Filed: Dec. 29, 1999
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 99-40599 Summary Calendar _ TWYLA G SHACKLEFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST MICHAEL HEALTHCARE CENTER; ET AL, Defendants, ST MICHAEL HEALTHCARE CENTER, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Docket No. 5:98-CV-93 _ December 28, 1999 Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant Twyla G. Shackleford (“Shackleford”) appea
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 99-40599 Summary Calendar _ TWYLA G SHACKLEFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST MICHAEL HEALTHCARE CENTER; ET AL, Defendants, ST MICHAEL HEALTHCARE CENTER, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Docket No. 5:98-CV-93 _ December 28, 1999 Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff-Appellant Twyla G. Shackleford (“Shackleford”) appeal..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-40599
Summary Calendar
_____________________
TWYLA G SHACKLEFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ST MICHAEL HEALTHCARE CENTER; ET AL,
Defendants,
ST MICHAEL HEALTHCARE CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
Docket No. 5:98-CV-93
_________________________________________________________________
December 28, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Twyla G. Shackleford (“Shackleford”)
appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of Defendant-Appellee St. Michael Healthcare Center (“St.
Michael”). For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 16, 1993, while working at St. Michael Hospital,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Shackleford was injured in a slip-and-fall accident. Shackleford
filed a claim for worker’s compensation that was accepted as
compensable by the hospital, a self-insured employer.
Shackleford began receiving medical treatment for her injuries
and, on May 8, 1995, underwent an operation to remove her tail-
bone. Shackleford continued to complain of pain after the
surgery and, on April 15, 1996, underwent another operation.
Both operations were performed at St. Michael Healthcare Center.1
Shackleford claims that her body was not properly supported and
padded during the second operation, causing her further injuries.
These injuries are the basis for this medical malpractice action.
Prior to her second operation, Shackleford filed suit in
Texas state court seeking damages against SCH Entercorp (“SCH”),
the entity responsible for maintaining the flooring at the
hospital. Shackleford complained that it was SCH’s negligence
that created the hazard that caused her to slip and fall. St.
Michael Hospital intervened in this suit seeking reimbursement of
worker’s compensation payments made to Shackleford.
Shackleford’s suit against SCH was settled through mediation. A
Settlement Agreement was subsequently entered into between
Shackleford, SCH, and the hospital. The agreement provided that
1
St. Michael Hospital, Shackleford’s employer, was located in
Texarkana, Arkansas. The hospital closed when St. Michael
Healthcare Center opened in Texarkana, Texas. Both facilities
share a common corporate pedigree. The hospital was organized as
an Arkansas corporation with the sole corporate member being the
Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate World, Houston, Texas. The
healthcare center is an unincorporated division of the Sisters of
Charity of the Incarnate World, Houston, Texas.
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Shackleford would receive $60,000 from SCH, and $15,000 from St.
Michael Hospital, and that the hospital would waive its third-
party subrogation lien of $24,164.71. This lien included the
costs associated with both of Shackleford’s operations. In
return, Shackleford agreed to the following release:
The parties hereto do for themselves, and
their respective officers, directors,
stockholders, agents, employees,
administrators, legal representatives, heirs,
executors, successors, and assigns, remise,
release and forever discharge the other
parties hereto, and their respective officers
directors, stockholders, agents, employees,
administrators, legal representatives, heirs,
executors, successors, and assigns of and
from all or any manner of action, or actions,
suits, cause or causes of action,
controversies, claims, and demands
whatsoever, against the other parties hereto,
which they have or ever had, known or unknown
now existing or that might arise hereafter,
directly or indirectly attributable to the
transaction described in pleadings on file in
said cause, being intended to release any and
all actions, suits, causes of action, claim
and demands whatsoever, including, but not
limited to fraud and deceit, which any party
to such cause or to this Settlement Agreement
may have against the other party whether or
not asserted in the above numbered and styled
cause.
