Filed: Feb. 11, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D REVISED FEBRUARY 11, 2004 January 27, 2004 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-60493 JAKE AYERS, JR, Private Plaintiffs; Plaintiff - Appellant LILLIE B AYERS; LEOLA BLACKMON; RANDOLPH WALKER; HENRY BERNARD AYERS; IVORY PHILLIPS, Dr; VERNON ARCHER, Dr; DOROTHY WALLS; FRANCIS OLADELESHOWL, Dr; ALEX D ACHOLONU, Dr Appellants v. BENNIE G THOMPSON, United States Congressman, Second Cong
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D REVISED FEBRUARY 11, 2004 January 27, 2004 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-60493 JAKE AYERS, JR, Private Plaintiffs; Plaintiff - Appellant LILLIE B AYERS; LEOLA BLACKMON; RANDOLPH WALKER; HENRY BERNARD AYERS; IVORY PHILLIPS, Dr; VERNON ARCHER, Dr; DOROTHY WALLS; FRANCIS OLADELESHOWL, Dr; ALEX D ACHOLONU, Dr Appellants v. BENNIE G THOMPSON, United States Congressman, Second Congr..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED FEBRUARY 11, 2004 January 27, 2004
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-60493
JAKE AYERS, JR, Private Plaintiffs;
Plaintiff - Appellant
LILLIE B AYERS; LEOLA BLACKMON; RANDOLPH WALKER; HENRY BERNARD
AYERS; IVORY PHILLIPS, Dr; VERNON ARCHER, Dr; DOROTHY WALLS;
FRANCIS OLADELESHOWL, Dr; ALEX D ACHOLONU, Dr
Appellants
v.
BENNIE G THOMPSON, United States Congressman, Second
Congressional District Mississippi
Plaintiff - Appellee
and
PLAINTIFF/INTERVENORS (GOVERNMENT)
Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
HALEY BARBOUR, Etc.; ET AL
Defendants
HALEY BARBOUR, Governor, State of Mississippi
Defendant - Appellee
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF STATE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
Appellee
v.
LOUIS ARMSTRONG
Movant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi, Greenville
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
KING, Chief Judge:
African-American citizens of Mississippi, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated (“the Private
Plaintiffs” or “the Private-Plaintiff class”), filed this class-
action lawsuit in 1975, seeking to compel the desegregation of
Mississippi’s system of higher education. After nearly thirty
years of litigation, a settlement agreement has been reached
between the Private Plaintiffs, the United States (which
intervened in this action in support of the Private Plaintiffs),
and the State of Mississippi. Among other obligations, the
agreement promises approximately $500 million in funding over
seventeen years to remedy the present effects of Mississippi’s
past policies of de jure segregation. After conducting a hearing
on the fairness of the proposed settlement agreement and
receiving a concurrent resolution from the Mississippi
Legislature supporting the proposal and agreeing to fund it, the
district court approved the settlement.
Dissatisfied with the relief provided for in the agreement,
2
several of the Private Plaintiffs (“Appellants”) appeal to this
court, asking us to reverse the district court’s decision and,
thereby, to invalidate the settlement. Appellants also desire to
opt out of this class action and, thus, to continue litigating
this controversy. Finally, Appellants’ attorney, who represented
the Private-Plaintiff class for many years, contends that he must
be permitted to proceed separately regarding his fees, even
though the settlement agreement provides a lump sum for the fees
of all the attorneys who have represented the Private Plaintiffs.
We have reviewed Appellants’ objections to the settlement
agreement, and we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in approving it. In addition, we conclude that the
district court correctly denied Appellants’ motion to opt out of
the Private-Plaintiff class. Finally, we reject the assertion of
Appellants’ attorney that he is entitled to proceed separately
regarding attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background
A. Procedural History1
1
The procedural history of this litigation has been
chronicled in several prior court opinions. Except to the extent
that it is relevant to this appeal, we do not repeat that history
here. For proceedings regarding the first trial in this case,
see Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Ayers
v. Allain,
893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990); Ayers v. Allain,
914
F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc); United States v. Fordice,
505
U.S. 717 (1992). For proceedings concerning the second trial,
see Ayers v. Fordice,
879 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Miss. 1995); Ayers
v. Fordice,
111 F.3d 1183 (5th Cir. 1997).
3
1. Proceedings Through the First Appeal
The Private Plaintiffs2 filed suit against, among others,
the Governor of Mississippi and the Board of Trustees of State
Institutions of Higher Learning (“the Board”). The United States
subsequently intervened as a plaintiff. In their complaints, the
Private Plaintiffs and the United States alleged, inter alia,
that the Defendants had not satisfied their affirmative
obligation under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI to
disestablish the State’s racially dual system of higher
education.3 After conducting a trial, the district court ruled
that the State——by adopting race-neutral policies and procedures
and taking certain affirmative actions——had satisfied its duty to
reform the former de jure segregated state-university system.
Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1564 (N.D. Miss. 1987). We
affirmed. Ayers v. Allain,
914 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
2
In September 1975, the district court certified, under
Rule 23(b)(2), the following class:
[A]ll black citizens residing in Mississippi, whether
students, former students, parents, employees, or
taxpayers, who have been, are, or will be discriminated
against on account of race in receiving equal educational
opportunity and/or equal employment opportunity in the
universities operated by [the] Board . . . .
3
Mississippi’s state-university system consists of eight
schools——five historically white universities and three
historically black universities. The historically white
universities are the University of Mississippi, Mississippi State
University, Mississippi University for Women, the University of
Southern Mississippi, and Delta State University. The
historically black universities are Jackson State University,
Mississippi Valley State University, and Alcorn State University.
4
banc).
2. The Supreme Court’s Decision
Reversing, the Supreme Court held that both this court and
the district court had applied an incorrect legal standard. See
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729-32 (1992). According
to the Court’s opinion,
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable
to its prior system that continue to have segregative
effects——whether by influencing student enrollment
decisions or by fostering segregation in other facets of
the university system——and such policies are without
sound educational justification and can be practicably
eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of
proving that it has dismantled its prior system. Such
policies run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, even
though the State has abolished the legal requirement that
whites and blacks be educated separately and has
established racially neutral policies not animated by a
discriminatory purpose.
Id. at 731-32. In other words, the Court ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI4 require Mississippi to abolish
any policy or practice that (1) is traceable to de jure
segregation, (2) continues to have segregative effects, (3) is
without sound educational justification, and (4) can be
practicably eliminated.
Having articulated the legal standard to be applied on
remand, the Court closed with an important clarification:
4
The Supreme Court opined that “the reach of Title VI’s
protection extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment,”
thereby obviating the need to engage in distinct analyses.
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 732 n.7; accord
Ayers, 111 F.3d at 1191 n.5.
5
If we understand [the Private Plaintiffs] to press us to
order the upgrading of Jackson State, Alcorn State, and
Mississippi Valley State solely so that they may be
publicly financed, exclusively black enclaves by private
choice, we reject that request. The State provides these
facilities for all its citizens and it has not met its
burden under Brown to take affirmative steps to dismantle
its prior de jure system . . . .
