Filed: Apr. 05, 2000
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 99-30583 Summary Calendar _ BRENDA MEEKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus M. J. FOSTER, a.k.a. Mike, Governor of the State of Louisiana; MADLYN B. BAGNERIS, Secretary, Department of Social Services; VERA W. BLAKES, Assistant Secretary, Department of Social Services; ROBERT P. THOMPSON, Director, Family Independence Work Program; LAURA PEASE, Assistant Director, Family Independence Work Program; and LAURA BECK, Assistant Director, Fam
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 99-30583 Summary Calendar _ BRENDA MEEKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus M. J. FOSTER, a.k.a. Mike, Governor of the State of Louisiana; MADLYN B. BAGNERIS, Secretary, Department of Social Services; VERA W. BLAKES, Assistant Secretary, Department of Social Services; ROBERT P. THOMPSON, Director, Family Independence Work Program; LAURA PEASE, Assistant Director, Family Independence Work Program; and LAURA BECK, Assistant Director, Fami..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-30583
Summary Calendar
_____________________
BRENDA MEEKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
M. J. FOSTER, a.k.a. Mike, Governor of the State of
Louisiana; MADLYN B. BAGNERIS, Secretary,
Department of Social Services; VERA W.
BLAKES, Assistant Secretary, Department
of Social Services; ROBERT P. THOMPSON,
Director, Family Independence Work Program;
LAURA PEASE, Assistant Director, Family
Independence Work Program; and LAURA BECK,
Assistant Director, Family Independence
Work Program,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana
(98-CV-2047)
_________________________________________________________________
April 3, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The defendants in this case have filed an interlocutory appeal
in response to the district court’s denial of their 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and their 12(c)
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I
Brenda Meekins had been a Program Specialist for the State of
Louisiana’s Department of Social Services since 1993. She was part
of the Department’s Family Independence Work Program (“FIND”). In
administering this program, the Department of Social Services
contracts with private entities to provide training and job
placement to those on welfare. Ms. Meekins’s job was to monitor
the program to ensure compliance with federal and state laws and
regulations.
Soon after starting her job, Ms. Meekins discovered widespread
irregularities within the Department in its attempts to comply with
federal and state regulations. For example, case records were not
documented to show that case managers were monitoring client
participation and attendance, and false participation data was
being reported to the federal government. Ms. Meekins repeatedly
reported these problems. Her charges led to an official review of
the program, but the erroneous reporting continued.
During this period, Ms. Meekins maintained her contacts with
the Southern University of New Orleans, where she had obtained her
Bachelor of Social Work and Master of Social Work degrees. She
periodically spoke publicly on welfare reform issues with faculty
and students. She also worked to train faculty and students in
connection with welfare issues. But she did not discuss the terms,
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policies, or procedures employed by the Department in connection
with the FIND.
On June 23, 1998, Robert Thompson informed Ms. Meekins that
she had been suspended for thirty days, retroactive to June 1, and
recommended for dismissal. Meekins was later dismissed on July 14,
1998. The basis for the dismissal was insubordination arising from
three sets of incidents:
(1) Continuing contact, despite instructions to the contrary,
with Viola Washington, Executive Director of the Welfare
Rights Organization (“WRO”). The WRO is one of the
organizations that contracted with the FIND. The contact
included continued monitoring of the contract with WRO
and receiving checks written on a WRO account.
(2) Continuing contact with potential contractors.
(3) Continuing public speech on welfare-related matters at
the Southern University of New Orleans.
Ms. Meekins filed suit in federal district court, alleging
violations of Louisiana’s Whistleblowers’ Act and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. The defendants responded with a 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss the federal claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and a 12(c) motion to dismiss the federal claims for
failure to state a claim. The district court ordered Ms. Meekins
to file a Schultea reply.1 She did so, and the district court then
1
In Schultea v. Wood, a panel of this court required that the
plaintiff's complaint "state factual detail and particularity
including why the defendant-official cannot maintain the immunity
defense." 27 F.3d 1112, 1115 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994),
47 F.3d 1427
(rehearing en banc)(citation omitted). The court found that
Schultea failed to allege a cognizable claim in his complaint, but
also that the complaint did not constitute the plaintiff's best
case. Thus, the court remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to
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denied the defendants’ two motions. The defendants then requested
an interlocutory appeal on two issues: whether the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of the Eleventh
Amendment bar to claims against them in their official capacities,
and whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
When the defendants filed this interlocutory appeal, it forced
the district court to postpone the trial. That, in turn, allowed
the court to consolidate Ms. Meekins’s parallel suit against the
defendants in their individual capacities with the one against them
in their official capacities. The court had previously refused to
do this because of the limited time before the start of trial, but
with the postponement, it was now able to do so.
"amend his complaint, if possible, to plead sufficient facts
supporting a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment" that the
defendants violated a property or liberty interest recognized by
the Constitution. Id. at 1118.
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II
A
As a threshold matter, we have jurisdiction to hear this
interlocutory appeal on the two issues the defendants raise. See
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139, 144,
113 S. Ct. 684,
121 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1993)(allowing
interlocutory appeals of determinations concerning Eleventh
Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 530,
105
S. Ct. 2806,
86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546,
69 S. Ct. 1221,
93 L. Ed. 1528
(1949)(allowing interlocutory appeals of determinations that
“finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral
to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied
review and too independent . . . to require that appellate
consideration be deferred”).
B
We next review the district court’s denial of the defendants’
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Ms. Meekins contends, and the defendants concede, that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar Ms. Meekins’s claims for injunctive relief
against them in their official capacities. They are correct. See
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-60,
28 S. Ct. 441,
52 L. Ed. 714
(1908)(Eleventh Amendment not a bar to suits against government
officials in their official capacities when those suits seek
injunctive relief). Reinstatement, which Ms. Meekins seeks, would
5
qualify as acceptable injunctive relief. Hander v. San Jacinto
Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus, Ms.
Meekins may seek injunctive relief against the defendants in their
official capacities as part of her federal law claim.
Both sides also concede that damages are a different matter.
Damages are not available in suits against such individuals in
their official capacity. Chrissy v. Mississippi Dep’t of Public
Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1991). Thus, we overturn the
district court on this issue and dismiss Ms. Meekins’s federal law
claims for damages against the defendants in their official
capacities.
We do not address the availability of damages against the
defendants in their individual capacities. Though the trial judge
consolidated the original suit and Ms. Meekins’s more recent suit
against the defendants in their individual capacities, the judge
did so after denying the defendants’ two motions to dismiss.
Indeed, the consolidation order was entered after the defendants
filed their notice of appeal. For that reason, we have no
jurisdiction over issues related to the new suit because the
district court has not made an appealable ruling with respect to
them.
C
The defendants have also raised the defense of qualified
immunity. Because we have dismissed the damages claims against the
defendants in their official capacities and have not addressed the
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availability of damages against the defendants in their individual
capacities, the only remaining question is whether qualified
immunity is available as a defense in suits for injunctive relief
against defendants in their official capacities. It is not. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67,
105 S. Ct. 3099,
87
L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985)(qualified immunity not available as a defense in
official capacity actions); Wyatt v. Cole,
928 F.2d 718, 722 (5th
Cir.)(same), rev’d on other grounds,
504 U.S. 158,
112 S. Ct. 1827,
118 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1992); Mangaroo v. Nelson,
864 F.2d 1202, 1208
(5th Cir. 1989)(qualified immunity has no relevance when injunctive
relief is sought).
III
For these reasons, the district court decision is
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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