Filed: Jul. 14, 1999
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: REVISED, July 14, 1999 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-10128 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARL JAY WASKOM, JR., Defendant-Appellant, * * * * * * * * * * * * _ No. 98-10166 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD TAYLOR, JR., Defendant-Appellant. * * * * * * * * * * * * _ No. 98-10167 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAWN DEE ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant. * * * * * * * * * * * * _ No. 98-10168 _ UNITED STATES
Summary: REVISED, July 14, 1999 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-10128 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARL JAY WASKOM, JR., Defendant-Appellant, * * * * * * * * * * * * _ No. 98-10166 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD TAYLOR, JR., Defendant-Appellant. * * * * * * * * * * * * _ No. 98-10167 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHAWN DEE ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant. * * * * * * * * * * * * _ No. 98-10168 _ UNITED STATES ..
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REVISED, July 14, 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 98-10128
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CARL JAY WASKOM, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant,
* * * * * * * * * * * *
________________
No. 98-10166
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDWARD TAYLOR, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
________________
No. 98-10167
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SHAWN DEE ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
_________________
No. 98-10168
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CATHERINE DEE ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
______________________________________________
June 22, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, POLITZ and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Carl J. Waskom, Jr., Edward Taylor, Jr., Shawn Dee Adams, and
Catherine Dee Adams appeal the sentences imposed on them by the
district court. With respect to the sentences imposed on Waskom
and the Adamses, we vacate and remand for resentencing. Because
the sentencing judge should have granted Taylor’s motion for
recusal, we vacate his sentence and remand for new sentencing
proceedings before a different judge.
I
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Waskom, Taylor, Shawn
Adams, and Catherine Adams (collectively “the defendants”) pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by
robbery and physical violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
Taylor and the Adamses also pleaded guilty to possession of an
unregistered firearm and aiding and abetting, in violation of 26
U.S.C. §§ 5845, 5861(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. After the entry of the
guilty pleas, the district court applied the federal Sentencing
2
Guidelines to sentence each defendant. Taylor received a 262-month
term of imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of
supervised release, and a $200 special assessment. Shawn Adams
received a 168-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by a
three-year term of supervised release, and a $200 special
assessment. Catherine Adams received a 180-month term of
imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised
release, and a $200 special assessment. Waskom received a 110-
month term of imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of
supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.
Because the defendants did not proceed to trial, the factual
résumés accompanying their pleas, the Presentence Reports (PSRs)
and their addenda,1 preliminary and sentencing proceedings before
the district court, and tapes admitted into evidence provide the
background for the appellants’ sentences. These sources reveal
that in or about March 1997, the defendants entered into a
conspiracy to commit a number of criminal acts that would culminate
in the robbery of an armored car. The car they planned to rob
routinely traveled to federally insured banks located in
Bridgeport, Texas and Chico, Texas to pick up and deliver United
States currency. In order to prevent law enforcement officers from
responding adequately to the heist, the defendants intended to
create a diversion by detonating several explosive devices at the
1
As a general rule, a PSR bears sufficient indicia of
reliability such that the sentencing judge may consider it as
evidence in making the factual determinations required by the
guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Alford, 142 F.3d 825, 831-
32 (5th Cir. 1998).
3
nearby Mitchell Energy Corporation gas refinery. The defendants
planned to finance their criminal activities by robbing two
different individuals, whom they suspected to be narcotics
traffickers.
Before the police interrupted the plan, the defendants took
several steps toward accomplishing their goal. For example, the
four conducted surveillance of one of the drug traffickers they had
targeted, and Taylor traveled to Bridgeport and Chico to conduct
surveillance of the armored car.
On March 29 and April 1, the defendants met to discuss plans
for the robbery. They agreed that they should conduct a “test”
detonation. On April 5, Shawn Adams, Catherine Adams, and Waskom
met at the Adamses’ residence, where they constructed two small
explosive devices. They then traveled to the LBJ Grasslands and
detonated the two devices. On April 6, Catherine Adams and Waskom
went to the Mitchell Energy Corporation gas refinery to survey the
facility. They drew a small sketch of the plant and the
surrounding area. One week later, Shawn Adams, Catherine Adams,
and Waskom met at the Adamses’ residence to discuss the
construction of explosive devices. The three met again, two days
later, to continue their discussions. Ultimately, the defendants
settled on a plan to detonate explosive devices at the gas refinery
and rob the armored car on May 1. Waskom informed his employer
that he would be away from work on that day.