Id. at 743. Thus, the Court affirmed that this litigation
concerns eliminating the effects of prior legal segregation, not
mandating equality among Mississippi’s publicly funded
educational institutions. Cf. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (explaining that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees to individuals the equal protection of the
laws).
3. The Second Trial and the Remedial Order
On remand, the district court applied the legal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court and found vestiges of
segregation with continued segregative effects in several areas
of Mississippi’s higher-education system. See Ayers v. Fordice,
879 F. Supp. 1419, 1477 (N.D. Miss. 1995). To reform these
areas, consistent with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on
educational soundness and practicability, the district court
issued a remedial decree,
id. at 1494-96, and it ordered the
establishment of a three-person committee to monitor the
implementation of its decree.
Id. at 1494. We describe below
only those provisions of the decree that bear on this appeal.
Regarding admissions standards, the court accepted the
6
Board’s proposed admissions policy, which remains in place today.
Id. at 1494 (accepting the Board’s proposed admissions policy);
id. at 1477-79 (describing that policy). Previously, admissions
standards were stricter at the historically white universities
than at the historically black universities, and the standards
were based almost exclusively on an applicant’s performance on
the American College Test (ACT). See
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 734-
35. The prior admissions standards were a vestige of de jure
segregation that continued to have segregative effects: Because
African-American applicants as a class scored lower on the ACT
than white applicants, the standards effectively channeled black
students to the historically black universities. See
Fordice,
505 U.S. at 734-35. Under the Board’s current policy, however,
uniform standards govern admission to all of the State’s
universities.
Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1477-78. Also, rather than
being based almost entirely on ACT scores, the current admissions
standards also take into account high school grades.
Id.
Further, applicants who do not meet the regular admissions
criteria can still gain admission through completion of a spring
screening process, which for some students leads to participation
in a summer remedial program and further remedial instruction
during the regular academic year.
Id. at 1478-79.
The decree directed the implementation of the Board’s
proposals for the development of additional academic programs at
7
Jackson State, including programs in the field of allied health
and graduate degrees in social work, urban planning, and
business. Id. at 1494. The court further instructed the Board
to conduct an institutional study of Jackson State, involving
examination of the feasibility and educational soundness of
providing additional academic offerings there, such as an
engineering school, a law school, and a pharmacy program.
Id. at
1494-95. Regarding Alcorn State, the district court ordered the
establishment of an MBA program at the school’s Natchez Center.
Id. Additionally, the court ordered the Board to study whether
desegregation in the two state universities in the Mississippi
Delta region——Delta State and Mississippi Valley State——could
only be achieved through consolidating the two institutions.
Id.
The remedial decree also directed the State to submit to the
monitoring committee a report addressing the practicability of
having the State assume control over the facilities-maintenance
funds then controlled individually by each of the eight state
universities.
Id. The district court further instructed the
Board “to study the feasibility of establishing system-wide
coordination of the community colleges in the State in the areas
of admissions standards and articulation procedures, and report
to the Monitoring Committee” regarding its findings.5
Id. at
5
Although a separate lawsuit was underway regarding
Mississippi’s community-college system, the district court issued
these directions respecting the community colleges because
8
1496.
4. This Court’s 1997 Opinion
On appeal, while upholding most of the district court’s
decision, this court rejected a few of its conclusions, and we
set forth several instructions to be followed on remand. We
focus here only on those aspects of our 1997 opinion that are
relevant to this appeal. We concluded that the district court
erred in finding that the use of ACT cutoffs to award
scholarships was not traceable to the de jure system and that
this policy did not continue to foster segregation. Ayers v.
Fordice, 111 F.3d 1183, 1209 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522
U.S. 1084 (1998). Thus, we remanded for consideration of the
practicability and educational soundness of reforming this aspect
of the undergraduate scholarship policies at the historically
white universities and of implementing, if necessary, appropriate
policies at those colleges impact access to the state-university
system. See
Ayers, 879 F. Supp. at 1474-75. Specifically, the
district court observed that the community colleges are in a
position to take students——who, upon graduation from high school,
are not capable of succeeding at a four-year university——and to
prepare them to transfer to a university and, thereby, to obtain
a four-year degree.
Id. Because these under-prepared students
were often African-American, the court suggested that the
community colleges were a valuable resource for integrating the
four-year universities and for serving as an alternative route to
a bachelors degree for black students.
Id. Finding that the
community colleges were not performing this task “to any great
degree,” the court therefore ordered the Board to study whether
the universities and the community colleges should coordinate
their admissions requirements and remedial programs.
Id. at
1475.
9
remedial relief. Id. at 1209, 1228. In addition, we directed
the district court to investigate the status of the Board’s
proposal to consolidate Mississippi Valley State and Delta State.
Id. at 1214, 1228. If the district court determined that the
Board planned not to merge the two schools, we instructed the
court to order the Board to study other methods of desegregating
Mississippi Valley State, including adding academic programs at
that school.
Id. We also concluded that the Board should report
to the monitoring committee on new academic and land-grant
programs that would have a reasonable chance of increasing the
number of non-African-American students attending Alcorn State.
Id. at 1214, 1228. Additionally, we remanded the issue of
equipment funding, asking the district court to investigate the
cause and segregative effect of disparities between the money
received by the historically white universities and the
historically black universities and, if necessary, to implement
appropriate relief.
Id. at 1225, 1228. Finally, we instructed
the district court to monitor closely the effectiveness of the
summer remedial program.
Id. at 1228-29. We indicated that the
program should be reformed as necessary to achieve the objective
of identifying and admitting students who are capable——with
reasonable remediation——of performing at the university level,
but who fail to qualify for regular admission.
Id.
5. Proceedings on Remand From Our 1997 Decision
10
Below we briefly review the aspects of the proceedings
conducted and the orders issued by the district court on remand
from our 1997 decision in this case that are relevant to this
appeal.
In June 1998, the district court ruled that it would no
longer consider the consolidation of Mississippi Valley State and
Delta State, since the Board had concluded that the merger was
not practical. Thus, as we instructed it to do in our 1997
opinion, the court directed the Board to study programs that
could be implemented at Mississippi Valley State to attract non-
African-American students. Next, the district court found that
the Board was in the process of implementing a Ph.D. program in
social work at Jackson State. After observing that, in response
to our 1997 decision, the Board had ceased using ACT scores as
the sole criterion for awarding scholarships, the district court
instructed the Board to submit information to the court and to
the Plaintiffs regarding the educational soundness of using ACT
scores as one aspect of the scholarship-award criteria.
