Filed: Nov. 26, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT November 26, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 03-50460 CYNTHIA R. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JUPE COMPANY, INC., Women Business Enterprise, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (SA-01-CV-1025) Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* In her pro se complaint, Cynthia Williams claimed Jupe Compan
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT November 26, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 03-50460 CYNTHIA R. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JUPE COMPANY, INC., Women Business Enterprise, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (SA-01-CV-1025) Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* In her pro se complaint, Cynthia Williams claimed Jupe Company..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT November 26, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-50460
CYNTHIA R. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JUPE COMPANY, INC., Women Business Enterprise,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-01-CV-1025)
Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In her pro se complaint, Cynthia Williams claimed Jupe Company
discriminated against her on the basis of race, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq. Summary judgment was awarded Jupe. AFFIRMED.
I.
Through a temporary employment agency, Jupe hired Williams to
work for 45 days as a receptionist. After her first day on the
job, however, Jupe contacted the agency and stated it did not want
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
Williams to return. According to Jupe, Williams’ performance had
been unsatisfactory because she took too long to perform simple
tasks (such as typing a letter).
II.
In response to Jupe’s summary judgment motion, Williams filed
an “objection to the motion for summary judgment”; she stated in
the objection that it was a “motion for continuance” and requested
a jury trial. It is not clear whether Williams appeals, pro se,
the denial of her continuance motion or the summary judgment. We
consider both issues.
A.
Williams contends the denial of her continuance motion
precluded her obtaining witness statements and discovery necessary
for her discrimination action. We review rulings on Rule 56(f)
continuance motions for abuse of discretion. Daly v. Sprague, 675
F.2d 716, 724 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1047
(1983). Williams did not submit mandatory disclosures, failed to
respond to discovery until the magistrate judge threatened to
dismiss her action, and demanded the magistrate judge summon
witnesses to testify (no live testimony for summary judgment
proceedings). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion.
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B.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same
legal standard as the district court. E.g., Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood
Co., 297 F.3d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1188
(2003). Such judgment should be granted if the evidence shows
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”. FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c); see
Wyatt, 297 F.3d at 408-09. A fact issue is
material only “if its resolution could affect the outcome of the
action”.
Wyatt, 297 F.3d at 409.
In determining whether there is a material fact issue, we
consider all of the evidence in the record but do not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. E.g., Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
Instead, we “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party”. Id.;
Wyatt, 297 F.3d at 409.
Williams attempts to prove her race discrimination claim by
indirect evidence. As a result, we apply the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under this three-part scheme, a plaintiff must first present a
prima facie case of discrimination. A plaintiff does so by
showing: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was
qualified for the position sought; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) she was replaced by someone outside the
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protected class. E.g., Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715,
720 (5th Cir. 2002). If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s case by
demonstrating a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for
its actions”.
Id. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to attempt to show that the defendant’s proffered
reason is instead a pretext for discrimination.
Id.
We assume that Williams presented a prima facie case. Jupe
responded by stating that it terminated her because of her poor
performance. This proffered reason constitutes a legitimate, non-
discriminatory justification for Jupe’s adverse employment action.
See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP,
190 F.3d 398, 408 (5th
Cir. 1999).
Williams attempts to show that Jupe’s claimed justification is
a pretext for discrimination. She contends that Jupe
mischaracterized her work performance. Mr. Jupe stated in his
affidavit that Williams spent three hours typing a simple letter.
Williams stated in her affidavit that instead it took her 50
minutes.
Again, at the summary judgment stage, we take the nonmovant’s
(Williams’) representation of the facts as true. Even if we assume
that Jupe is mistaken about precisely how long it took Williams to
type the letter, this does not satisfy Williams’ burden to create
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a material fact issue on whether Jupe’s asserted justification
(poor performance) was a pretext for discrimination.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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