Unbeknownst to the four conspirators, a confidential informant
had been recording their interactions and relaying their plans to
4
law enforcement authorities since March. As a consequence, the
defendants were arrested on April 22, before they could execute
their plans. According to Detective Charles Storey, the lead
investigating agent, the defendants’ plan to rob one of the
targeted drug traffickers on the evening of April 22 prompted the
authorities to make the arrests that day.
II
On appeal, all four defendants argue that the district court
erred in denying them a three-point reduction of their base offense
level. This claim relates to § 2X1.1(b)(2) of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. In addition, Waskom raises several other
issues pertaining to the district court’s calculation of his
sentence.
We review de novo the sentencing court’s application of the
federal Sentencing Guidelines and review for clear error its
associated findings of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Goynes,
– F.3d –, 1999 WL 288261, at *2 (5th Cir. May 10, 1999). We uphold
a defendant’s sentence “unless it was imposed in violation of law;
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines; or outside the range of the applicable sentencing
guideline and is unreasonable.” United States v. Garcia,
962 F.2d
479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1992).
In addition to his specific challenges to his sentence, Taylor
argues that the sentencing judge, the Honorable John McBryde,
should have granted Taylor’s motion for recusal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 455(a). Because the decision whether to recuse is within
5
the discretion of the district court judge, we review for abuse of
discretion the denial of a motion for recusal. See United States
v. Anderson, 160 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
We begin with the issue that is common to all of the
defendants: whether the district court properly denied them a
three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2) of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. We then discuss the issues raised
individually by Waskom and Taylor.
III
A
In cases of attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy, the federal
Sentencing Guidelines direct the sentencing court to calculate the
applicable offense level by using the base offense level from the
guideline for the substantive offense, unless there is a specific
offense guideline for the conspiracy charge that forms the basis of
the sentencing. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2X1.1
(1997) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.).2 After ascertaining the base
offense level, the sentencing court makes adjustments from the
substantive offense guideline for any intended offense conduct that
is established with reasonable certainty. See id. In the case of
conspiracy, the guidelines further direct:
[D]ecrease by 3 levels, unless the defendant or a co-
conspirator completed all the acts the conspirators
believed necessary on their part for the successful
completion of the substantive offense or the
2
The PSRs and the district court relied on the 1997 Guidelines
Manual to calculate the defendants’ sentences. The subsequent
amendments to the guidelines do not affect the provisions at issue
here.
6
circumstances demonstrate that the conspirators were
about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or
interruption by some similar event beyond their control.
U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2). The commentary accompanying § 2X1.1
explains this adjustment:
In most prosecutions for conspiracies . . . , the
substantive offense was substantially completed or was
interrupted or prevented on the verge of completion by
the intercession of law enforcement authorities or the
victim. In such cases, no reduction of the offense level
is warranted. Sometimes, however, the arrest occurs well
before the defendant or any co-conspirator has completed
the acts necessary for the substantive offense. Under
such circumstances, a reduction of 3 levels is provided
under [§ 2X1.1(b)(2)].
U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, comment. (backg’d). The focus of § 2X1.1(b)(2)
is “on the conduct of the defendant, not on the probability that a
conspiracy would have achieved success.” United States v. Medina,
74 F.3d 413, 418 (2d Cir. 1996). In effect, the guideline “gives
the defendant a three-level discount if he is some distance from
completing the crime.” United States v. Egemonye,
62 F.3d 425, 429
(1st Cir. 1995).
Determining whether a reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2) is
warranted necessarily requires a fact-specific inquiry. With its
focus on the conspirators’ conduct in relation to the object
offense, the application of § 2X1.1(b)(2) thus resists a precise
standard. This is particularly so in a case such as this, where
there is no dispute that the defendants had not completed all the
acts they believed necessary to commit the substantive offense and
the question is only whether they were “about to” do so.