In August 1998, the district court appointed a monitor to
aid the court and the parties in implementing the remedial
decree: Dr. Jerry Boone, a former state university administrator
from Tennessee.6
6
The court amended its previous order that had provided
for a three-person monitoring committee. To the extent that
Appellants now contend that either the district court’s selection
11
In October 1999, the district court ruled that the Board had
fully complied with several of its obligations concerning Jackson
State. After considering the monitor’s status report, the court
concluded that the Board had implemented academic programs in
allied health, social work (Ph.D.), urban planning (masters and
Ph.D.), and business (Ph.D.) at Jackson State. The court also
noted that the Board had conducted an institutional study of
Jackson State and had prepared to establish an engineering school
at the university. Accordingly, the court stated that the Board
of a sole monitor or the identity of the individual selected to
serve as the monitor requires us to invalidate the parties’
settlement, we reject their contention. Approximately six months
after we handed down our 1997 decision in this case, the district
court ordered each side to submit six names from which the court
would select the monitoring committee. In the opinion
accompanying its order, the court noted that the parties’ failure
to agree on the membership of the monitoring committee was
delaying the implementation of the remedial decree. At that
time, the Private Plaintiffs, who were represented by Alvin
Chambliss (attorney for Appellants here), were busy seeking
Supreme Court review of our 1997 decision. Consequently, counsel
for the Private Plaintiffs chose not to address the issues then
pending in the trial court, such as the composition of the
monitoring committee. At the district court’s direction, the
United States submitted names of candidates for the monitoring
committee on behalf of both itself and the Private Plaintiffs.
Approximately two-and-a-half months after the district court’s
deadline for the submission of candidates had passed, the Private
Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting access to the list of
candidates submitted by the Defendants, but it does not appear
that the Private Plaintiffs ever sought to submit their own list
of candidates. While the record does not reflect precisely why
the district court——faced with the parties’ inability to agree on
the committee’s composition——eventually decided to appoint only
one monitor, we cannot conclude that the court’s action requires
us to invalidate the present settlement. Further, we reject
Appellants’ unsupported attacks on Dr. Boone’s qualifications to
serve as the court-appointed monitor.
12
had complied with most of its duties regarding new academic
programs at Jackson State.
In July 1999, the district court ruled that the Board had
complied with the paragraph of the remedial decree concerning
coordination of admissions standards and establishment of
articulation agreements between the State’s community colleges
and its universities. The court found that Mississippi’s
community colleges had approved an open-admissions policy.
Further, the court observed that the Board had standardized “an
alternative procedure for students to qualify for university
admission by completing specified requirements at a community
college.” The court also noted that, under the Board’s policy,
students who unsuccessfully attempt the summer remedial program
are counseled regarding community-college enrollment.
In July 2000, the district court approved the Mississippi
Legislature’s appropriation of funds to construct a facility to
house the court-ordered MBA program at Alcorn State’s Natchez
campus. See Ayers v. Fordice, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9877, at *9 (N.D. Miss. July 6, 2000).
In January 2001, the district court issued an order
regarding legal and pharmacy education at Jackson State. Finding
no unmet demand for legal education in the Jackson area, the
court concluded that the Board need not establish a law school at
Jackson State for the purpose of desegregating that institution.
13
The district court also found that the existing pharmacy program
at the University of Mississippi was meeting the State’s need for
pharmacy education. It further ruled that the creation of either
a law school or a pharmacy school at Jackson State was neither
feasible nor educationally sound.7 The district court then
announced that “[w]ith these issues resolved, the court finds
that all elements of the Ayers Remedial Decree having to do with
Jackson State University and involving significant expenditures
of funds have now been completed.”
In February 2001, the district court concluded that the
Board’s proposal regarding facilities-maintenance funds
essentially satisfied this aspect of the remedial decree.
To summarize the status of this litigation when the district
court was presented with the proposed settlement agreement, most
of both the district court’s remedial decree and our instructions
on remand had been implemented. Thus, only the following issues
remained to some extent unresolved: (1) further review of the
uniform admissions standards;8 (2) continued evaluation of the
7
But, while noting that such a program was not required
by the court’s remedial decree, the district court approved the
Board’s proposal for an inter-institutional pharmacy program,
jointly controlled by Jackson State, the University of
Mississippi, and the University of Mississippi Medical Center.
8
In June 1998, the district court ordered the Board to
monitor freshman enrollment statewide to assess the impact of the
uniform admissions standards. The district court had scheduled a
hearing on the admissions standards, but it was postponed pending
settlement negotiations. In his analysis of enrollment data from
1993-1998, the monitor reported “a substantial and fairly steady
14
summer remedial program;9 (3) investigation of potential new
academic programs that might help to desegregate Mississippi
Valley State and Alcorn State; (4) assessment of equipment
funding; and (5) consideration of the use of ACT scores as a
component of the criteria for awarding scholarships.
B. Proceedings Concerning the Settlement Agreement
1. The Settlement Agreement
After lengthy negotiations, all of the Defendants, the
increase in total freshmen enrollments, universities and
community colleges combined, among resident black students.” But
he also noted that African-American freshmen were “drift[ing]
away from the universities and toward the community colleges.”
In addition, the monitor cautioned against placing too much
weight on the data, pointing out that his analysis dealt only
with numbers from three years before and three years after the
uniform admissions standards were instituted.
9
The monitor also reported to the district court on the
effectiveness of the summer remedial program. The monitor’s
assessment of the program was quite positive; he concluded:
“Overall, I believe the spring screening and summer remedial
program should be regarded as a success for those who attend the
summer program. Most of the students who go through it complete
it successfully and go on to attend one of the universities in
the fall.” Further, he noted that there had been “no reduction
in black students attending college since the summer program was
initiated, although a larger proportion are choosing to attend a
community college,” a result which did not trouble the monitor
“because transfer arrangements between the universities and the
community colleges make initial enrollment in a community college
a clear alternative for university-bound students who prefer not
to go through the summer program.” Noting that many of the
rejected applicants who did not participate in the spring
screening process and the summer remedial program were apparently
unaware of the programs’ existence, the monitor recommended that
the Board should be required to ensure that students who do not
qualify for regular admission are adequately informed about the
spring screening process and the summer remedial program,
including the availability of financial aid for participants.
15
United States, and the lead Private Plaintiff (Congressman Bennie
Thompson),10 on behalf of both himself and the Private-Plaintiff
class, reached a settlement agreement. By its terms, “[j]udicial
approval of [the] Agreement is to relieve the Board, and all
other defendants, of any further obligations under the remedial
decree.” Further, the “only obligations of the Board, and other
defendants, arising out of or related to the Ayers litigation
will be those specified in [the] Agreement.” We describe below
the major obligations contained in the Agreement.
a. Financial Assistance for the Summer Remedial
Program
Under the agreement, the State will provide special funding
in the amount of $500,000 annually for five years (from 2002-
2006) and $750,000 annually for five additional years (from 2007-
2011) to supplement the need-based financial aid presently
available to summer program participants.11 Further, the
agreement obligates the Board to “widely” publicize both the
opportunity to enroll in the summer remedial program and the
10
Congressman Thompson is one of the twenty-one original
named plaintiffs in this suit, and in March 2000, the district
court designated——for “purposes of efficient communications and
organization”——Congressman Thompson as the “lead plaintiff” in
this action.
