Filed: Mar. 23, 2001
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 00-40457 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RAUL SILVA-SOTO, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-99-CR-426-1 March 23, 2001 Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Raul Silva-Soto appeals his convictions for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 00-40457 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RAUL SILVA-SOTO, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. B-99-CR-426-1 March 23, 2001 Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Raul Silva-Soto appeals his convictions for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms ..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-40457
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAUL SILVA-SOTO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. B-99-CR-426-1
March 23, 2001
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Raul Silva-Soto appeals his convictions for conspiracy to
possess and possession with intent to distribute more than 100
kilograms of marihuana. He contends that the district court erred
in sustaining the Government’s challenge for cause to a potential
juror who had misdemeanor convictions for solicitation of
prostitution and homosexual conduct, that a Government witness was
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
allowed to comment on his postarrest silence in violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights, and that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his convictions.
The record does not show that the district court abused its
discretion in sustaining the Government’s challenge to the juror,
premised on the Government’s argument that the juror had been
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.1 See United States v.
Gonzalez-Balderas,
11 F.3d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1994). The
appellant concedes that he cannot show that the panel that actually
judged his case was biased. See
id. A witness’s unsolicited,
brief and isolated reference to appellant’s postarrest silence,
following his denial of any knowledge of the marihuana hidden in
the vehicle he was driving which he had borrowed from his father,
1
The prospective juror had three prior convictions, all
misdemeanors, namely DWI, Prostitution (Solicitation) and
Homosexual Behavior. The government in challenging the juror
merely said “we would challenge No. 24 for cause that he was
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.” Defense counsel’s
response was only “his homosexual behavior which we would urge is
either not a crime of moral turpitude, or if it is, it is
constitutionally improper.” Defense counsel continued without
interruption to make its own challenges to other jurors.
Immediately thereafter, the district court merely stated
“Government’s challenge for cause to No. 24 is sustained.” Nothing
said by the government or the district court, nor anything else in
the record, suggests that the challenge was made or sustained on
the basis of the conviction for Homosexual Behavior. At trial
defense counsel did not suggest that prostitution was not a crime
of moral turpitude or that the conviction for that offense was not
a proper basis for the challenge for cause. In its appellate brief
the government asserts the challenge was made on the basis of the
prior prostitution conviction, which appellant concedes is an
offense of moral turpitude. Nothing in the record suggests that
appellant was or was believed or appeared to be homosexual.
2
was never mentioned by the prosecution during trial and had no
tendency to undercut any theory of defense at trial (or anything
said by appellant to the officers), and was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. United States,
547 F.2d 1240,
1247-48 (5th Cir. 1977). Finally, there was amply sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant knowingly conspired with others and possessed with
intent to distribute the marihuana that was concealed in
compartments welded inside the gas tank of the vehicle driven by
appellant. See United States v. Ortega Reyna,
148 F.3d 540, 543
(5th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.
3