Certain principles nonetheless exist to guide a sentencing
court’s application of the guideline in this type of case. First,
7
the § 2X1.1(b)(2) inquiry focuses on the substantive offense and
the defendant’s conduct in relation to that specific offense. See
United States v. Westerman, 973 F.2d 1422, 1428-29 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the sentencing court erred in focusing on the
conspirators’ completion of an arson where the object offense was
mail fraud); United States v. Rothman,
914 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the relevant inquiry under § 2X1.1(b)(2) is the
degree of completion of the underlying offense). Second,
§ 2X1.1(b)(2) does not require the reduction for a conspirator who
has made substantial progress in his criminal endeavor simply
because a significant step remains before commission of the
substantive offense becomes inevitable. Cf. United States v. Knox,
112 F.3d 802, 813 (5th Cir.) (upholding the district court’s denial
of the reduction despite the defendant’s claim that he was
unprepared to launder the full amount at issue), vacated in part on
other grounds,
120 F.3d 42 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Brown,
74 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that the reduction may be
denied “even though a defendant had not reached the ‘last step’
before completion of the substantive offense”). Third, in order to
support a denial of the reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2), the
circumstances must demonstrate that the balance of the significant
acts completed and those remaining tips toward completion of the
substantive offense. This requires that the district court
consider the quality of the completed and remaining acts, not
simply the relative quantities of each. See United States v.
Martinez-Martinez,
156 F.3d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (considering
8
the substantiality of the steps remaining before the defendants
could complete the substantive offense). Fourth, a sentencing
court should consider the temporal frame of the scheme and the
amount of time the defendant would have needed to finish his plan,
had he not been interrupted. As the completion of the offense
becomes more imminent, the reduction will become less appropriate.
See U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2) & comment. (backg’d). Fifth, the
sentencing court should assess the conspirator’s degree of
preparedness to accomplish the remaining acts believed necessary to
complete the substantive offense. See, e.g., United States v.
Khawaja, 118 F.3d 1454 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that defendants
were not about to complete the acts they believed necessary to
launder the remaining balance of the funds at issue because they
“had not taken crucial steps [such as] preparing falsified
documentation, securing cashier’s checks, or arranging meetings for
the exchange”); United States v. Sung,
51 F.3d 92, 95 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that a commodity counterfeiter had not completed all
the acts he believed necessary to complete the substantive offense
with respect to any sales of counterfeit goods beyond 17,600
bottles because he possessed only enough liquid to fill that number
of bottles). Where conspirators are substantially prepared to
complete the remaining acts they believe necessary for their plan,
they are more likely to be “on the verge” of completing the
substantive offense, U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, comment. (backg’d), and are
thus unlikely to deserve the reduction. See, e.g., United States
v. Medina
74 F.3d 413, 419 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that
9
conspirators--having procured a floor plan, firearms, handcuffs,
ski masks, and a get-away vehicle for use during a robbery--were
“about to complete” their planned offense when they were arrested
as they approached the front door of the targeted business); United
States v. Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d 28,35 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding
that conspirators were “about to complete” a robbery based on
evidence that they “arrived . . . prepared and equipped to carry
out a robbery and were thwarted only by the unexpected early
departure of the Wells Fargo truck”); United States v. Johnson, 962
F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding the denial of § 2X1.1(b)(2)’s
reduction where, at the time of their arrest, the conspirators--
possessing firearms, stolen vehicles, nylon stockings and stocking
caps, and gloves--had pulled into the parking lots of the banks
they planned to rob). These five considerations do not exhaust the
factors that may be relevant in a given case, but they do provide
a framework for assessing whether a § 2X1.1(b)(2) reduction is
inappropriate because a conspirator was about to complete the acts
believed necessary to accomplish the substantive offense.
B
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question
whether the denial of a § 2X1.1(b)(2) three-level reduction was
warranted in this case. Detective Storey, the lead investigator,
testified at a preliminary hearing and at the two sentencing
hearings. He provided an overview of the defendants’ planning and
the extent to which the defendants had taken the steps they
believed necessary to complete the substantive offense underlying
10
the conspiracy charge. His testimony revealed that significant
aspects of the defendants’ plan were uncertain or unrealized at the
time of their arrest.
