to an additional weapon enhancement for his
underlying drug offense.
The Sentencing Commission thoroughly considered the interplay of the mandatory minimum
sentence for use of a firearm with the sentence guidelines for the underlying crimes. The guidelines
prohibit a court from departing from the guidelines based on a factor that the Sentencing Commission
considered in formulating the guidelines. See Caldwell, 985 F.2d at 765. Therefore, this court held
as a matter of law that a mandatory minimum sentence under 924(c) cannot justify a downward
departure for the underlying offense. See
id.
Under Caldwell, therefore, the mere fact that Winters faced a sixty-month minimum sentence
on the gun charge cannot by itself justify a departure from the guidelines. Thus, the district court’s
departure was allowable only if unusual circumstances remove this case from the heartland of cases
contemplated by the guidelines.
The district court determined that this is an unusual case for which t he guidelines are
inadequate. First, the court noted that Winters lawfully possessed his weapon. See id. The court
recognized that Winters’ lawful possession of the gun was not sufficient grounds for departure, but
stated that it added to the totality of the circumstances calling for departure.
Id. at 28. Second, the
court recognized the fact that Winters’ was a law enforcement officer, and noted his service record.
“Let me inject this. If ever there has been an unusual case under the guidelines it is that this 15-year
would have applied to the underlying offense absent a conviction 18
U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a). This is required because the
offense level for the underlying offense may be reduced when there is
also a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a) in
that any specific offense charact eristic for possession, use, or
discharge of a firearm is not applied. . . . “
8
veteran of law enforcement with the Department of Corrections who, the evidence shows, had an
unblemished record and who exhibited this type of behavior.” See id. at 29.
A district court’s determination of what is a usual or unusual case is entitled to substantial
deference. See Koon, 116 S. Ct. 2035. However, the district court offered no facts which
differentiate this case from any other case in which a law enforcement officer uses excessive force or
obstructs justice.
Instead, the district court found this case extraordinary primarily because of Winters’ personal
characteristics. Personal traits such as those relied upon by the district court are not proper bases for
departures from the guidelines. See Winters, 105 F.3d at 206. See also United States v. O’Brien,
18 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that departure based on assessment of defendant’s good
character is inconsistent with guidelines);
Harrington, 82 F.3d at 88 (recognizing that a defendant’s
personal characteristics are not usually acceptable grounds for departure).
For example, Winters’ status as a correctional officer and his fifteen year service history do
not provide proper grounds for departure. Employment status and records of civic or public service
are discouraged factors under the guidelines, and can therefore be grounds for departure only in
exceptional cases. See USSG § 5H1.5, 11. The fact that Winters’ worked for the prison system for
fifteen years surely does not by itself take Wint ers out of the “heartland” of officers normally
convicted of violating an inmates’ civil rights. See also United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758
(4th Cir. 1996) (Vietnam Veteran with 20 years military service and responsibilities to mentally ill
wife and sick son did not present “exceptional” case).
Furthermore, Winters’ status as a correctional officer is closer to an aggravating factor rather
than a mitigating one. See Winters, 105 F.3d at 207. Winters’ status as a corrections officer
9
necessarily meant that the criminal conduct - which took place in his capacity as a corrections officer -
constituted an abuse of a public position. The guidelines specifically state that crimes involving the
abuse of public trust may be considered aggravating - not mitigating - factors. See id., citing USSG
§ 3B1.3. See also
Winters, 105 F.3d at 207 (“[T]he Commission considered criminal acts committed
by government agents to require a firmer response in order to prevent them.”).
The guidelines also discourage departures based on family ties and responsibilities. See USSG
§ 5H1.6. Accordingly, courts should only depart from the guidelines on these bases in rare or
exceptional cases. See id. There is no evidence that Winters’ family will suffer any more than any
family suffers when one member is sentenced to prison. See
Harrington, 82 F.3d at 89; United States
v. Kapitzke,
130 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he disintegration of existing family life or relationships
. . . is to be expected when a family member engages in criminal activity that results in a period of
incarceration.”), citing United States v. Canoy,
38 F.3d 893, 907 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, Winters’
family ties do not present a valid basis for departure.
The district court held that all these factors should be taken into consideration together, to
take them outside the heartland of the guidelines. Indeed, the district court seems to have felt that
the severe punishment required by the guidelines in this case didn’t fit the crime. See R.E. Tab 6
p.257 (“The facts in this case do not warrant a sentence within the applicable guideline’s range for
counts 4 and 9 PLUS an additional 5-year mandatory and consecutive term of imprisonment on count
5.”). The Sentencing Commission recognized that such a case might occur, where several otherwise-
insufficient factors combined to justify a departure. See Commentary accompanying § 5K2.0.
However, the Commission stated such cases would be “extremely rare.”
10
This is not such an extremely rare case. Moreover, the district court has not articulated
“relevant facts and valid reasons” demonstrating why this case is extraordinary or even unusual in
comparison to other cases under the guideline. See Winters, 105 F.3d at 208. Once again “the
district court’s reasoning fails to cite the compelling facts necessary to satisfy the very high standard
for this type of departure from the Guidelines.” See
id. Therefore, the district abused its discretion
in departing from the guidelines.
2. Status as Correctional Officer as Basis for Departure
The district court’s second basis for departure was the fact that Winter’s status as a
corrections officer makes him highly susceptible to abuse in prison. Winters had been an officer in
Mississippi prisons for over fifteen years when the incident occurred. During that time, the district
court reasoned, he had met many prisoners. Some of these prisoners would now likely be in federal
prison. Those prisoners would know that Winters had been a corrections officer. The district court
determined that this circumstance justified a departure based on Winters’s apparent high susceptibility
to abuse by other prisoners.
In Koon, the United States Supreme Court held that the district court properly considered the
defendants’ particular susceptibility to abuse in prison as a basis for a downward departure. See id.