11
The Board, however, “specifically reserves the right to
no longer provide the summer program at certain Mississippi
universities should future circumstances so warrant.”
16
availability of financial aid for program participants.12
b. Academic Programs
The agreement provides for the establishment, continuation,
or enhancement of a variety of academic programs at Alcorn State,
Jackson State, and Mississippi Valley State.13 Further,
12
This provision is directly responsive to the monitor’s
recommendation that the Board adequately inform students who are
denied regular admission about the summer program and the
financial aid available to those who participate in it.
13
The specific programs or program areas named in the
agreement are detailed below. When a particular program is being
or will be provided at a branch campus, that information is
indicated parenthetically.
Alcorn State: (1) business administration, masters (Natchez
campus); (2) accounting, masters (Natchez campus); (3) finance,
bachelors (Lorman campus) and masters (Natchez campus);
(4) physician assistants, masters (Natchez campus or Vicksburg
campus); (5) biotechnology, masters (Lorman campus); (6) computer
networking, bachelors (Vicksburg campus); (7) environmental
science, bachelors (Lorman campus); (8) nursing; (9) teacher
education; (10) mathematics and sciences (biology, chemistry,
physics); and (11) computer science.
Jackson State: (1) business, Ph.D.; (2) urban planning,
masters and Ph.D.; (3) social work, Ph.D.; (4) civil engineering,
bachelors; (5) computer engineering, bachelors;
(6) telecommunications engineering, bachelors; (7) public health,
masters; (8) health care administration, bachelors;
(9) communicative disorders, masters; (10) higher education,
Ph.D.; (11) public health, Ph.D.; (12) Mississippi
Interinstitutional Pharmacy Initiative; (13) school of allied
health; (14) school of public health; (15) school of engineering
(graduate programs in civil, computer, and telecommunications
engineering will be considered for implementation upon
accreditation of the baccalaureate engineering programs);
(16) business; and (17) education.
Mississippi Valley State: (1) history, bachelors;
(2) special education, masters and bachelors; (3) computer
science, masters; (4) bioinformatics, masters; (5) leadership
administration, masters; (6) business administration, masters;
(7) biology; (8) chemistry; (9) computer science;
(10) mathematics; and (11) special education.
17
beginning with fiscal year 2002, annual appropriations are to be
provided to the historically black universities for seventeen
years, in the total amount of $245,880,000, to fund the numerous
academic programs detailed in the agreement.14
c. Endowments
The agreement establishes both a publicly funded and a
privately funded endowment for the benefit of Alcorn State,
Jackson State, and Mississippi Valley State. Mississippi will
create the public endowment, which will consist of $70 million,
over the course of fourteen years. Additionally, the agreement
requires the Board to use its best efforts over a seven-year
period to raise $35 million for the privately funded endowment.
Initially, the endowments will be managed by a seven-person
committee composed of the presidents of the historically black
universities, the Commissioner of Higher Education, two members
of the Board, and a member to be agreed on by the other members.
14
The agreement also states that,
The Board will maintain the right to evaluate program
implementation in light of program objectives including
reservation of the right to direct reallocation of
monies, in consultation with the presidents of the
historically black universities, to other academic
programs and other-race endeavors identified in this
Agreement. Given the considerable period of time covered
by this Agreement, the Board further reserves the right
to substitute academic programs, in consultation with the
presidents of the historically black universities, for
those presently identified should future circumstances so
warrant.
18
The income from both endowments will be allocated 28.3% to Alcorn
State, 43.4% to Jackson State, and 28.3% to Mississippi Valley
State, with the schools being required to use the funds for
other-race15 marketing and recruitment, including the employment
of other-race recruiting personnel and the award of other-race
student scholarships. The schools may also expend the endowment
income on the academic programs provided for in the agreement.
Alcorn State, Jackson State, and Mississippi Valley State
will each receive its pro rata share of the endowments when the
institution attains a total other-race enrollment of ten percent
and sustains that enrollment for three consecutive years. After
obtaining full control over the endowment funds, the historically
black universities may use the income for “sound academic
purposes such as faculty compensation, academic program
enhancements and student scholarships.”
d. Capital Improvements
The agreement authorizes various capital improvements, at a
total cost of up to $75 million, at Alcorn State, Jackson State,
and Mississippi Valley State.
e. Funding
According to the agreement, the funding necessary to
implement the agreement’s provisions supplements the usual
15
The agreement defines “other-race” as non-African-
American.
19
appropriations made to the state-university system and does not
supplant normal funding for Alcorn State, Jackson State, and
Mississippi Valley State.
f. Recognition of Jackson State as a Comprehensive
University
Acknowledging that Jackson State presently offers a broad
array of academic programs and that its service area extends
beyond the Jackson, Mississippi, metropolitan area, the Board
agrees that Jackson State should be “recognized as a
comprehensive university.” The additional programs, facilities,
and other resources to which comprehensive recognition entitles
Jackson State are those provided for in the agreement.
g. Attorneys’ Fees
Under the agreement, the attorneys for the Private
Plaintiffs will receive a total of $2.5 million for fees, costs,
and expenses. Additionally, the agreement states that
The class representative (Congressman Thompson) and Class
counsel Byrd, Derfner and Pressman specifically represent
that North Mississippi Rural Legal Services, The Center
for Law and Education, and Alvin O. Chambliss, Jr. have
knowledge of these provisions (i) that the Ayers
defendants’ obligations for attorneys’ fees, costs and
expenses will be fully satisfied on payment of $2,500,000
. . . and (ii) that no present or former counsel for the
Class, or member of the Class, may seek attorneys’ fees,
costs and expenses other than as set forth in this
Agreement.
h. Settlement Implementation
The agreement obligates the Board to report annually to lead
counsel for the Private Plaintiffs and counsel for the United
20
States on the agreement’s implementation. In addition, it
expresses the parties’ decision to submit to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the district court any dispute relating to the
agreement. Also, the agreement will not become final until its
approval is no longer subject to further appeal or judicial
review.
2. Appellants’ Motion to Opt Out
Unhappy with the relief provided for in the agreement,
Appellants filed a motion to opt out of the Private-Plaintiff
class. After holding a two-day evidentiary hearing, the district
court denied their motion. See Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-
B-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19730, at *1, *18 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 26,
2001).
3. The District Court’s Approval of the Settlement
Agreement
Several months after it ordered that notice of the proposed
settlement be published in newspapers throughout Mississippi, the
district court conducted a fairness hearing, receiving testimony
from proponents of and objectors to the settlement. See Ayers v.
Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, 2002 WL 91895 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2,
2002). The district court acknowledged that it had heard
persuasive arguments both for and against approving the
settlement.
Id. at *3.16 Despite having concerns about the
16
In its opinion, the court summarized the most weighty
contentions on each side. See Ayers, 2002 WL 91895, at *3-4.