According to Detective Storey, the defendants backed out of
their planned robbery of the targeted drug traffickers on two
occasions before April 22. Ultimately, the defendants never robbed
either drug trafficker. The defendants also failed to obtain the
component parts to construct the explosive devices needed to create
the planned diversion at the gas refinery. At one point, Waskom
had indicated that he would attempt to obtain two fifty-five gallon
barrels of explosive material from an uncle in Chicago. It became
apparent that he would not be able to do so, however, and the
defendants consequently developed a contingency plan involving the
use of a large pipe bomb. Detective Storey testified that Waskom
never tried to obtain explosives from the Chicago uncle, who in
fact may not have existed. Searches of the defendants’ homes and
vehicles did not turn up any pipe. Detective Storey suggested that
the failure to recover any pipe indicated that the conspirators
still needed to acquire pipe to manufacture the explosive devices.
The defendants did possess a small amount of black powder, but
Detective Storey testified that the quantity was insufficient to
execute their plan to detonate several explosive devices.
Detective Storey posited that, had the defendants succeeded in
accomplishing the drug-trafficker robbery that they had
contemplated, then they would have had money to purchase the items
needed to construct the explosive devices. He acknowledged,
11
however, that the underlying robberies had not occurred and that
the defendants did not have money from any other source. As a
consequence, at the time of their arrests, the defendants had not
constructed any explosive devices to be used to create a diversion
during the robbery, nor did they even have the funds to do so.
That the conspirators were, in the words of Detective Storey,
“still in the planning stages” is further evidenced by a recording
of a conversation that the confidential informant and three of the
defendants had just minutes before the defendants’ arrests. During
this conversation, the defendants discussed the manner in which
they would plant the explosive devices and the way in which they
would confront the armored car and bank personnel. Taylor stated
that they still needed a vehicle or the assistance of other
individuals to remove the money from the armored car. As an
alternative, the defendants discussed the possibility of stealing
the armored car itself. Taylor observed, “I don’t know if May
first is pushing it, well [sic] we go back to June first or we can
take May fifteenth or, it don’t matter.” Later in the
conversation, he stated, “You know like I say we got way too much
planning to do between now and then to [sic], let’s see once, once
we get this all figured out here, and get this down pact [sic],
well then we can move on together to the decisions that we gotta
make.” Thus, moments before their arrest, these defendants
believed that there were significant aspects of their plot that
required additional planning, decisionmaking, and implementation.
The PSRs prepared for Waskom, Taylor, and the Adamses
12
nonetheless advised that the three-level reduction was not
applicable. The addenda to those reports stated that the
conspirators had completed all the acts they believed necessary for
the successful completion of the substantive offense but were
apprehended before implementing their final plans. According to
the addenda,
The conspirators had conducted extensive surveillance of
the armored car, the car’s route, the gas refinery, and
escape routes for leaving the area. They had obtained
pipes, fittings, and manuals with the full intention of
making the destructive devices. They had exploded two
prototypes in preparation for building the large devices
and had begun to make back up plans to use readily
available black powder in the bombs. It is evident that
the plan was on schedule and would have been completed if
the defendants had not been arrested. A three level
reduction should not be applied.
The district court overruled the defendants’ objections to the
PSR’s recommendation, adopted the PSR’s findings and conclusions,
and denied the three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2). In
rendering his decision, the sentencing judge stated:
I . . . find that they were far enough along that
they were about to complete all such acts but for their
apprehension. There were, as the witness, Storey,
indicated, two things lacking to make it as elaborate as
they had discussed, and that is more black powder and
some pipe. But they certainly had it within their means
to obtain those things readily, and even if they didn’t
they had something in their control that could cause a
lot of damage and certainly create the diversion.
And the fact that one of the conspirators had
already arranged to be off work on the day they had
discussed doing it, would certainly be a strong
indication that they were ready to do it. So I’ll
overrule that objection.