However, Koon was an extreme case and no facts remotely similar to it are present here. Koon
involved the sentencing of the Los Angeles Police Department officers convicted of beating Rodney
King. The district court found that the “extraordinary notoriety and national media coverage of this
case, coupled with the defendants’ status as po lice officers, make Koon and Powell unusually
susceptible to abuse in prison.” See
Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2053.
11
Any attempt to compare this case to the Rodney King incident is unavailing. A few stories
in a local or state-wide newspaper cannot compare to the national outrage emanating from the beating
of Rodney King, not to mention the subsequent riots. The notorious circumstances involved in Koon
and the identity of the officers involved received such sust ained national media coverage as to
permeate prison facilities nationally. There is no record evidence to show that the instant event was
reported beyond the local area of its occurrence. Winters argues that this case is unique because he
was a corrections officer accused of beating an inmate. However, his situation is not outside the
heartland of cases in which a law enforcement officer is accused of using excessive force or violating
a person’s civil rights under color of law.
Koon does not create a general rule that a defendant’s status as a police officer can justify a
downward departure. In United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 1996) the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a defendant’s status as a law enforcement officer can, by itself, justify a
downward departure based on “disproportionate problems” suffered by incarcerated police officers.
See
Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 758. That court determined that allowing such a general rule suggests that
“law enforcement officers, as a class, are entitled to more favorable treatment under the Sentencing
Guidelines.” See
id. The court found no indication that either Congress or the Sentencing
Commission intended to treat law enforcement officers more favorably than other defendants. See
id. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant’s mere status as a law enforcement officer
cannot justify a downward departure. See
id.
Like Rybicki, the district court offered no compelling reasons why Winters is any more
susceptible to abuse in prison than any other corrections officer sentenced to prison. Compare United
States v. Long,
977 F.2d 1264, 1278 (8th Cir. 1992) (allowing departure where defendant’s frail
12
health left him "exceedingly vulnerable to possible victimization and resultant severe and possibly fatal
injuries.") with United States v. Russell, 156 F.3d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 1998) (defendant’s deafness did
not leave him vulnerable to attack as in Long). Instead, the court determined that Winters’ mere
status as an officer justified the departure.
To allow a departure on the basis that Winters is a law enforcement officer would thwart the
purpose and intent of the guidelines. See United States v. Kapitzke, 130 F.3d at 822 (allowing
departure because child pornographers were susceptible to abuse in prison would thwart the
guidelines’ sentences for such crimes). The Sentencing Commission surely considered the possibility
that some defendants convicted of violating a persons civil rights under color of law would be law
enforcement officers. As noted earlier, the Commission applied greater not lesser sentences for such
crimes. Therefore the district court abused its discretion when it departed downward from the
guidelines simply because Winters was a law enforcement officer.
Having rejected the district court reasons for a downward departure as expressed in its notice
of intent to depart downward, we turn our attention to the dissent’s rejection of our methodology.
First, the dissent emphasizes that the district court made its determination based on the totality of the
circumstances. Indeed, the dissent recites the phrase “totality of the circumstances” as some mantra
which if stated frequently enough will supplant even the district court’s written basis for a departure.
Despit e the apparent wishes of the dissent, the “totality of the circumstances” is not simply a
paradigm which renders the district court’s basis for a downward departure insulated from review of
the elements which make up the totality.
A “total” is nothing more than the sum of its component parts. Here, those parts include,
inter alia, Winters’s subjection to a mandatory minimum of five years and his susceptibility to abuse
13
in prison. Again, these are the two reasons articulated in the district court’s notice of intention to
consider a downward departure. Individually, neither offers a basis for a downward departure. It
is axiomatic that combined they do not offer a basis for departure. Similarly, we find that any
derivative from the articulated bases does not offer a basis for departure.3
The dissent’s reliance on our recent decision in United States v. Threadgill, 1999 WL 212251
(5th Cir. April 13, 1999) is mistaken. In Threadgill, the district court articulated two factors which
removed this case from the heartland. There, as in the case at bar, the majority accorded substantial
deference to the factual determinations of the district court; nevertheless, the majority offered an
assessment of the substantive bases for the departure. Based on its analysis, the majority found that
Threadgill “was certainly not a case where the dist rict court disregarded an applicable Guidelines
range in favor of another it preferred.”
Id. at * 18. Here, the applicable guideline range required a
sentence of 108-135 months of imprisonment for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 1503, to which
3
For example, the dissent highlights the reasons the district court found Winters susceptible
to abuse. We reject the same because all relate to Winters status as a correctional officer and nothing
in the record indicates that Winters is unique among other inmates who were formerly correctional
officers or police officers. The dissent’s attempt to minimize the effect of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons letter confirming that it is fully capable of housing Winters exposes the futility of its argument.
The dissent hypothesizes that the Federal Bureau of Prisons could have produced a similar
letter in Koon yet the Supreme Court found that susceptibility to abuse should be considered.
Nothing in Koon indicates the existence of any such letter; therefore, it is equally plausible that no
letter existed. Yet, we need not engage in such conjecture regarding the facts in Koon because there
is little doubt that the facts surrounding the violation of Rodney King’s civil rights received far greater
exposure than Winters’s violation of Larry Floyd’s. In fact, despite the dissent’s emphasis on the
publicity surrounding this case, nothing in the record bears upon the nature and extent of any such
publicity.
Furthermore, while the publicity in Koon introduced a measure of complexity in safely housing
the defendants in any federal facility, the relative paucity of publicity in this case precludes us from
finding a comparative measure of complexity. Winters spent 15 years working in a penitentiary in
Mississippi and was imprisoned in Minnesota. By emphasizing Winter’s status as a corrections
officer, the dissent impermissibly lowers the bar for corrections officers.