21
proposed settlement, including its high cost and long duration,
the district court expressed a preference for ending this case
through agreement of the parties. Id. at *4. But it worried
that none of the parties involved had the authority to
appropriate the substantial sum necessary to fund the proposal.
Id. at *4. Accordingly, the district court stated that——if the
Mississippi Legislature would endorse the agreement and agree to
fund it——the court would approve the settlement.
Id. at *5.
After the district court received a concurrent resolution
evidencing the Legislature’s support for and agreement to fund
the settlement, the court issued a final judgment approving the
settlement. According to the district court,
[I]f the State of Mississippi through its elected
representatives, the policymakers of the State, wants to
go further in the enhancements to the historically black
institutions than called for by the court——and they have
advised the court they do——then their actions will be
given precedence. It is not illegal to do more than that
required by the Constitution.
Ayers v. Musgrove, No. 4:75CV009-B-D, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Miss.
Feb. 15, 2002). The court’s decision, inter alia, specified that
(1) this suit is a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(2);
(2) the settlement agreement is incorporated by reference into
the final judgment; (3) the agreement “affords the Class Members
considerable relief in light of the established law of this case,
the present stage of these proceedings and the range of possible
recovery through further litigation, and is, in all respects,
22
fair, reasonable, adequate and in the best interest of the
Class”; and (4) all claims relating to this controversy are
dismissed with prejudice.17 Id. at 2-4. In addition to
appealing the district court’s final judgment approving the
settlement, Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of
their motion to opt out of the Private-Plaintiff class.18
II. Standard of Review
A district court’s findings of fact must be accepted unless
those findings are clearly erroneous, but we review de novo a
district court’s conclusions of law. See Prudhomme v. Tenneco
Oil Co., 955 F.2d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1992). In addition, “[o]ur
appellate review of the district court’s approval of a settlement
is limited; an approved settlement will not be upset unless the
court clearly abused its discretion.” Parker v. Anderson,
667
F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982) (citing Young v. Katz, 447
17
Before turning to the merits of Appellants’
contentions, we briefly observe that the funding provided for in
the settlement agreement is apparently being withheld, pending
final judicial approval of the parties’ settlement. At oral
argument, counsel for the State explained that, while the Board
continues to fulfill its obligations under the district court’s
remedial decree, implementation of the additional commitments
contained in the agreement awaits final court approval of the
settlement.
18
Below we address those of Appellants’ contentions that
we can adequately discern from the briefing. Several of
Appellants’ arguments are insufficiently developed and are,
therefore, waived. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A); L & A
Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 106, 113
(5th Cir. 1994).
23
F.2d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 1971)); accord Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983). Finally, a district court’s
denial of a motion to opt out of a class certified under Rule
23(b)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Penson v.
Terminal Transp. Co.,
634 F.2d 989, 994 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan.
1981).
III. Discussion
A. The District Court’s Approval of the Settlement Agreement
A district court has discretion to approve a class-action
settlement under Rule 23(e) if the settlement is fair, adequate,
and reasonable. Parker, 667 F.2d at 1208-09. Our cases instruct
that the district court’s “exercise of discretion is to be tested
by inquiries that ‘ensure that the settlement is in the interest
of the class, does not unfairly impinge on the rights and
interests of dissenters, and does not merely mantle oppression.’”
Reed, 703 F.2d at 172 (quoting Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
576 F.2d 1157, 1214 (5th Cir. 1978)). Further, six factors guide
our review of a decision to approve a settlement agreement
resolving a class-action suit:
(1) the existence of fraud or collusion behind the
settlement; (2) the complexity, expense and likely
duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the
proceedings and the amount of discovery completed;
(4) the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the merits;
(5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions
of the class counsel, class representatives, and absent
class members.
Id. (citing Parker, 667 F.2d at 1209). Accordingly, we focus
24
below on the Parker factors, and we also address both Appellants’
inadequate-representation contention and their challenge to the
agreement’s provision regarding attorneys’ fees.
1. Fraud or Collusion
Appellants’ brief contains several vague assertions of
collusion. Primarily, Appellants claim that they had
insufficient access to and participation in the settlement
negotiations. Further, they suggest that collusion occurred in
the negotiation of attorneys’ fees.
It is unclear why Appellants’ attorney, Alvin Chambliss (who
represented the Private-Plaintiff class for many years), did not
participate in the settlement negotiations. The lead Private
Plaintiff, Congressman Thompson, testified at the fairness
hearing that every effort was made to keep Mr. Chambliss informed
regarding the negotiations. Further, letters and
facsimiles——indicating correspondence between lead counsel for
the class and Mr. Chambliss concerning the settlement talks——were
presented as exhibits at the fairness hearing. Regardless, the
district court found Appellants’ allegations of collusion to be
unsupported. Ayers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19730, at *16.
Because Appellants have pointed to no record evidence that
contradicts this finding——let alone evidence showing it to be
clearly erroneous——we reject their contention that collusion was
present in the settlement negotiations.
25
2. The Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the
Suit and the Stage of the Proceedings
The second and third Parker factors——the complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation and the stage of
the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed——weigh in
favor of affirming the district court’s decision. First,
regarding the second factor, settling now avoids the risks and
burdens of potentially protracted litigation concerning several
aspects of our remand instructions and the district court’s
remedial decree. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text
(describing five issues that were not fully resolved when the
parties reached their agreement). Specifically, settlement
eliminates the transaction costs that further proceedings would
impose on the process of desegregating Mississippi’s state-
university system. The agreement also provides relief for the
class sooner than continued litigation would.
Second, examination of the stage of the proceedings and the
amount of discovery completed weighs in favor of upholding the
settlement. The several trials and appeals that have already
occurred in this case have largely resolved the controlling legal
issues. Thus, the parties and the district court possess ample
information with which to evaluate the merits of the competing
positions.
3. Likelihood of Success on the Merits and Range of
Possible Recovery
26
Because two trials and several appeals have already occurred
in this case, the probability of the Plaintiffs’ success on the
merits and the range of possible recovery have largely been
resolved. Our 1997 opinion conclusively determined nearly all of
the State’s obligations.19 Most of our instructions to the
district court in that opinion concerned the remedial decree, see
Ayers, 111 F.3d at 1228-29, and as discussed above, the district
court concluded——before the parties reached their
settlement——that much of the remedial decree had been
satisfied.20
Nevertheless, aside from their allegations of collusion,
Appellants’ main objections to the settlement agreement center on
their view that the relief it provides is inadequate. Appellants
primarily seek more money for academic programs and facilities at
the historically black universities and lower admissions
standards. But they also object to the requirement that the
19
Appellants claim that Mississippi, in dismantling its
former system of de jure segregation, has not complied with Title
VI and several regulations and policies promulgated in accordance
with that statute. But their reliance on Title VI and its
implementing regulations is unavailing because Mississippi’s
obligations have been determined under the Fourteenth Amendment;
both the Supreme Court and this court have stated that the
requirements of Title VI extend no further than those of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 732 n.7;
Ayers, 111
F.3d at 1191 n.5.
