Filed: Feb. 25, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 02-50193 BOBBY WAYNE WOODS, Petioner-Appellant, VERSUS JANIE COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas, Austin Division A-01-CV-50-SS February 24, 2003 Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Appellant, Bobby Wayne Woods (“Woods”) is a Texas state death penalty inmate. Woods i
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 02-50193 BOBBY WAYNE WOODS, Petioner-Appellant, VERSUS JANIE COCKRELL, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas, Austin Division A-01-CV-50-SS February 24, 2003 Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Appellant, Bobby Wayne Woods (“Woods”) is a Texas state death penalty inmate. Woods is..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 02-50193
BOBBY WAYNE WOODS,
Petioner-Appellant,
VERSUS
JANIE COCKRELL, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas, Austin Division
A-01-CV-50-SS
February 24, 2003
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant, Bobby Wayne Woods (“Woods”) is a Texas state death
penalty inmate. Woods is appealing the decision of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
1
Division, denying his petition for federal habeas relief. A
certificate of appealability has been granted by the district court
on the one issue Woods is now appealing.
BACKGROUND
We have already outlined the facts concerning Woods’ crime,
trial, conviction, and sentencing in an earlier opinion. Woods v.
Cockrell, 307 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2002). Briefly, the procedural
history is as follows.
Woods was arrested and charged with, inter alia, capital
murder and was indicted on June 4, 1997. He was found guilty by a
jury on May 21, 1998. Following a punishment hearing, the jury
returned affirmative answers on May 28, 1998, on the issues
relating to Woods’ future dangerousness and intent to commit
murder, and a negative answer on the existence of mitigating
circumstances to justify a life sentence. The trial court then
sentenced Woods to death.
Woods appealed the conviction and sentence to the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, and concurrently filed a state application for
writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
Woods’ conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. Woods v.
State, No. 73,136 (Tex. Crim. App. June 14, 2000). His motion for
rehearing was denied and the court entered a mandate on September
13, 2000. The Court of Criminal Appeals also denied Woods’ habeas
petition in an unpublished opinion based on the findings of the
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trial court. Ex parte Woods, No. 44,856-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept.
13, 2000). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on
February 21, 2001. Woods v. Texas, 531 U.S. 1155 (2001). Woods
petitioned for federal habeas relief in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas on December 11, 2000.
That court transferred the case to the Western District of Texas,
which entered its ruling on summary judgment on February 8, 2002,
denying Woods’ claim for habeas corpus relief. The district court
found Woods’ challenge to the admissibility of his confession
procedurally barred because Woods had defaulted the claim in the
Texas courts.
On April 16, 2002, however, the district court granted a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to whether, in light of Lee
v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002), the Texas procedural bar to Woods’
challenge to the admissibility of his confession should not prevent
federal habeas review. The district court expressed its view that
Woods’ contentions were not persuasive and that Lee does not apply
but nonetheless on this issue, but not on any other issues which
Woods was attempting to appeal, the court granted a COA.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), which provides that a
prisoner may not appeal the denial of a petition for habeas corpus
under § 2254 without first obtaining a COA, Woods sought a COA on
several other issues from this Court in a petition filed on April
25, 2002. Woods was denied any additional COA in an opinion issued
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on September 24, 2002. Woods, 307 F.3d at 353.
Accordingly, the issue now before us is whether the district
court was correct in finding that a state court’s conclusion that
Woods had procedurally defaulted his claim when he failed to raise
it during direct appeal of his conviction involved the application
of an adequate and independent state procedural rule to foreclose
substantive federal relief. Of course, if the state procedural
default does not bar federal relief, then, pursuant to the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),1 this
court must determine whether the state court’s alternative
conclusion that Woods had failed to demonstrate constitutional
error involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
DISCUSSION
Whether the District Court Correctly Concluded that Woods’
Complaint Was Barred from Review in Federal Court Because the Texas
Courts Had Rejected the Claim Based on an Adequate and Independent
State Procedural Ground.
Federal courts are precluded from reviewing a question of
federal law “if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state
law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate
to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729
1
AEDPA applies in this case because Woods filed his federal
petition after the statute’s enactment. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521
U.S. 320, 335 (1997).
4
(1991). “This rule applies whether the state law ground is
substantive or procedural.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729. To satisfy
the “independent” and “adequate requirements,” the state decision
must “clearly and expressly” indicate that it rests on state
grounds which bar relief, and the bar must be strictly or regularly
followed by state courts, and applied to the majority of similar
claims. Amos v. Scott,
61 F.3d 333, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1995). “In
all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal
claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state
procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred
unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and
actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal
law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Coleman, 501 U.S. at
750.
There is no dispute that the state court’s decision was
clearly and expressly based on the Texas requirement that a
defendant raise a claim on direct appeal or risk defaulting the
claim on collateral review, absent a showing of discovery of new
evidence not available on direct review, nor is there a dispute
that this Texas rule is strictly and regularly enforced. See Soria
v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 232, 249 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section claim defaulted in state court was
foreclosed from federal review absent a showing of cause and
5
prejudice).