14
the mandatory consecutive 60 months imprisonment for the firearms violations under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) would have been added. See Winters, 105 F.3d at 206. While we do not concern ourselves
with the extent of the departure, the record indicates that the district court has failed to articulate a
plausible basis for departure. In so doing, the district court impermissibly sentenced Winters to its
“preferred” sentence of 12 months for a second time.
B. Reassignment to a Different Judge
Finally, the government urges this court to reassign this case to a different district judge on
remand. A federal court of appeals has the supervisory authority to reassign a case to a different trial
judge on remand. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
However, this is an extraordinary power and should rarely be invoked. See
id. Such reassignments
“should be made infrequently and with the greatest reluctance.” In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation: Adams Extract Co. v. Green Pay Packaging,
752 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Koeller v. Richardson-Merrel,
737 F.2d 1038, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Richey, J.,
concurring)).
This Circuit has not decided which of two tests should be used to decide whether to reassign
a case. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1333. Several circuits will reassign a case to avoid bias or the
appearance of bias. See
id. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, have adopted a more formal test,
which requires the court to consider three factors:
(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to
have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views
or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected,
(2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3)
whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any
gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1333, citing Davis
& Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States
15
v. Robin, 553 F.2d, 10 (2d Cir. 1997).
See also United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678, 695-96 (suggesting three-prong test should
be used where there is no direct evidence of bias).
This case does not call for reassignment under either test. No showing has been made that
we are presented with a case of bias or antagonism toward one party in the case. Contra, Johnson,
120 F.3d 1307 (reassigning case where lower court made repeated antagonistic remarks and admitted
hostility towards IRS). Although the district court twice chose to depart downward from Winters’
sentence, it made no indication that it would refuse to impartially weigh evidence and decide the
matters before it objectively.
Moreover, the fact that this court has already reversed the district court does not necessarily
require reassignment. In United States v. O’Brien, this court faced a procedurally similar situation.
See O’Brien, 18 F.3d at 302. There, the district court had imposed a sentence which this Court later
vacated. See
id. Upon remand, the district court again imposed an improper sentence. See
id. On
the second appeal, one of the parties urged this court to reassign the case. See
id. at 303-304. This
Court refused to do so. “The district judge will, we are confident, perform his duty. It is unseemly
for us to either assume that he will take a particular course or to suggest what he should do so long
as he reaches a decision in accordance with the controlling statutes.” See
id., quoting United States
v. Denson,
603 F.2d 1143, 1149 (5th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Schoenhoff,
919 F.2d 936
(5th Cir. 1990) (“We refuse to transfer an action for re-sentencing solely because two prior sentences
imposed by the trial court have been reversed.”). We decline the government’s invitation to reassign
this case.
16
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we VACATE Winter’s sentence and REMAND to the district
court for re-sentencing.
17
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
A district court is entrusted with discretion to determine
which cases present extraordinary circumstances warranting a
downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, we
are required to give substantial deference to such decisions.
Because the majority has failed to do so, and, in addition, has
misread the reasons given at resentencing for the downward
departure, I respectfully dissent.
To set the stage, three parameters bear noting: first, the
district judge, in making a downward departure, is, as noted,
entitled to “substantial deference”; second, the district judge
based the departure on the totality of the circumstances created by
the firearms count and the susceptibility to abuse in prison
factors, rather then treating them separately, as the majority does
erroneously; and third, only the departure, not its extent, is at
issue.
In this regard, a very recent decision by our court summarizes
nicely, in the light of Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996),
the framework for reviewing downward departures:
[O]ur analysis of a district court’s decision
to depart consists of three separate
determinations. An appellate court must ask:
(1) whether the factors relied on by the
district court for departure are permissible
factors under the Guidelines; (2) whether the
departure factors, as supported by evidence in
18
the record, remove the case from the heartland
of the applicable guideline; and (3) whether
the degree of departure is reasonable.
United States v. Threadgill, 1999 WL 212251, *13 (5th Cir. 1999).
For our purposes here, the Supreme Court has already decided that
departures based on susceptibility to abuse in prison are
permissible, as discussed infra; and, as noted, the Government does
not challenge the extent of the departure. Therefore, at issue is
only the “heartland” question.4
Concerning that question, the Supreme Court in Koon, decided
after the first sentencing in this case, addressed, among other
things, the district court’s decision to depart downward based on
the enormous publicity and outrage surrounding that case. The
Court recognized the superior position of district courts in
4
The majority misconstrues Threadgill in part, by relying on
Threadgill’s statement that it “was certainly not a case where the
district court disregarded an applicable Guidelines range in favor
of another it preferred”. Maj. Opn. at 14 (quoting Threadgill,
1999 WL 212251 at *18). Then, although recognizing that the extent
of the departure is not at issue here, the majority concludes that
“the district court impermissibly sentenced Winters to its
‘preferred’ sentence of 12 months”. Maj. Opn. at 15. True, the
quoted statement from Threadgill in part concerned the second
inquiry on review: whether the case is outside the heartland. But,
it also concerned the third inquiry on review: whether the extent
of the departure was reasonable. Threadgill,
1999 WL 212251 at
*18, *22 n.16. Again, we are concerned only with the second
inquiry — the heartland question. And, it is in this regard that
the majority’s treatment of Threadgill is most troubling, by
failing to address Threadgill’s discussion of the standards to be
applied in making the first two inquiries (whether the factors were
permissible and whether the facts take the case out of the
heartland).
- 19 -
determining whether, for sentencing purposes, a case was “typical”:
Before a departure is permitted, certain
aspects of the case must be found unusual
enough for it to fall outside the heartland of
cases in the Guideline. To resolve this
question, the district court must make a
refined assessment of the many facts bearing
on the outcome, informed by its vantage point
and day-to-day experience in criminal
sentencing. Whether a given factor is present
to a degree not adequately considered by the
Commission, or whether a discouraged factor
nonetheless justifies departure because it is
present in some unusual or exceptional way,
are matters determined in large part by
comparison with the facts of other Guidelines
cases. District courts have an institutional
advantage over appellate courts in making
these sorts of determinations, especially as
they see many more Guidelines cases than
appellate courts do. In 1994, for example,
93.9% of Guidelines cases were not appealed.