20
To the extent that Appellants allege that the district
court disregarded our 1997 remand instructions, we reject their
contention. Appellants do not direct us to anything in the
record that would support such an assertion.
27
historically black universities reach and sustain an other-race
enrollment of ten percent before gaining full control over the
endowments created by the settlement agreement. Additionally,
Appellants assert that the agreement does not adequately address
institutional mission designations,21 faculty
salaries, governance, accreditation, and the allocation of land-
grant functions between Alcorn State and Mississippi State
University. We address each of Appellants’ specific contentions
in turn below and explain why Appellants are unlikely to achieve
greater relief through further litigation.
Concerning Appellants’ desire for more funding for and
21
In 1981, the Board assigned missions to the state
universities in Mississippi. Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1539. A
university’s “mission” defines the institution’s “role and scope”
relative to the other institutions within the system.
Id. The
Board designated the University of Mississippi, Mississippi
State, and the University of Southern Mississippi as
“comprehensive” universities.
Id. This designation indicates
that these institutions offered a greater number and higher level
of degree programs than did the remaining universities and that
these schools were expected to offer a number of doctoral
programs, but not in the same disciplines.
Id. Jackson State
was classified as an “urban” university, indicating that its role
was to serve the urban community of Jackson, Mississippi.
Id. at
1539-40. Mississippi Valley State, Alcorn State, Mississippi
University for Women, and Delta State received the designation of
“regional” university.
Id. at 1540. The regional designation
signifies that these institutions were expected to focus on the
provision of undergraduate education.
Id.
While the agreement provides for the recognition of Jackson
State as a comprehensive university, it also states that Jackson
State’s “use of the comprehensive description does not imply any
change in [its] institutional mission classification.
Institutional mission designations are not being addressed by
this Agreement.”
28
programs at the historically black universities, our 1997
decision affirmed the district court’s finding that “merely
adding programs and increasing budgets is not likely to
desegregate” a historically black university. Ayers, 111 F.3d at
1213 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, we upheld the district court’s determination that
the State’s funding formula is not traceable to de jure
segregation.
Id. at 1224-25. While we did instruct the district
court to investigate potential programmatic enhancements at
Alcorn State and Mississippi Valley State for the purpose of
desegregating those schools,
id. at 1228, the settlement
agreement makes ample provision for academic offerings at both
universities. Further, testimony of the Board’s witnesses at the
fairness hearing indicates that many of these programs were
selected in accordance with our guidance that “well-planned
programs that respond to the particular needs and interests of
local populations can help to desegregate historically black
institutions.”
Id. at 1213-14.
As discussed above, several new academic programs have also
been added at Jackson State, and the settlement agreement
provides for the continuation of these programs in addition to
the implementation of several new programs. Appellants
nonetheless assert that the settlement should be invalidated
because programs in law, pharmacy, engineering, and public health
29
have not been established at Jackson State. Further, they
contend that Jackson State should have partial control over the
University of Mississippi Medical Center, located in Jackson,
Mississippi.
Each of Appellants’ contentions has been addressed by prior
court rulings. First, the district court found, in its January
2001 order discussed above, that placing either a law school or a
pharmacy school at Jackson State was neither feasible nor
educationally sound; moreover, no party even sought such steps at
the time of the district court’s ruling.22 Second, in the same
order, the district court noted that an engineering school and a
masters in public health program have already been implemented at
Jackson State, and the settlement agreement provides continued
funding for these offerings as well as funding for a school of
public health at Jackson State. Third, regarding the University
of Mississippi Medical Center, our 1997 decision affirmed the
district court’s finding that institutional affiliation between
Jackson State and the Medical Center had no desegregative
potential. Id. at 1211, 1215.
Regarding facilities at the historically black universities,
our 1997 opinion also rejected “Plaintiffs’ argument for general
22
An inter-institutional pharmacy program, over which
Jackson State has partial control, was developed, however, and
the settlement agreement provides for the continuation of that
program.
30
funds to enhance facilities” at these schools. Id. at 1224.
Still, the settlement agreement provides up to $75 million for
capital improvements at the historically black universities,
including acquisition of property, construction of new buildings
and repairs and renovation of existing ones, purchase of
additional equipment, and landscaping and drainage installation.
In addition, in its February 2001 order discussed above, the
district court concluded that the Board had essentially satisfied
its obligation under the remedial decree to assume greater
control over funds for facilities maintenance.
Turning to Appellants’ contentions respecting the current
admissions policy, their hope for lower admissions standards also
cannot be reconciled with our 1997 opinion, which specifically
approved the district court’s adoption of uniform admissions
standards that are rigorous enough to exclude students incapable
of succeeding at the university level. See id. at 1198-1200. In
particular, we affirmed the district court’s finding that the
open admissions component of the standards then (and, apparently,
again now) sought by the Private Plaintiffs was educationally
unsound.23
Id. at 1199. We did, however, instruct the district
23
At oral argument, Appellants advocated a return to
tiered admissions standards, with the historically white
universities employing stricter admissions criteria than the
historically black universities. Appellants fail to recognize,
however, that the Supreme Court condemned that prior policy as a
vestige of de jure segregation with continued discriminatory
effects. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 734-35.
31
court to review the efficacy of the spring screening process and
the summer remedial program. See id. at 1201, 1228-29. As
discussed above, the court-appointed monitor’s reports indicate
that the summer program has been a success. Further, the
settlement agreement responds to the monitor’s primary
recommendation regarding the summer program——i.e., that the
program, and the availability of financial aid for participants,
should be adequately publicized by the Board.
We also reject Appellants’ objection to the requirement that
each of the historically black universities achieve and maintain
ten-percent other-race enrollment before receiving its share of
the endowments. As the United States explains in its brief, the
ten-percent threshold seeks to ensure that the historically black
universities devote the endowment funds to promoting the
desegregation of their schools, not to upgrading them “so that
they may be publicly financed, exclusively black enclaves by
private choice.” Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743. This provision will
not encourage the historically black universities to discriminate
in admitting students because the current admissions standards
are uniform across the state-university system; the schools lack
discretion to deny entry to those applicants who meet the uniform
criteria. Instead, the ten-percent threshold will provide the
historically black universities with a legitimate incentive to
32
recruit and to attract other-race students.24
In addition, Appellants’ complaint that institutional
mission designations should have been addressed in the agreement
is not well taken. In our 1997 opinion we observed that the
district court’s remedial decree “does not order any alteration
of the mission designations,” and we further noted that “[n]o
party appeals retention of the mission designations per se.”
Ayers, 111 F.3d at 1211. But, even if we were to reconsider this
issue now, the extensive programmatic enhancements at the
historically black universities that have been implemented thus
far and will be established as a result of the agreement are
intended to remedy the present segregative effects of this
particular vestige of de jure segregation. Cf.
id. at 1213 (“The
issue of programmatic enhancement directly implicates policies
governing institutional missions, which the district court found
to be traceable to the de jure system and to have current
segregative effects.”).