The reason the district court granted COA was because Woods
claims that the Supreme Court case of Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362
(2002), controls this case and dictates that the Texas procedural
bar does not prevent federal review of his claim. Without
explanation, Woods cites Lee and suggests “that not all state
procedural bars preclude federal review of a claim.” Appellant’s
Brief at 15-16. Although, this is correct, his understanding and
application of Lee are incorrect.
In Lee, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of “adequate”
for purposes of the “independent and adequate state ground”
doctrine. Id. at 375-78. The Court explained that, “[o]rdinarily,
violation of firmly established and regularly followed state rules
. . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.
There are, however, exceptional cases in which exorbitant
application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground
inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.”
Id. at
376 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In Lee, the Supreme Court had to decide whether a Missouri
procedural rule was an adequate ground to prevent federal review of
a habeas petition. Id. at 365. Lee had alleged that he was denied
due process of law when the state trial court refused to grant his
oral motion for an overnight continuance to locate subpoenaed key
witnesses that had been present but were suddenly missing.
Id. At
6
the time of trial, neither the court nor the prosecutor identified
any procedural flaw in Lee’s motion for continuance.
Id. at 365-
66. In fact, when it denied the motion, the trial court appeared
to decide the issue on its merits.
Id. The Missouri Court of
Appeals, however, concluded that Lee’s motion for continuance did
not comply with certain procedural rules requiring such motions to
be in writing and accompanied by an affidavit, and therefore
declined to reach the merits of Lee’s constitutional claim.
Id. at
366. When Lee sought federal habeas relief both the district court
and court of appeals found the state procedural bar to be adequate
to prevent federal review.
Id. at 374. The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that Lee, “having substantially, if imperfectly,
made the basic showings [] prescribe[d]” by the Missouri rules,
“qualifie[d] for adjudication of his federal ... claim.”
Id. at
366. The Court found that Lee’s case fell “within the small
category of cases in which asserted state grounds are inadequate to
block adjudication of a federal claim” for three reasons.
Id. at
381. First, when the trial court ruled on Lee’s motion, it made
its ruling despite any procedural problems and Lee could not have
affected the ruling by complying with the rules.
Id. Second, no
published state decision, in a similar case, required flawless
compliance with the procedural rules.
Id. at 382. Third, Lee
substantially complied with the rule in such a way as to fulfill
the underlying rationale for the rule.
Id. at 382-83.
7
In the present case, there are no similarities to Lee. The
state court found that Woods had procedurally defaulted his claim
when he failed to raise it during direct appeal. There is nothing
“exceptional” about this case and there was no “exorbitant”
application of a state rule. Rather, the rule as applied in Woods’
case serves its purpose of ensuring cases reach finality and
ensuring that habeas review is not to be used to litigate matters
which should have been raised on direct appeal. Ex parte Gardner,
959 S.W.2d 189, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Because the rule is
well established, Woods had notice of the rule and the consequences
of not complying with the rule. Additionally, Woods did not
“substantially meet” the “essential requirements” of the rule.
Therefore, his case is not among the “small category” of cases
governed by Lee and there can be no federal review of Woods’ claim.
In his brief, Woods makes essentially two other arguments to
support his claim that the district court erred by holding his
challenge to the admissibility of his confession was foreclosed
from federal review based on the Texas court’s invocation of a
state procedural bar. These arguments are without merit. First,
Woods argues that he exhausted his constitutional arguments during
the state collateral review. This is irrelevant because Woods did
not raise his challenge to the admissibility of his statements on
direct review and therefore was correctly barred by Texas law from
asserting the claim on collateral review. Gardner, 959 S.W.2d at
8
199 (stating “writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate
matters which should have been raised on direct appeal”); Ex parte
Groves,
571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (stating that
“habeas corpus shall not lie as a substitute for appeal”).
Second, Woods argues even if his claim is defaulted, he is
excused by demonstrating both (1) cause and prejudice, and (2) a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Woods, however, attempts to
argue cause by claiming his counsel was ineffective, and, although
an independent constitutional claim may provide cause, his claim
has never been argued to the state court and is therefore also
procedurally defaulted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,
451 (2000). Further, Woods has failed to show prejudice, in that
the claimed violation “worked to his actual and substantial
disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady,
456 U.S. 152,
170 (1982) (emphasis in original). Similarly, Woods’ argument that
there is a fundamental miscarriage of justice in applying the
procedural bar is not applicable in this case because he failed to
make a “persuasive showing that he is actually innocent of the
charges against him.” Finley v. Johnson,
243 F.3d 215, 220 (5th
Cir. 2001)(citing
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750).
Because we find Lee inapplicable and because Woods has not
shown that he has not defaulted his claim or should be excused from
the default, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
9
judgment denying federal relief and it is therefore unnecessary to
proceed with an AEDPA analysis.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court denying Woods federal
habeas relief is affirmed. AFFIRMED.
10