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court clearly erred in concluding that, at the time of
their arrest, the conspirators were about to complete all the acts
13
they believed necessary to rob the armored car. We reach this
conclusion because the conspirators’ plan required significant
steps to be taken before they could complete the substantive
offense. The record reveals that the acts the defendants believed
they needed to accomplish for the success of the armored-car
robbery were far more complex than any acts they had actually
committed and their completion of the remaining acts was neither
imminent nor a foregone conclusion. Successful completion of the
acts leading up to the robbery of the armored car would have
entailed the commission of the planned robberies of the suspected
drug traffickers; the purchase of component parts for the explosive
devices; the assembly, planting, and carefully timed detonation of
those devices; and formulation and execution of a concrete plan of
attack to make off with the contents of the armored car. At the
time of their arrest, the defendants had taken none of these steps.
Of particular importance to the district court’s decision to
deny the § 2X1.1(b)(2) reduction was the fact that Waskom had
arranged to be away from his job on May 1, the target date for the
robbery. According to the sentencing judge, this indicated that at
least one of the defendants thought the offense was “complete
enough” and that the conspirators were “ready” to commit the
robbery. Although Waskom’s plan to be away from work is of some
persuasive value, it is more indicative of his belief that the
group would be prepared to commit the robbery by that date than a
finding that the group was already equipped to do so. Further,
that Waskom set aside the target date becomes less weighty when
14
considered in the context of the defendants’ penchant for selecting
dates to commit robberies only to back out as the time for action
approached.3 When viewed in light of the full record, Waskom’s
plan to be away from work on May 1 does not persuade us that the
defendants were about to complete the armored-car robbery at the
time of their arrest on April 22.
Despite uncontroverted evidence that the conspirators lacked
the component parts to construct the explosive devices and had
insufficient resources to secure those materials, the district
court concluded that “they had it within their means to obtain
those things readily.” This finding is not supported by the
record. In the alternative, the court found that they possessed
“something . . . that could cause a lot of damage and certainly
create the diversion.” In reaching this conclusion, the court
presumably relied on the testimony that the conspirators possessed
a small amount of black powder, which could have been used to
construct a single pipe bomb with the potential to damage the
energy facility and cause injuries. Given the fact that the
authorities were unable to recover any pipe, this conclusion is
3
According to the PSRs, the conspirators initially planned to
rob the first drug trafficker on March 25, the second on March 30,
and the armored car on April 2, but they did not meet any of these
target dates. They also planned to rob an individual on April 15
but did not do so. April 22, the day the defendants were arrested,
was the next target date for the robbery of a drug trafficker. The
defendants had pushed back the scheduled date of the armored car
robbery to May 1 but, on the day of their arrest, discussed the
prospect of another postponement because significant preparations
remained. The record thus reveals a pattern of delay on the part
of the conspirators in taking certain steps they believed necessary
to complete the substantive offense--a pattern that continued up to
the moments before their arrest.
15
speculative. More importantly, there is no indication in the
record that the defendants would have proceeded if they had been
unable to construct the size and number of explosive devices they
had planned to detonate at the plant.
Although the district court may very well have been correct
that the defendants eventually would have secured the materials
they needed to construct the explosive devices, the relevant
question is whether they were about to do so. The record is clear
that, at the time of their arrest, the defendants lacked the
resources and materials they needed for their plan and were thus
unprepared to accomplish the remaining acts they believed necessary
to rob the armored car without interference from the authorities.
Certainly, the defendants had taken steps in furtherance of their
conspiracy. Those steps, however, pale in comparison to the acts
remaining to complete the intended offense. In sum, the record
does not support a finding that, at the point of their arrests, the
defendants were on the verge of completing the acts they believed
necessary to commit the substantive offense of robbing the armored
car. We therefore find that the district court clearly erred in
denying the three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2).
C
With the benefit of the § 2X1.1(b)(2) discount, the adjusted
offense levels for Taylor and the Adamses allow ranges of
imprisonment below the actual sentences imposed, so the error was
not harmless. See United States v. Mills, 9 F.3d 1132, 1139 (5th
Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we vacate the sentences of Taylor, Shawn
16
Adams, and Catherine Adams and remand for resentencing.