Finally, turning to Appellants’ last four areas of concern,
our 1997 decision affirmed the district court’s 1995 rulings that
no relief was warranted to remedy disparities in the salaries,
the hiring, or the promotion of African-American faculty, id. at
24
Moreover, we note that the ten-percent threshold
responds to the monitor’s observation that the historically white
universities have been desegregating faster than the historically
black universities.
33
1226-27; to modify the composition of the Board or its staff, id.
at 1227-28; to address the Board’s efforts regarding the
accreditation of academic programs at the historically black
universities,25
id. at 1214-15; or to re-allocate land-grant
responsibilities between Alcorn State and Mississippi State
University,
id. at 1217.
Accordingly, both the probability of the Plaintiffs’ success
on the merits and the range of possible recovery point strongly
in favor of affirming. Rejection of the settlement and further
litigation is unlikely to lead to greater relief for the Private-
Plaintiff class, particularly since most of the relief sought by
Appellants has been foreclosed by our 1997 decision in this case.
The settlement agreement provides meaningful relief; in
particular, it contains generous funding for (1) a variety of new
and enhanced academic programs at the historically black
universities and (2) financial aid for participants in the summer
remedial program——a program lauded by the court-appointed
monitor——to assist those denied admission under the current
uniform standards. Further, we reiterate that the targeted
programmatic enhancements provided for in the agreement are
intended to promote desegregation at the historically black
25
We did, however, instruct the district court to ensure
that the then-existing business programs at Jackson State
received accreditation. In June 1998, the district court
determined that this step had been achieved.
34
universities. To the extent that Appellants “press us to order
the upgrading of Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi
Valley State solely so that they may be publicly financed,
exclusively black enclaves by private choice,” the Supreme Court
has rejected their contention. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743.
4. The Opinions of the Class Counsel, Class
Representatives, and Absent Class Members
Appellants also assert that reversal is required because
many class members oppose the settlement agreement.26 Our
jurisprudence, however, makes clear that a settlement can be
approved despite opposition from class members, including named
plaintiffs. See Reed, 703 F.2d at 174-75 (affirming the district
court’s approval of a settlement despite “the objections of
twenty-three of twenty-seven named plaintiffs and nearly forty
percent of the 1,517 member class”);
Parker, 667 F.2d at 1207-08,
1214 (affirming a district court’s approval of a settlement of a
class-action suit even though nine of the eleven named plaintiffs
opposed the settlement); Cotton v. Hinton,
559 F.2d 1326, 1331
(5th Cir. 1977) (“A settlement can be fair notwithstanding a
large number of class members who oppose it.”). That several
26
Appellants claim that approximately 4,000 class
members, including more than half of the original named
plaintiffs, do not support the settlement agreement. But, while
the record indicates that several class members oppose the
settlement, the number does not appear to be anywhere near 4,000.
According to the district court’s opinion regarding Appellants’
motion to opt out of the class, ninety-nine Private Plaintiffs
sought to opt out. Ayers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19730, at *1.
35
class members desire broader relief, which has been foreclosed by
prior court rulings, does not prevent judicial approval of this
settlement agreement, which promises substantial relief to the
class.
5. Inadequate Representation
Appellants also argue that the district court erred in
approving the settlement because the class was not adequately
represented during the settlement negotiations. Mr. Chambliss,
Robert Pressman, and Armand Derfner have represented the Private
Plaintiffs for many years. In March 2000, attorneys from the law
firm of Byrd and Associates entered an appearance on behalf of
the Private Plaintiffs, which was “acknowledged and agreed to” by
Mr. Chambliss. Later that month, the district court designated
Congressman Thompson as the lead plaintiff. In May 2000, in
response to an order from the district court, Congressman
Thompson named Isaac Byrd and Byrd’s law firm as lead counsel for
the Private Plaintiffs. Still, Mr. Chambliss, Mr. Pressman, and
Mr. Derfner continued to represent the Private-Plaintiff class.27
It appears that Mr. Byrd and his firm took the lead in
negotiating the settlement agreement on behalf of the Private
Plaintiffs. In their brief, Appellants criticize Congressman
Thompson’s and Mr. Byrd’s representation of the class during the
27
Mr. Pressman and Mr. Derfner, in addition to Mr. Byrd,
currently represent the Private-Plaintiff Appellees in this
appeal.
36
settlement negotiations. In particular, Appellants note that Mr.
Byrd is primarily a plaintiffs’ personal-injury lawyer and is
inexperienced in civil-rights litigation.
In Reed, this court noted that “adequacy of representation
and adequacy of settlement are different sides of the same
question.”28 703 F.2d at 175. Further, we stated that “the
settlement itself provides insight into adequacy of
representation.” Id.; accord
Parker, 667 F.2d at 1211 (stating
that “generally an attorney who secures and submits a fair and
adequate settlement has represented the client class fairly and
adequately”). Here, the district court concluded that the
settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and our
analysis of the agreement in the context of the Parker factors
reveals no abuse of discretion by the district judge. We also
observed in Reed that “it is the trial judge who can best know
how well the class was
represented.” 703 F.2d at 175. Here, the
district court found “the allegations of inadequate
representation of class members wholly unsubstantiated.”29
28
Indeed, Appellants’ complaints about the representation
provided by Congressman Thompson center on their disagreement
with his view that the settlement agreement is satisfactory.
29
In its order naming Thompson lead plaintiff, the
district court remarked that he “is one of the original named
plaintiffs who brought this suit against the defendants herein
and has been more active than any other plaintiff in pursuing
this case, having appeared before the court on several occasions
as a witness and representative of the plaintiff class and also
at conferences.”
Regarding the attorneys who negotiated the settlement
37
Ayers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19730, at *16. Accordingly, because
the agreement provides ample relief to the class and Appellants
have not shown that any record evidence supports their
inadequate-representation allegation, we refuse to invalidate the
settlement on this ground.
6. Attorneys’ Fees
Appellants also contend that the settlement should be
rejected because the amount of attorneys’ fees was negotiated
along with the rest of the agreement. But they fail to cite any
authority for the proposition that a district court abuses its
discretion when it approves a settlement agreement that contains
a provision for attorneys’ fees. On the contrary, the Supreme
Court has stated that, “[i]deally, of course, litigants will
settle the amount of a fee.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
agreement, the district court stated,
Mr. Byrd, retained and named by Mr. Thompson, the lead
private plaintiff, as lead counsel for the class, is a
competent attorney whose co-counsel, Mr. Pressman and Mr.
Derfner, undisputedly competent and long-time attorneys
for the class, actively participated in the settlement
negotiation process, along with the independent
participation of the United States Department of Justice
attorneys, whose competent representation of the United
States for more than twenty-five years is undisputed.
Ayers, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19730, at *16. That counsel for the
United States was personally involved in the settlement
negotiations gives us an additional reason to conclude that the
class was adequately represented. Cf. United States v. City of
Miami,
614 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that, when
approving a consent decree in a case in which the United States
was the plaintiff, a court “can safely assume that the interests
of all affected have been considered”).
