Filed: Sep. 16, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 02-30126 Summary Calendar _ In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of L & L ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., as owner of the B-20, B-21, B-29, B-31, B-34, and B-35, for Exoneration or Limitation of Liability, _ L & L ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., as owner of the B-20, B21, B-29, B-31, B-34, and B-35, Petitioner-Appellee versus THE MERIDIAN RESOURCE & EXPLORATION COMPANY; TEXAS MERIDIAN PRODUCTION CORPORATION, Claimants-Appellants. _ A
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 02-30126 Summary Calendar _ In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of L & L ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., as owner of the B-20, B-21, B-29, B-31, B-34, and B-35, for Exoneration or Limitation of Liability, _ L & L ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., as owner of the B-20, B21, B-29, B-31, B-34, and B-35, Petitioner-Appellee versus THE MERIDIAN RESOURCE & EXPLORATION COMPANY; TEXAS MERIDIAN PRODUCTION CORPORATION, Claimants-Appellants. _ Ap..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 02-30126
Summary Calendar
__________________
In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of L & L ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., as
owner of the B-20, B-21, B-29, B-31, B-34, and B-35, for Exoneration or Limitation of Liability,
__________________
L & L ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC., as owner of the B-20, B21, B-29, B-31, B-34,
and B-35,
Petitioner-Appellee
versus
THE MERIDIAN RESOURCE & EXPLORATION COMPANY; TEXAS MERIDIAN
PRODUCTION CORPORATION,
Claimants-Appellants.
__________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 99-CV-3859-S
__________________
September 13, 2002
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:1
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
On June 24, 1999, an oil-well owned and operated by Appellant Meridian Resource &
Exploration Company (“Meridian”) blew out near the intersection of Bayou Chene and the
Intercoastal Waterway. L&L Environmental Services, Inc. (“L & L”), was hired to contain the
spill and assist in cleanup efforts. On June 28, 1999, Mandalay Properties, L.L.C. (“Mandalay”) a
class-action lawsuit in Louisiana state court against Meridian, L & L, and others. Mandalay
asserted claims against Meridian in maritime and state law and alleged that L & L negligently
failed to contain and remove pollution following the blowout. Upon Mandalay’s motion, the
district court dismissed L & L from the suit without prejudice.
L & L subsequently filed a petition in federal district court pursuant to the Limitation of
Liability Act seeking exoneration or limitation from liability arising from its role in the cleanup
efforts. Meridian filed an answer to the limitation petition and a claim that L & L was liable to it
for indemnification or contribution. No other claims were filed, and L & L moved for summary
judgment on Meridian’s claim. The district court granted L & L’s motion, and Meridian appeals.
Meridian first argues that the district court determined prematurely whether Meridian
could prove its claim against L & L because, under maritime law, a cause of action for
contribution or indemnity does not arise until a judgment is entered on the principal demand
against the principal defendant. Meridian’s reliance on Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Drilling Rig
ROWAN/ODESSA,
761 F.2d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 1985), is misplaced. Marathon Pipe held that
when determining whether a third-party indemnity claim was time-barred, the action did not
accrue until the principal defendant was cast in judgment on the principal demand. See
id. at 236.
It was appropriate for the district court to first determine whether L & L was liable at all on
Meridian’s claim. See Texaco, Inc. v. Williams,
47 F.3d 765, 769 n.19 (5th Cir. 1995)
2
(“questions to be settled in the proceedings are ‘first, whether the ship or its owners are liable at
all’” (quoting Providence and New York Steamship Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co.,
109 U.S. 578, 595
(1883))).
The district court did not err in granting L & L’s motion for summary judgment. Meridian
responded to L & L’s motion for summary judgment with allegations in the complaint and the
testimony of plaintiffs’ state-court expert. A complaint’s allegations are insufficient to defeat
Meridian’s summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
447 U.S. 242, 256
(1986). Furthermore, the expert’s testimony, concerning the presence of a hydrocarbon sheen
beyond the boundaries of the control booms, does not address any alleged negligence on the part
of L & L in deploying the booms. Nor does the presence of a hydrocarbon sheen necessarily lead
to an inference that the sheen’s presence was the result of L & L’s performance.
AFFIRMED.
3