To ignore the district court’s special
competence – about the “ordinariness” or
“unusualness” of a particular case – would
risk depriving the Sentencing Commission of an
important source of information, namely, the
reactions of the trial judge to the fact-
specific circumstances of the case.
Id. at 98 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis
added).
This passage from Koon reveals two errors in the majority’s
reasoning. First, the majority states that there are two permitted
bases for a downward departure: if the conduct is outside the
heartland of typical cases; and “[a]lternatively, ... if ‘[the
sentencing court] finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
- 20 -
Commission in formulating the sentencing guidelines’”, quoting
Koon, 518 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added). Maj. Opn. at 5-6. As I
read the Guidelines and Koon, these are not alternative permitted
downward departure bases. Rather, the departure is permitted if
the factors in the case take it outside the “heartland”; that
results when the circumstances are so unusual that they were not
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. See
id. at
94 (Guidelines “apply to a heartland of typical cases. Atypical
cases were not ‘adequately taken into consideration,’ and factors
that make a case atypical provide potential bases for departure”);
see also United States v. Rivera,
994 F.2d 942, 947 (1st Cir. 1993)
(a case that is outside the heartland of a guideline “is, by
definition, an ‘unusual case’”). This clarification is important
because, in the final analysis, the district court’s reason for the
downward departure at issue resulted from it finding the sentencing
considerations outside the heartland. It came to this conclusion
because the unique, total circumstances of this case had not been
taken into consideration by the Commission.
Second, the above-quoted passage from Koon notes the
substantial deference that appellate courts must accord such
departure decisions.5 As our court stated quite recently:
5
In addition to worrying that a red herring (the district
judge’s expertise) has been dragged over the heartland issue, the
majority fears that my construction of the substantial discretion
standard would render downward departure decisions “virtually
- 21 -
Koon thus teaches that when a district court
decides to depart based on the particular
facts of a case, it is acting within its
special competence. Accordingly, it is the
near-exclusive province of the district court
to decide whether a particular factor, or set
of factors, removes a case from the applicable
heartland. We must accord those decisions the
greatest deference.
Threadgill, 1999 WL 212251 at *16 (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
As discussed more thoroughly infra, the district judge went to
great lengths to explain why he thought this case is so unusual.
In addition to insight gained from having presided over the trial,
the district judge’s reasons were grounded in his extensive
judicial service and experience, especially with matters involving
the penitentiary, in that he has handled litigation concerning it
for more than 15 years.
But, in spite of the district judge’s unique position to find
this case outside the heartland, the majority dismisses his
reasoning, stating that Winters’ “situation is not outside the
heartland of cases in which a law enforcement officer is accused of
impervious from appellate review”, and cautions that this standard
is not “designed to ward off the scrutiny of this court”. Maj. Opn.
at 5 n.1. Obviously, the substantial discretion standard is not
intended to have that effect. On the other hand, I simply
recognize, and (unlike the majority) am faithful to, the narrow
standard of review that has been mandated. Threadgill, 1999 WL
212251, *16 (“it is the near-exclusive province of the district
court to decide whether a particular factor, or set of factors,
removes a case from the applicable heartland” (emphasis added)).
Rather than apply this standard, the majority substitutes its
judgment for that of the district court.
- 22 -
using excessive force or violating a person’s civil rights under
color of law”. Maj. Opn. at 11. In so doing, the majority cites
no authority for this proposition, and ignores the district judge’s
vast and unique experience in applying the Guidelines in this
instance.
Furthermore, the majority compounds the error by parsing the
judge’s reasoning and erroneously addressing each of his rationales
separately. In contrast, the district judge’s statements at
resentencing demonstrate that he considered all the circumstances
together, in their totality, in concluding that the case was
outside the heartland. The majority addresses the two reasons the
district court gave in its “Notice of Intent to Depart” (the
mandatory firearm sentence and the Koon susceptibility to abuse
factor) as if our court must decide whether either alone would
support the district judge’s decision. This treatment misconstrues
that judge’s reasoning and undermines the substantial deference
owed him in such circumstances.
First, the majority rejects the mandatory five-year
consecutive sentence under the 18 U.S.C. §924(c) firearms
conviction as a basis for departure, stating that “[n]o permissible
basis for departure was provided by the gun charge”. Maj. Opn. at
6. The district judge agreed with this; the firearms sentence was
- 23 -
not the basis for his departure.6 Instead, the district judge
correctly considered the interplay of the mandatory five-year
firearms sentence with the other circumstances in considering the
totality of the circumstances that warranted a departure. He made
clear that he was not departing solely because of the mandatory
firearms sentence and that he understood the import of United
States v. Caldwell, 985 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1993).
In Caldwell, the defendant was convicted under § 924(c) and
for underlying drug offenses. The district court departed downward
because the gun did not have an “integral role” in the offense and
because of the defendant’s minimal participation in the crime.
Caldwell, 985 F.2d at 765. Our court reversed, concluding that the
case did not present “unusual circumstances” justifying a
departure.
Id. at 766. That conclusion was based on finding that
the Sentencing Commission had taken into account the interplay
between § 924(c) and the underlying drug offense.
Id.
The interplay between § 924(c) and the underlying civil rights
offense in this case has also been taken into consideration by the
Commission. Winters’ base offense level for the underlying civil
rights offense was not enhanced for the use of the firearm, because
6
At resentencing, the district judge did not dispute that §
924(c) applied to Winters. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras,
950 F.2d 232, 241 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
504 U.S. 941
(1992) (§ 924(c) applies to police officers who commit crimes using
their firearm).