The release further specified that “[a]ll parties have read this
Settlement Agreement and understand that this is a compromise and
settlement and release of all claims, known or unknown, present
or future, that they have, or may have of the parties released
arising out of the matters described herein.”
After Shackleford filed this medical malpractice action
against St. Michael Healthcare Center, St. Michael moved for
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summary judgment. St. Michael argued that the surgery was a
result of Shackleford’s slip-and-fall accident, and therefore her
claim of medical malpractice was barred by the Settlement
Agreement. The district court agreed and granted St. Michael’s
motion for summary judgment. Shackleford timely appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standards as the court below. See
Matagorda County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
On appeal, Shackleford argues that her current malpractice
suit is not encompassed by the Settlement Agreement because St.
Michael Healthcare Center was not a party to the agreement and
because it is a separate and distinct entity from St. Michael
Hospital. This court need not untangle the web of corporate
entities because Shackleford waived this issue by failing to
raise it below. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
will not consider arguments on appeal that were not presented
below in response to the summary judgment motion. See Haubold v.
Intermedics, Inc., 11 F.3d 1333, 1336 (5th Cir. 1994).
Shackleford next argues that the Settlement Agreement did
not serve to release St. Michael from medical malpractice claims
4
arising from her surgery. We disagree. The plain language of
the agreement and Texas law dictate a finding that Shackleford
effectively released St. Michael.
To release a claim, the release document must “mention” the
claim. See Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943
S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. 1997); Victoria Bank and Trust Co. v.
Brady,
811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1991). The Texas Supreme Court
has rejected the notion that a claim is not “mentioned” unless it
is specifically enumerated. See
Keszler 943 S.W.2d at 435. In
Keszler the court found that a doctor who executed a release with
his employer-hospital after the hospital took “corrective action”
against him, effectively released the hospital from a later tort
action based on his on-the-job exposure to hazardous chemicals.
The court noted that the agreement released all parties from
claims “relating to” their relationship as employer and employee.
The court found that Keszler’s exposure to toxic chemicals was
“related to” his relationship with the hospital and therefore
within the scope of the earlier release.
We find Keszler persuasive when applied to the facts in this
case. We agree with the district court that the language of the
Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and, therefore, its
interpretation is a matter of law. See Keszler, 943 S.W.3d at
434. The Settlement Agreement released the parties from all
claims “directly or indirectly attributable” to the “transactions
described in the pleadings,” i.e., the slip-and-fall accident.
The agreement also released the parties from all claims “known or
5
unknown, present or future” arising out of the accident. We find
that the plain language of the agreement “mentions” Shackleford’s
current claim against St. Michael. The second operation is
clearly attributable to her slip-and-fall accident and would not
have been necessary absent that accident. Shackleford
effectively released St. Michael from responsibility for her
current injuries by signing the Settlement Agreement.
Shackleford argues that Victoria Bank and Trust Co. v.
Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991), dictates the conclusion that
St. Michael was not effectively released from this claim. We
find this argument unpersuasive. In that case, Brady, in two
separate transactions with Victoria Bank, borrowed a $150,000 and
established a line of credit. A dispute arose regarding the
loan, and the parties entered into a settlement agreement
releasing both sides from liability based on “the...loan
transaction.”
Brady 811 S.W.2d at 937. When another dispute
arose regarding the line of credit, the bank argued that the
earlier agreement released the bank from any actions based on
either the credit line or the loan. The Texas Supreme Court
disagreed, finding that the only claim mentioned in the agreement
dealt with the loan, not with the credit line. See id at 939.
Such is not the case here. The agreement signed by
Shackleford effectively released St. Michael from all claims
“directly or indirectly attributable” to the slip-and-fall
accident. We agree with the district court that any injuries
Shackleford suffered as a result of the second operation were
6
indirectly attributable to the original accident. Therefore,
Shackleford’s current claim is barred by the Settlement
Agreement.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, we AFFIRM.
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