IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

                       _____________________

                            No. 98-40784
                          Summary Calendar
                       _____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                versus

GILBERTO GARCES-GARCIA,

                                             Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Southern District of Texas
                       USDC No. M-98-CR-53-1
_________________________________________________________________

                            October 7, 1999

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     Gilberto Garces-Garcia was convicted in district court of

illegally re-entering the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a) and (b).    He argues that the district court erred in

imposing a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A),

based on his having committed an “aggravated felony.”         In 1993,

Garces was convicted in Texas state court of aggravated assault; he

was sentenced to 10 years in prison, the imposition of which term

was suspended in favor of probation.          Garces contends that the

suspension of the sentence precluded it from being an “aggravated


     *
      Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
felony,” as that term is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(43)(F).

This court recently rejected an argument--similar to one raised by

Garces--that a statutory definition of “term of imprisonment”

included in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B), which does embrace suspended

prison terms, does not apply to § 1101(a)(43)(F).               See United

States   v.   Banda-Zamora,   

,   730   (5th   Cir.   1999).

Accordingly, the district court properly considered Garces’s 1993

conviction to be an “aggravated felony” and properly enhanced his

offense level under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

     Garces has not shown error, plain or otherwise, as to his

contention that the definition of “aggravated felony” in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(F) is unconstitutionally vague.            United States v.

Calverley, 

, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994)(en banc); see, e.g.,

.

                                                         A F F I R M E D.




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