- 24 -
that use was taken into account for the § 924(c) sentence. See
U.S.S.G. § 2H1.4(a)(1994 ed.) (court to apply greater of offense
level 10 or 6 plus offense level of underlying offense for § 242
convictions); U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) (guideline for aggravated
assault – the underlying offense in this case – that provides a 4
level increase for use of a firearm); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 (underlying
offense should not be enhanced for use of a firearm when defendant
is also convicted under § 924(c)).
The district judge understood this. This interplay is
reflected in the Presentence Report; there was no firearms
enhancement to the base offense level for the civil rights
conviction. But, the district judge recognized that other
considerations came into play that, in his view, took this case
outside the heartland:
The facts [concerning Winters and those in
Caldwell] are very distinguishable. Caldwell
[did not involve] a law enforcement officer.
Caldwell [concerned] a drug dealer arrested in
a motel room and [he] had a gun within the
useful area, I guess you could say. I’m not
persuaded that Caldwell can be analogized to
the case against Mr. Winters. And I say it
for this reason. Mr. Winters legitimately had
this weapon on him. He was out on a mission
to recapture an escaped prisoner. He didn’t
shoot the victim with the gun. But he did,
the evidence shows, strike him over the head
with this gun. I simply meant to point out in
my downward departure reasons, reason No. 2
[in the notice — the weapons count], that here
we don’t have someone who was illegally in
possession, carrying or using a firearm. The
illegal use of it, though[,] was the striking
- 25 -
on the head. And while that alone perhaps is
not a sufficient ground for downward
departure, I mention it in conjunction with my
first ground [in the notice – susceptibility
to abuse in prison] because the overall
totality of the circumstances in this case
call for a downward departure.
(Emphasis added.)
The district judge was within his discretion in concluding
that the Sentencing Commission had not anticipated such unusual
facts. Addressing this, the district judge stated:
Now, as a correctional officer searching for
an escaped prisoner, ... Winters legitimately
possessed a firearm during that search. And
following the capture of the escaped inmate,
Mr. Winters used this firearm for an illegal
purpose, to strike the victim on the head.
The defendant did not use the firearm within
its designed purpose, but used the weapon as a
club to strike the victim. It is likely this
defendant did not give any thought to what he
used to hit the victim with, and used this
firearm to strike the victim because it
happened to be in his hand at the time he
chose to use illegal force against the victim.
It is also likely that Mr. Winters would have
used another item, such as a walkie-talkie,
which one of the guards did use against this
victim, a baton or something of that nature[,]
if that item, instead of a firearm, had been
in his hand when he chose to strike the
victim.
Moreover, I do not read Caldwell as preventing district courts
from ever considering the mandatory firearms sentence as one of the
factors in the decision to depart downward. Although the district
court may not depart solely on that basis, the district judge made
it clear that this was merely one consideration of many.
- 26 -
Finally, Caldwell does not hold that, after a district court
has decided to depart downward based on a legitimate reason, it
cannot consider the firearms sentence in deciding the extent of the
departure. The Guidelines’ range for the civil rights and
obstruction of justice convictions was 108-135 months (9-11.25
years), to be followed by the mandatory consecutive five years for
the firearms count, totaling approximately 15 years. Instead, the
district court departed downward to one year for the first two
convictions, resulting in six years imprisonment. At resentencing,
conceding that an approximate 15-years sentence was “too severe”,
the Government stated that, if the district court would depart
downward only 50% from the 108-135 months range, it would not
appeal the sentence.
Had the district court done so, the sentence for the
underlying offenses would be between 4.5 to 5.63 years, which, with
the consecutive mandatory five years, would have resulted in an
approximate 10-years sentence. In short, it appeared that the
Government wanted Winters to serve approximately 10 years. This
supports the Government’s unspoken recognition that, in the light
of the circumstances in this case, imprisonment of greater than
approximately 10 years is outside the heartland. (Again, the
extent of the departure is not at issue.)
Perhaps the majority is concerned that allowing the district
court to consider the five-year mandatory sentence as a factor
- 27 -
would undermine the purpose of § 924(c). However, this and other
courts have considered the impact of the five-year mandatory
sentence in allowing departures in other circumstances.7 For
example, a district court may consider the effect of a § 924(c)
sentence in departing downward for substantial assistance. See
United States v. Alvarez, 51 F.3d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1995) (district
court may impose sentence below statutory minimum on Government’s
motion to reflect substantial assistance); United States v.
7
Two other cases were found in this circuit where the district
court departed downward where a § 924(c) sentence was involved. In
United States v. Wainuskis, 942 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Miss. 1996), in
which the defendant pleaded guilty to a § 924(c) violation and
underlying offenses, the district court departed downward from a
range of 78 to 97 months and imposed a 30-month sentence to run
consecutively with the § 924(c) five-year sentence. Later, due to
a change in the interpretation for the term “use” of a firearm, as
employed in § 924(c), see Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137
(1995), the defendant challenged her plea to the § 924(c) charge.
The district court noted that it “would not have made such a
substantial downward departure if [it] had known that [§ 924(c)]
would subsequently be modified or changed by the Supreme Court
contrary to previous controlling precedent”.
Id. at 1109. This
demonstrates that the district court considered the impact of the
mandatory sentence in deciding the extent of his departure for the
underlying offense sentence.
Section 924(c) also provides for a mandatory 30-year term of
imprisonment for the use of certain types of firearms. In United
States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 738 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1185 (1997), one of the defendants was convicted under
this provision, but the district court departed downward to 10
years imprisonment, rather than imposing the mandatory 30-year
sentence required by the statute. The Government did not appeal
the departure.
- 28 -
Schaffer, 110 F.3d 530, 532-33 (8th Cir. 1997).
