Filed: Jul. 25, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 01-11454 Summary Calendar _ MARIA BENTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus HOT SHOT EXPRESS, INC., ETC; ET AL, Defendants HOT SHOT EXPRESS, INC., A Company of the Jones Motor Corporation Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas (No. 99-CV-1015-H) _ July 24, 2002 Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM*: Maria Benton (“Benton”) appeals from the
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 01-11454 Summary Calendar _ MARIA BENTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus HOT SHOT EXPRESS, INC., ETC; ET AL, Defendants HOT SHOT EXPRESS, INC., A Company of the Jones Motor Corporation Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas (No. 99-CV-1015-H) _ July 24, 2002 Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM*: Maria Benton (“Benton”) appeals from the ..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 01-11454
Summary Calendar
__________________________
MARIA BENTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HOT SHOT EXPRESS, INC., ETC; ET AL,
Defendants
HOT SHOT EXPRESS, INC., A Company of the Jones Motor Corporation
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas, Dallas
(No. 99-CV-1015-H)
___________________________________________________
July 24, 2002
Before DAVIS, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
Maria Benton (“Benton”) appeals from the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of Hot Shot Express, Inc.
(“Hot Shot”). Because the summary judgment was not a final
decision under Title 28 U.S.C. §1291, we dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I. Facts and Proceedings
Benton sued Hot Shot, Russ Benet, Lona Benet, and R.E.B.
Express, Inc. (“R.E.B.”) asserting claims of breach of contract,
fraud, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act.
After reading an advertisement published by R.E.B./Hot Shot in a
national trucking magazine, Benton purchased a truck and trailer
and entered into a hauling contract. Benton purchased the truck
and trailer before seeing them but was assured they met all safety
requirements and were ready for use. The truck and trailer were
not, however, in an acceptable condition when Benton arrived to
retrieve them.
Benton apparently had conversations with representatives of
Hot Shot and R.E.B. and was under the impression that R.E.B. was an
agent for Hot Shot. As a result, Benton initially filed suit
against Hot Shot and Russ Benet, and Hot Shot filed a third party
complaint against R.E.B. Hot Shot denied giving any agency
authority to R.E.B. or Benet, but Benton contended that Hot Shot
was vicariously liable for any actions taken by R.E.B. or Benet.
Hot Shot filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by
the district court on October 10, 2001, so Benton appealed.
II. Analysis
We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to
consider the merits of this appeal. Under Title 28 U.S.C. §1291,
we have authority to entertain “appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States.” While the district
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court granted Hot Shot’s motion for summary judgment, it did not
dispose of the claims against Russ and Lona Benet or R.E.B. Under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b),
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action,...or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only
upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination
and direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Jurisdiction over this appeal is appropriate only if the district
court certified the appeal under Rule 54(b) as all claims have yet
to be adjudicated. The district court may direct the entry of a
final judgment to fewer than all parties to an action only if (1)
it makes an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and (2) an express direction for the entry of judgment is
made. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
54(b), supra. Benton is under the mistaken
impression that the clerk of court’s entry of the district court’s
Memorandum Opinion and Order is an entry of judgment. It is not.
Because the summary judgment order did not dispose of the claims
against all defendants and was not certified under Rule 54(b),
Benton’s appeal is premature. Accordingly, this appeal is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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