Based on the assistance that Waskom provided the government,
he received a downward departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the
guidelines. Although his guideline range of imprisonment was 168
to 210 months, Waskom was sentenced to a 110-month term of
incarceration. With the benefit of the three-level reduction,
Waskom’s guideline range of imprisonment is 121 to 151 months. The
Supreme Court has held that, if “the district court misapplied the
Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court
concludes, on the record as a whole, . . . that the error did not
affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.”
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203,
112 S. Ct. 1112,
1120-21 (1993). Although Waskom’s sentence falls below the
corrected guideline range, we cannot conclude that the
§ 2X1.1(b)(2) error was harmless. Waskom’s 110-month sentence was
the result of a significant downward departure based on the
government’s motion pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the Guidelines and the
sentencing judge’s finding that Waskom substantially assisted the
government. We cannot discern from the record whether the
sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence had he been
departing from the range set by an offense level of thirty-two,
instead of thirty-five. See United States v. Bush,
70 F.3d 557,
560 n.3 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that an error in calculating the
base offense level was not harmless because it might have affected
the extent of the § 5K1.1 downward departure that had resulted in
a sentence falling below the corrected sentencing range). As it is
17
the prerogative of the district court, in the first instance, to
determine the degree of departure warranted by a defendant’s
assistance, we vacate Waskom’s sentence and remand for
resentencing.
IV
Waskom raises several additional issues pertaining to the
calculation of his sentence. We address each in turn.
A
Waskom argues that the district court erred in applying
§ 2X1.1 of the Guidelines. Waskom pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
obstruct and delay interstate commerce by robbery and physical
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In the case of
conspiracy, the offense level is to be determined in accordance
with the provisions of § 2X1.1, unless a specific offense guideline
expressly covers the conspiracy charge at issue. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2X1.1. Before the district court, Waskom objected to the PSR’s
application of § 2X1.1, arguing that there was no partially
completed offense. In response, his PSR’s addendum set forth facts
to demonstrate that the offense was partially completed. Waskom
then filed several objections to the PSR’s addendum but stated that
he “accept[ed] the Addendum” as it pertained to his initial § 2X1.1
objection.
On appeal, Waskom asserts in wholly conclusory fashion that
“there was no ‘partially completed’ offense” and that the district
court therefore erred in applying § 2X1.1 for the calculation of
his offense level. In seeking the benefit of the three-level
18
reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2), however, Waskom urges that § 2X1.1
should apply to his case. Because Waskom acceded below to the
application of § 2X1.1, has presented this Court with no
substantive basis to find this provision inapplicable, and argues
that it does apply for purposes of the reduction under
§ 2X1.1(b)(2), we find that Waskom has waived his challenge to the
applicability of § 2X1.1. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225
(5th Cir. 1993). The district court did not err in applying
§ 2X1.1 in calculating Waskom’s sentence.
B
Waskom also argues that the district court erred by refusing
to decrease his offense level pursuant to § 3B1.2(a) of the
Guidelines, which provides for a four-level reduction if the
defendant was a minimal participant in the offense. The commentary
accompanying the guideline notes that § 3B1.2(a)'s reduction
applies to a defendant who plays a minimal role in
concerted activity. It is intended to cover defendants
who are plainly among the least culpable of those
involved in the conduct of a group. Under this
provision, the defendant’s lack of knowledge or
understanding of the scope and structure of the
enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative
of a role as minimal participant.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.1). The commentary further directs
that “[i]t is intended that the downward adjustment for a minimal
participant will be used infrequently.” Id., comment. (n.2). Only
those rare defendants who are “substantially less culpable than
the average participant” in a conspiracy will warrant the reduction
under § 3B1.2.
Id., comment. (backg’d).
The PSR did not recommend that Waskom receive a reduction in
19
his offense level for his role in the offense, and Waskom objected.
The district court overruled Waskom’s objection but indicated that,
in determining where to sentence Waskom within the applicable
guideline range, it would consider his conduct in relation to that
of the other conspirators. As with other sentencing-related
factual findings, this court reviews for clear error the district
court’s determination that a defendant did not play a minimal role
in the offense. See United States v. Zuniga, 18 F.3d 1254, 1261
(5th Cir. 1994).