Further, allowing this departure will not undermine the
purpose of § 924(c). Congress’ intent was, inter alia, that
defendants convicted under § 924(c) spend a minimum of five years
in prison. See United States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1426 (5th
Cir. 1994) (Congress’ concern in enacting 1984 amendments to §
924(c) was in providing for a minimum mandatory sentence for use of
a firearm in certain crimes). That purpose is more than satisfied
by the six-year sentence imposed by the district court.8
Moreover, neither § 924(c) nor the case law of this circuit
state that a district court may never consider the impact of a
five-year mandatory sentence. Caldwell states that district courts
may not depart based solely on this criterion, but that is not the
situation here.
Even if I am incorrect in my reading of Caldwell, and it is
(as the majority appears to conclude) inappropriate to ever
consider the impact of the mandatory firearms sentence, I would
still affirm the sentence based on the other factors highlighted by
the district judge, including the susceptibility to abuse in
8
Section 924(c)’s mandatory sentence provision was also
intended to deter the use of firearms in the commission of crimes.
United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 1083-84 (5th Cir.
1993). In this case, the deterrent value of the mandatory sentence
is preserved; the district court sentenced Winters to five years
for the firearms conviction to be served consecutively with one
year for the § 242 conviction.
- 29 -
prison. As the Supreme Court has stated: “A sentence thus can be
‘reasonable’ even if some of the reasons given by the district
court to justify the departure from the presumptive guideline range
are invalid, provided that the remaining reasons are sufficient to
justify the magnitude of the departure.” Williams v. United
States, 503 U.S. 193, 204 (1992). Here, the totality of the
circumstances, even disregarding the mandatory sentence, justifies
our according the requisite deference to the district judge and
affirming the departure.
In this regard, the majority states that the district judge’s
“second basis for departure was the fact that Winters’ status as a
corrections officer makes him highly susceptible to abuse in
prison”. Maj. Opn. at 11 (emphasis added). Again, this was not a
“second”, separate, or alternative basis; instead, it was simply
part of the totality of the circumstances found to mandate downward
departure.
In Koon, the Court stated that the crimes committed by the
police officers in beating a suspect, “were by definition the same
for purposes of sentencing law as those of any other police
officers convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 of using unreasonable
force in arresting a suspect”. Koon, 518 U.S. at 112. However,
the Court relied on the videotape of the crime, the publicity, and
- 30 -
the public outrage in affirming the downward departure. Id.
The district judge carefully considered Koon’s applicability:
And as I recall in United States v. Koon, the
defendant in Koon is to be distinguished from
Mr. Winters. Koon was a police officer, a law
enforcement officer out working with the
public. On the other hand, in this particular
case, Mr. Winters was a Lieutenant working in
corrections in a state prison. He has had
day-to-day contact with prisoners, presumably
throughout the course of his 15-year career
with the Mississippi Department of
Corrections. We know that a substantial
number of prisoners who began doing time in
the state system eventually filter into the
federal system. And it’s logical to assume
than even though, certainly Mr. Winters’ case
did not receive the notoriety and publicity
connected with the Koon case, nonetheless it
received a great deal of notoriety in ... the
state of Mississippi through the media because
an indictment resulted from the recapture of
an inmate who was maliciously assaulted by Mr.
Winters, who struck the inmate with a firearm
while the inmate was on the back of a ...
truck being taken, as I recall, perhaps to the
hospital already because he had been struck by
a walkie-talkie by someone earlier while being
transported back to the penitentiary.
Thus, based on the district court’s close consideration of Winters’
susceptibility to abuse in prison, combined with its consideration
of the unique facts of this case and the effect of the mandatory
firearm sentence, the district court departed downward.
The majority rejects this reasoning, stating that “[a] few
stories in a local or state-wide newspaper cannot compare to the
national outrage emanating from the beating [at issue in Koon], not
to mention the subsequent riots”. Maj. Opn. at 11. The majority’s
- 31 -
reasoning effectively writes Koon out of the law by requiring
national publicity and outrage for the susceptibility to abuse in
prison exception to apply.
I do not read Koon to require such extensive publicity. In
Koon, after discussing the publicity in that case, the Supreme
Court stated that the determination by the district court that the
defendants would be more susceptible to abuse in prison “is just
the sort of determination that must be accorded deference by the
appellate courts”. 518 U.S. at 111. Likewise, in this case, the
district judge’s conclusion regarding the local and state-wide
publicity should be afforded far more deference than that given by
the majority.9 As noted, the sentencing judge in this case has
been involved in extensive prison litigation and is in a unique
position to gauge a defendant’s likelihood of abuse in prison.
The majority also cites to United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d
754 (4th Cir. 1996), and concludes erroneously that “the [district]
court determined that Winters’ mere status as an officer justified
the departure”. Maj. Opn. at 12. The district court at no time
intimated that Winters deserved a departure solely because of his
9
In stating that there is a “relative paucity of publicity in
this case”, Maj. Opn. at 14 n.3, the majority erroneously
substitutes its view of the facts for that of the district court.
This is a factual question; the district court’s determination
should be accorded far more deference than the majority is willing
to give. See Threadgill, 1999 WL 212251 at *15 (district court’s
resolution of factual questions must be “accord[ed] substantial
deference”).
- 32 -
status as a corrections officer. The majority’s reliance on
Rybicki is misplaced; even the majority notes that the Fourth
Circuit in that case was faced with the issue of “whether the
defendant’s status as a law enforcement officer can, by itself,
justify a downward departure”. Maj. Opn. at 12 (emphasis added).