38
437 (1983). True, the Court has suggested that, in cases where
the plaintiffs request damages and the defendant offers to settle
for a lump sum covering both damages and attorneys’ fees,
negotiating the allocation may present a conflict of interest for
the plaintiffs’ attorney. But even in such cases, the Court has
declined to prohibit simultaneous negotiation of liability and
fees, stating that “a defendant may have good reason to demand to
know his total liability.” White v. N.H. Dep’t of Employment
Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 454 n.15 (1982). Indeed, in the context of
civil-rights litigation seeking injunctive relief, the Court has
opined that prohibiting agreement between the parties on
attorneys’ fees “might well preclude the settlement of a
substantial number of cases.” Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717,
733 (1986); cf. Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs.,
616 F.2d 305,
312, 326-27 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming the district court’s
approval of a settlement agreement that resolved a public-school-
desegregation class action and that provided for the attorneys’
fees of both counsel for the named plaintiffs and counsel for the
absent class members). The provision for attorneys’ fees
therefore does not cause us to conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in approving the settlement agreement.
7. Conclusion
We have analyzed the agreement in the context of the Parker
factors, and we hold that the district court did not abuse its
39
discretion in approving the settlement agreement. Further, we
agree with the district court that Appellants’ inadequate-
representation argument fails, and we reject Appellants’
assertion that the agreement’s clause regarding attorneys’ fees
renders the settlement invalid.
B. The District Court’s Denial of Appellants’ Motion to Opt Out
of the Class
Appellants assert that they should have been permitted to
opt out of the class because it does not satisfy the requirements
of Rule 23(a). Alternatively, they claim that Rule 23 cannot be
applied to deny them the opportunity to litigate their claims in
a separate proceeding. Appellants raise two arguments in support
of this alterative contention. First, they maintain that
Mississippi state law affords them the right to proceed with a
separate action30 and that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), requires us to apply state law rather than Rule
23. Second, Appellants suggest that refusing to permit them to
opt out impinges on their First Amendment rights.
We have held that “a member of a class certified under Rule
23(b)(2) has no absolute right to opt out of the class.” Penson,
634 F.2d at 994. Rather, a “district court . . . acting under
its Rule 23(d)(2) discretionary power, may require that an opt-
out right and notice thereof be given should it believe that such
30
See MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 24.
40
a right is desirable to protect the interests of the absent class
members.” Id. Typically, such cases involve “hybrid” Rule
23(b)(2) class actions, in which individual monetary relief for
certain class members is sought in addition to class-wide
injunctive or declaratory relief.
Id. “Such a class action, at
least in the relief stage, begins to resemble a 23(b)(3) action,
and there has been more concern with protecting the due process
rights of the individual class members to ensure they are aware
of the opportunity to receive the monetary relief to which they
are entitled.”
Id.
Here, the class was certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because
Mississippi, in maintaining vestiges of its prior de jure system
of higher education, had “acted [and] refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). This
case is not a hybrid class action; the Private Plaintiffs have
sought solely injunctive and declaratory relief throughout the
litigation. Even in their briefs to this court,
Appellants——while expressing their dissatisfaction with the
extent of the relief provided for in the settlement agreement——do
not request any individual relief, whether monetary or otherwise.
Appellants’ interests do not diverge from those of the Private
Plaintiffs who support the settlement, except to the extent that
41
Appellants believe that they are entitled to greater class-wide
injunctive relief. Accordingly, since Appellants have failed to
show the existence of individual claims that are separate and
distinct from the claims for class-wide relief, the district
court correctly concluded that no basis existed for it to
exercise its discretion to allow Appellants to opt out.
Additionally, we reject Appellants’ assertion that the
requisites of Rule 23(a) have not been met here. As discussed
above, the district court confirmed class certification in its
final judgment. Aside from their allegation of inadequate
representation, Appellants do not specify why——after nearly
thirty years of litigation——they now feel that class
certification was improper in this case. Further, Appellants’
inadequate-representation argument fails in this context for the
same reason that this contention did not cause us to reverse the
district court’s approval of the settlement: Appellants provide
nothing to contradict the district court’s finding that class
counsel and Congressman Thompson adequately represented the
Private-Plaintiff class.
Finally, Appellants’ contentions based on Erie and the First
Amendment lack merit. First, this is not a diversity case; thus,
Erie is inapplicable. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.” (emphasis
42
added)). Moreover, Erie does not affect the application of a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, such as Rule 23, in federal
court. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (“The Erie
rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule.”). Second,
Appellants provide no authority for the proposition that denying
them the right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(2) class violates the
First Amendment.
Appellants fail to articulate a viable ground for opting out
of the class. Consequently, we hold that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion.
C. Attorneys’ Fees
Finally, Mr. Chambliss asserts that he is not bound by the
provision for attorneys’ fees in the settlement agreement. He
insists that he is entitled to have his fee determined by the
district court. Further, he claims that he should be compensated
at the same level as the lawyers who represented Mississippi in
its tobacco litigation.
Mr. Chambliss’s contention lacks merit. First, to the
extent that Mr. Chambliss challenges the distribution of the sum
provided in the settlement agreement for attorneys’ fees, there
is no order for us to review because the district court has yet
to rule on the allocation of the attorneys’-fees money.31
31
The district court directed the Private Plaintiffs’
attorneys to agree on the allocation of the funds provided in the
agreement for attorneys’ fees, or the court stated that it would
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Second, if one reads Appellants’ brief as arguing that the
settlement agreement should not have been approved because the
provision for attorneys’ fees was improper, that contention is
unavailing, as explained above. Third, Mr. Chambliss provides no
authority for the proposition that he should be allowed to file a
subsequent claim for attorneys’ fees when the district court has
approved a settlement that contains an agreement as to fees. The
preferred view seems to be that a claim for attorneys’ fees in a
civil-rights action, which is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b),
is a single claim possessed by the client. See Evans, 475 U.S.
at 730 & n.19; Richards v. Reed,
611 F.2d 545, 546 & n.2 (5th
Cir. 1980). Here, the parties settled the class’s attorneys’-
fees claim along with the rest of this case. We therefore reject
Mr. Chambliss’s assertion that he is entitled to proceed
separately regarding attorneys’ fees. Further, until the
district court approves an allocation of the funds provided in
the settlement agreement for attorneys’ fees, we cannot review
whether Mr. Chambliss has received an appropriate share.
IV. Conclusion
determine the allocation. Class counsel has proposed a division
of the funds, which was negotiated and agreed to by five of the
six lawyers and firms that have represented the Private-Plaintiff
class. Only Mr. Chambliss neither participated in the
discussions nor approved class counsel’s proposal, even though he
was repeatedly invited to participate in the negotiations.
Nevertheless, the proposed division includes a significant share
for Mr. Chambliss. It does not appear from the record that the
district court has ruled on the proposed allocation.
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Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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