The PSR established that Waskom was more than a minimal
participant in the conspiracy. Waskom conducted surveillance of
one of the drug traffickers whom the defendants planned to rob;
accompanied his co-defendants to complete that robbery, which was
aborted due to an unforeseen complication; discussed plans for the
robberies with his co-defendants; showed the Adamses a model of an
explosive device that the defendants intended to use; advised the
informant that he planned to obtain powerful explosive material in
two 55-gallon drums from his uncle in Chicago; accompanied his co-
defendants to observe the detonation of two explosive devices;
conducted surveillance of the gas refinery and drew a sketch of the
plant and its surrounding area; and discussed building the
explosive devices and backup plans for obtaining the explosive
devices with his co-defendants. As his PSR’s addendum aptly
stated, Waskom “was aware of the scope and target of the offense,
the planned diversionary explosions, and the possibility of the
explosions causing injuries or death to innocent victims.” In
20
light of these facts, the district court did not err in denying the
reduction under § 3B1.2.
C
The remaining issues raised by Waskom pertain to increases in
his offense level based on specific offense characteristics.
Waskom argues that the district court erred by increasing his
offense level pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3)(C) of
the Guidelines. The PSR recommended each of these enhancements,
and the district court overruled Waskom’s objections to the
increases. In considering Waskom’s challenges to the offense-
specific increases, we adhere to § 2X1.1, which set Waskom’s base
offense level by reference to the guideline for the substantive
offense. Section 2X1.1 directs that adjustments be made “for any
intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable
certainty.” U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a). Thus, Waskom’s sentence accounts
for conduct that he specifically intended, even if the conduct did
not actually occur. See id. § 2X1.1, comment. (n.2).
Section 2B3.1(b)(1) directs a two-level increase “[i]f the
property of a financial institution was taken.” Waskom’s PSR
recommended the enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(1), asserting that the
property of a financial institution was the target of the offense.
As he did below, Waskom contends that the object of the offense was
an armored car, not a financial institution, and that the car might
well have contained payrolls and receipts, instead of financial
institution property. The PSR noted that the targeted armored car
routinely traveled through Bridgeport and Chico, making regular
21
pick-ups and deliveries at federally insured banks. The PSR
further stated that one of Waskom’s co-conspirators conducted
surveillance on the armored car as it made deliveries to the banks.
The district court did not clearly err by determining that the
taking of the property of a financial institution was an object of
the offense.
Waskom next argues that the district court erred by increasing
his offense level by six pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(2), which directs
such an increase if a firearm was “otherwise used.” A “firearm”
includes a destructive device such as the explosive devices the
defendants planned to detonate at the gas refinery, and “otherwise
used” is defined as conduct that “did not amount to the discharge
of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or
possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1,
comment. (nn.e & g); accord United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666,
678 (5th Cir. 1997). Before the district court and this Court,
Waskom argued that the enhancement applies only to the use of a
firearm during the commission of the substantive offense. Waskom
also claimed that the enhancement should not apply because he had
not pleaded guilty to the firearms charge that appeared in the
superceding indictment filed against the other defendants. The
district court overruled Waskom’s objection, finding that the
information in the PSR “establishe[d] with reasonable certainty
that the defendants, as part of their conspiracy, intended to use
an explosive device or firearm.”
The PSR stated that the defendants constructed bombs and
22
exploded the bombs in furtherance of the scheme to carry out the
planned robbery. The construction and detonation of the bombs
constituted more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing the
dangerous weapons. Further, the defendants intended to detonate
more bombs as a diversionary tactic during the commission of the
robbery. In light of these facts, the district court did not err
in determining that there was a reasonable certainty that a
destructive device would be “otherwise used” during the commission
of the offense. Once the record established with reasonable
certainty that the conspirators intended to detonate explosive
devices at the gas refinery, the defendants became subject to the
corresponding adjustment for such conduct, even though they did not
accomplish their planned acts and regardless of whether they were
charged with a separate firearms offense.
Waskom’s challenge to the adjustment pursuant to
§ 2B3.1(b)(3)(C) also fails. Section 2B3.1(b)(3)(C) directs a six-
level increase in the base offense level for the robbery if any
victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. See
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(C).4 The PSR recommended this enhancement
because the defendants planned to cause permanent or life-
threatening bodily injury by using diversionary explosives and
targeting the maximum number of law enforcement personnel possible.