The district judge stated that he was not departing downward
based solely on Winters’ position as a corrections officer.10
Instead, the judge found that a susceptibility to abuse departure
was warranted because: (1) Winters was a corrections officer with
daily contact with prisoners; (2) he had been a corrections officer
for 15 years, increasing the amount of contact he had with
prisoners; (3) the case received considerable media attention in
Mississippi, where Winters was employed and the prisoners would
have known about the incident; (4) prisoners in the state system
10
Indeed, in addressing downward departures that were granted
as a result of the defendant’s status in a class of offenders
frequently targeted by other prisoners (such as child
pornographers), two other circuits have held that Koon does not
allow a departure. See United States v. Wilke, 156 F.3d 749, 753
(7th Cir. 1998) (“Mere membership in a particular class of
offenders that may be susceptible to abuse in prison does not merit
a departure for vulnerability to abuse in prison”); United States
v. Drew,
131 F.3d 1269, 1271 (8th Cir. 1997) (child pornography
conviction and naivete of defendant not enough to support downward
departure for vulnerability to abuse); United States v. Kapitzke,
130 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Kapitzke’s mere membership in
a class of offenders that may be targeted by other inmates cannot
make his case extraordinary”). The district court did not depart
merely because of Winters’ status as a member of a vulnerable class
in prison (i.e., prison guards), but instead departed based on the
total circumstances surrounding this case.
- 33 -
often enter the federal system; and (5) the crime for which Winters
was convicted stemmed from his beating a prisoner. In short, it is
erroneous for the majority to conclude that the district judge
relied only on Winters’ corrections officer status in determining
that a susceptibility to abuse in prison departure was warranted.
In concluding that “the district court abused its discretion
when it departed downward from the guidelines simply because
Winters was a law enforcement officer”, the majority states that
“[t]o allow a departure on the basis that Winters is a law
enforcement officer would thwart the purpose and intent of the
guidelines”; and that “[t]he Sentencing Commission surely
considered the possibility that some defendants convicted of
violating a person’s civil rights under color of law would be law
enforcement officers. As noted earlier, the Commission applied
greater not lesser sentences for such crimes”. Maj. Opn. at 12
(emphasis in original).
Certainly, the Commission contemplated the sad fact that some
persons violating another’s civil rights would be law enforcement
officers. But, that is not the issue at hand. At issue is whether
the Commission contemplated that, for circumstances such as exist
in this case (corrections officer struck captured escapee with
pistol), that the officer would not only receive a substantial term
of imprisonment (10 years) under the Guidelines for civil rights
and obstruction of justice violations, greatly increasing, among
- 34 -
other things, his susceptibility to abuse in prison, but would also
receive a consecutive five year sentence on a firearms count (even
though the weapon was instead used as a club), adding to that
susceptibility and otherwise increasing the sentence to
approximately 15 years.11 Based upon his vast experience and
exercising his broad discretion, the district judge concluded that,
under the totality of the circumstances, this situation was not
contemplated; that the Commission never intended that a person
committing such an offense would serve approximately 15 years in
prison; and that, as a result, it was outside the heartland.12
The district court’s decision is further supported by United
States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 363 (5th Cir. 1998), in which
11
The Government points to a letter from the Bureau of Prisons,
stating that it is equipped to protect prisoners, such as Winters,
that have special security needs. Presumably, the Bureau could
have said the same for the defendants in Koon. Again, the Supreme
Court affirmed the district court’s susceptibility to abuse
departure in that case, deferring to the judgment of the district
court on such matters.
12
See Threadgill, 1999 WL 212251 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming
downward departure in money laundering case and deferring to
district court’s factual determinations). See also United States
v. Walters,
87 F.3d 663 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 498
(1996), where our court deferred to the district judge’s
determination that the defendant deserved mitigation in receiving
a sentence for money laundering because he did not receive any of
the stolen funds. Our court affirmed the departure because the
extent of the departure was reasonable and “the sentencing
guideline for money laundering and its commentary make no mention
of the failure to receive a personal benefit as a mitigating
factor”.
Id. at 671-72.
- 35 -
our court upheld a downward departure based on “the unusual facts
of [the] case[,] ... Department of Justice practice, the language
and structure of the guideline, and the absence of caselaw
supporting the government’s claim to typicality”. Likewise, the
district judge here considered what he, as an experienced judge,
found to be the unusual factors of this case; the Court’s reasoning
in Koon, holding that atypical susceptibility to abuse in prison
may warrant a downward departure; Winters’ position as a
correctional officer for 15 years, thus placing him in contact with
countless prisoners; and the fact that Winters was convicted of
beating a prisoner. While the Government asserts that this is a
typical case (as it did unsuccessfully in Hemmingson), it cites no
authority to show that this is a typical 18 U.S.C. § 242
prosecution.13
13
A search of 18 U.S.C. § 242 prosecutions appealed to either
our court or the Supreme Court resulting in a published opinion
revealed only one case involving a prison guard accused of beating
a prisoner. In United States v. Bigham, 812 F.2d 943 (5th Cir.
1987), prison guards beat, struck, and burned recaptured escaped
prisoners after returning to the prison. There is no indication in
the opinion that any of the guards struck the prisoners with a gun.
The opinion does not indicate the length of the sentence imposed on
any of the defendants.
Given the paucity of the reported cases involving appeals from
18 U.S.C. § 242 convictions for guards beating inmates, it is
unclear how the majority reaches the conclusion that this case is
a typical § 242 case. Indeed, it is because appellate courts see
so few cases on appeal relative to those addressed by the district
courts that we should, and must, give substantial deference to the
district court in determining the typicality of a case.
- 36 -
Moreover, the district court’s use of the totality of the
circumstances is supported in a post-Koon case from the Tenth
Circuit. In United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (10th
Cir. 1997), the court began by reviewing the impact of Koon on
appellate review of downward departures. The court noted that Koon
requires its most deferential review for the factual determinations
by the district court.
Id. at 1302 (citing
Koon, 116 S. Ct. at
2046). Here, as
discussed supra, part of the legal basis of the
district court’s decision was Winters’ susceptibility to abuse in
prison. Again, the Supreme Court has held that this may be taken
into account in deciding to depart downward. Thus, as also
discussed supra, the only determinations left for our review are
the district judge’s factual findings that Winters would be
susceptible to abuse in prison, to which we must grant substantial
deference (stated by Threadgill, as
discussed supra, to equate with
“accord[ing] those decisions the greatest deference”, 1999 WL
Further, the lack of this type of § 242 convictions before
this court undermines the majority’s conclusion that the district
court must be reversed because departures should be infrequent.
Given the infrequency with which this court must decide appeals
from these cases, departures such as the one before us can hardly
be described as “frequent”. Moreover, our court lacks jurisdiction
to review a district court’s refusal to depart downward unless its
decision was based on a mistaken belief that it lacked authority to
do so. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia-Gonzalez, 1999 WL
198889, *2 (5th Cir. 1999). This further undermines the majority’s
conclusion that this case is not atypical, as our court can only
review those cases in which a downward departure is granted, not
when it is refused.
- 37 -
212251 at *16).
The Collins court also recognized that some factors that would
not, alone, support a departure could be properly considered in
conjunction with other factors to warrant a downward departure. In
Collins, the district court departed downward based on the
defendant’s advanced age and infirmity and on the circumstances
surrounding an almost 10-year-old conviction that resulted in a
career criminal adjustment. Collins, 122 F.3d at 1305. In
affirming, the Tenth Circuit stated that, although offender
characteristics (such as age and infirmity) ordinarily should not
be taken into account, they could be considered “in combination
with other circumstances of a defendant’s criminal history”.
Id.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, rather than parsing the district court’s
reasoning (as the majority erroneously does here), the Tenth
Circuit considered the reasons for departing downward in the same
manner as the district court presented them – as part of the total
circumstances that, together, removed the case from the heartland.
Recently, the Eighth Circuit rendered a decision in a similar
case. In United States v. Colbert, 1999 WL 177300 (8th Cir. 1999),
the defendant, a police officer, was convicted of violating § 242
after he beat a suspect being held in the local jail. On appeal,
the defendant claimed, among other things, that the district court
erred in refusing to depart downward under Koon because the
defendant, as a police officer, would be susceptible to abuse in
- 38 -
prison; because the victim provoked the defendant; and because of
the defendant’s responsibilities to his children and fiancee.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision not to depart.14
Colbert, however, involved different facts than those present here:
first, the defendant in Colbert did not assert that there was
publicity surrounding his conviction that would increase the
susceptibility to abuse in prison; and second, here, the district
judge did not rely on either family responsibilities, as discussed
infra, or the conduct of the victim in deciding to depart downward.
Interestingly, although the Colbert court affirmed the
district court’s decision not to depart downward, Colbert supports
affirming the departure here. In rejecting the defendant’s
contentions, Colbert notes that Koon did not apply because “there
was no extraordinary publicity”. In contrast, here, the district
14
As discussed in note 10, the rule in our court is that we
generally lack jurisdiction to review a denial of a downward
departure. See, e.g., Valencia-Gonzales, 1999 WL 198889 at *2.
The Eighth Circuit follows the same rule. See, e.g., United States
v. Johnson,
1999 WL 105100, *3 (8th Cir. 1999) (“We have
jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary decision
not to depart downward from the Guidelines only if the district
court acted with an unconstitutional motive or erroneously believed
that it lacked the authority to consider a particular mitigating
factor”) (internal quotation omitted). The defendant in Colbert
did not claim that the district court acted with an
unconstitutional motive or under an erroneous belief that it could
not depart downward. Nevertheless, the court did not address
whether it had the authority to review the refusal-to-depart-
downward claim. Instead, the court proceeded to the merits and
appeared to review the district court’s decision under an abuse of
discretion standard.
- 39 -
judge found that there was significant publicity. Further, the
Eighth Circuit did not devote much discussion to analyzing the
district court’s decision. Rather, after a very brief discussion
of the holding in Koon, the court stated: “The District Court felt
these differences justified it in refusing to depart downward. We
see no abuse of discretion in these determinations.” Id. at *2.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit did not parse and dissect the
district court’s reasoning on each of the bases the district court
rejected in denying a downward departure. Rather, the court
followed the district court’s lead in examining the circumstances
of the case, and, in the end, deferred to the discretion and
reasoning of the district court. This is precisely the approach
the majority has erroneously failed to follow here.
Such an approach is warranted, where the district judge
carefully considered a combination of factors that lead it to find
this case atypical. By separating out each of the district court’s
reasons and analyzing each on its own, the majority destroys any
possibility of a district court departing downward when a case
presents numerous factors that, while each alone may not support a
departure, make the total case atypical.15 The Sentencing
15
The majority likens my use of “totality of the circumstances”
to a “mantra”. For this review, well it should be. Stating that
“[a] ‘total’ is nothing more than the sum of its component parts”,
Maj. Opn. at 13, the majority examines only the parts and never the
sum. This is at odds with our court’s approach in Threadgill and
Hemingson, where we looked at the total circumstances rather than
- 40 -
Commission did not intend for departures to be made only in those
case where one factor made the case atypical, but not in those
cases where a combination of factors made it so.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the
district court considered Winters’ family ties and responsibilities
in departing downward. In so doing, the majority quoted from our
court’s opinion for the first appeal in this case, United States v.
Winters, 105 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1997). There, our court stated:
That is not to say that, on remand, there can
be no possibility of a downward departure
based on family ties or responsibilities or
the defendant’s employment. See Koon, 116 S.
Ct. at 2050. (Congress did not grant courts
authority to decide what sentencing
considerations are inappropriate in every
case.) But the district court’s reasoning
fails to cite the compelling facts necessary
to satisfy the very high standard for this
type of departure from the Guidelines.
105 F.3d at 208 (Emphasis added). The majority quotes the last
sentence of this paragraph, Maj. Opn. at 10, but it is inapplicable
in this appeal; the district judge did not, on resentencing, base
his decision on Winters’ family ties or responsibilities.
Instead, as discussed, the district judge looked to other
factors. Because I would accord, as required, substantial
deference to his findings and would affirm the sentence imposed by
him, I respectfully dissent.
critically parsing each stated reason.
- 41 -
- 42 -
- 43 -