The PSR stated that the defendants planned to make anonymous
4
Although Waskom warranted a six-level increase under
§ 2B3.1(b)(2) and a six-level increase under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(C), he
received an eleven-level increase under these two provisions
because the the guideline directs that the cumulative adjustments
under § 2B3.1(b)(2) and (3) should not exceed eleven.
23
telephone calls to local law enforcement agencies advising of the
existence and location of a bomb to ensure that numerous officers
would be present when the explosive devices were detonated.
According to the PSR, the defendants were fully aware that the
planned diversionary explosion would probably kill many people,
primarily law enforcement personnel, but showed no concern about
that effect. Indeed, one of Waskom’s co-conspirators told the
confidential informant that a nearby state prison might be blown up
due to the anticipated size of the planned explosion and that he
planned on placing bombs in locations where they would “hurt the
most cops.” The PSR noted that case agents had reviewed the
conspirators’ plans and the refinery’s lay-out and had concluded
that the destruction intended by the defendants could have happened
as planned. The PSR concluded that, had the defendants had not
been arrested prior to execution of their plan, they would have
caused permanent or life-threatening bodily injury and probably
death.
The district court determined that “the defendants, as part of
their conspiratorial activities, did intend in relation to the
robbery and the overall events related to the robbery of the
armored vehicle to cause permanent or life-threatening bodily
injury,” and that such intent was “established with reasonable
certainty.” Waskom’s complaint that the adjustment is warranted
only in cases in which the injury actually occurs is unavailing
under § 2X1.1. Because the guideline allows adjustments for
intended offense conduct that is established with a reasonable
24
certainty, the district court did not err in increasing Waskom’s
offense level under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(C), as the PSR demonstrates with
reasonable certainty that the defendants intended that their
victims would sustain permanent or life-threatening bodily
injuries.
V
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), Taylor moved for the recusal
of the presiding judge, the Honorable John McBryde, and
reassignment of his case to a different district court judge within
the Northern District of Texas. The proffered ground for recusal
was the appearance of Taylor’s attorney, Paul D. Stickney, as a
subpoenaed witness before a special investigatory committee of the
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council. During those proceedings, Stickney
provided testimony adverse to Judge McBryde. The district court
denied Taylor’s motion and proceeded to accept his guilty plea and
impose the challenged sentence. Taylor now appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Taylor seeks only to be
resentenced. Our decisions in United States v. Anderson, 160 F.3d
231 (5th Cir. 1998), and United States v. Avilez-Reyes,
160 F.3d 258
(5th Cir. 1998), dictate the resolution of Taylor’s appeal. Those
cases involved similar motions under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) by
defendants represented by Stickney after his testimony before the
Judicial Council. We held that Judge McBryde abused his discretion
and committed reversible error in failing to recuse himself. We
reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that neither
Anderson nor Avilez-Reyes alleged a specific sentencing error other
25
than the failure to recuse. Here, Taylor challenges not only the
denial of his recusal motion, but also the four-level enhancement
under § 3B1.1 of the Guidelines, based on his role in the offense,
and the denial of the three-level reduction under § 2X1.1. In
accordance with our holdings in Anderson and Avilez-Reyes, we
vacate Taylor’s sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding
before a different district court judge in the Northern District of
Texas.5
VI
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the defendants’ sentences
with respect to the denial of the three-level reduction under
§ 2X1.1(b)(2), and we remand for resentencing in accordance with
this opinion. With respect to the enhancements of Waskom’s offense
level pursuant to § 2B3.1(b)(1), (b)(2)(B), and (b)(3)(C) and the
denial of a reduction under § 3B1.2(a), we find no clear error.
Finally, because the district court abused its discretion in
denying Taylor’s motion to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),
we vacate his sentence and remand for new sentencing proceedings
before a different district court judge within the Northern
District of Texas.
VACATE AND REMAND.
5
Because Taylor is to be resentenced, we do not address his
claim that the four-level increase of his offense level, pursuant
to § 3B1.1 of the Guidelines, was improper.
26
